Sunday, September 24th, 2017

Hacktivists and Whistleblowers – an Emerging Hybrid Threat?

Author:       Filed under: Emerging threats

Tags: , , ,

 Download this document in .pdf

Introduction

In the past two years cyber security became a centre of security policy strategies on both sides of Atlantic. We witnessed the use of sophisticated cyber weapons such as Stuxnet and Flame as well as various serious hacking attacks on US military which all had alleged state sponsorship. Wikileaks continued to publish high profile series of redacted classified materials connected to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Guantanamo prison and US diplomatic cables.  In 2012, Wikileaks for the first time launched a direct cooperation with the hactivist network Anonymous, and exposed an entire and non-redacted email communication of the private intelligence firm Stratfor. A Similar attack by Anonymous against another private security contractor, HBGarry, occurred in early 2011.

This contribution aims to examine an increasing impact of hactivists and whistleblower organisations on international relations from the soft security perspective. Defence community was for years too preoccupied analysing the possibility of cyber warfare by state-sponsored actors, and didn’t dedicate enough attention to mitigating threats stemming from non-state actors with activist or organised crime affiliations. Various hacking operations conducted by Anonymous and its spinoffs, and the unravelling story of Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange, are well documented by technology journalists on a daily basis. Instead of enumerating them, this paper will try to analyse this dynamic phenomenon of whistleblower organisations and hacktivist collectives and put it in a larger context of global push for open data in politics and the emerging concept of so-called “big data” and gamification.

The emerging nexus of whistleblower and hactivist organisations should be regarded with caution, but instead of labelling them criminals or terrorists, the security community should study their motives and direct their attention to the fight against organized crime, terrorists and autocrats. In order to better allocate the shrinking defence and security budgets it is necessary to distinguish a few ill-minded and potentially dangerous hackers from e.g. hactivists who played a constructive role in providing technical support for the dissent in the events of Arab Awakening in 2011 and for example tried to challenge the Los Zetas Cartel in Mexico. Therefore the narrative against hactivists should be carefully crafted, in order not to further alienate the young people who support internet freedom and could be at times beneficial to the soft security environment.

Background of the phenomenon

In the recent Security Jam 2012 organized by SDA with an aim to provide recommendations for the NATO Chicago Summit, a heated debate about so-called hybrid threats took place. During the discussion, Roy Hunstok, from NATO Allied Command Transformation noted that NATO “needs to develop a doctrine for understanding the complex challenges raised by groups such as Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, hacking groups such as Anonymous or global terrorist networks with no clear command structure” (Dowdall, 2012, p. 39).

The author of this contribution advocated during the Security Jam a need for a different unifying narrative which would treat e.g. terrorists and organized criminals as one joint threat, and thus change the present counterproductive narrative of so-called Culture Clash, where terrorists are disproportionally reflected and other hybrid threats such as transnational organized criminal networks aren’t sufficiently challenged. This notion was opposed by some “jammers’’ who argued that organized crime has economic aims whereas terrorists have ideological ones. But also terrorists use organised criminal structures and methods to finance their activities and criminals use terror to intimidate. And criminals often use anti-state ideology to market themselves and both groups have certain characteristics of fearless destructive and inhumane behaviour which has a single purpose to achieve a certain goal without considering individuals they affect. On the contrary, most hacktivists embody a different culture with values focused on freedom of expression, human rights and internet neutrality.  Many tend to have leftist views and despise Big Business, privacy violations, overuse of intellectual property and classified materials.

It is a mistake to view current hybrid actors in terms of their respective organisations and some defined structures. Anonymous is more of a brand, a label than an organisation. We tend to think of these organizations as some hierarchical structures with a certain central leadership. It is true that even in these types of loose collectives not everybody is equal. Some people are administrators of the IRCs (internet relay chats). But a 16 year old boy from Hague who was arrested after Anonymous in the Operation Payback targeted financial institutions, such as Visa and Mastercard with Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks after they refused to service Wikileaks payments, can be hardly viewed as one of the group’s leaders.

The origin of the hactivist phenomenon can be found in the 1984 novel Neuromancer by William Gibson, where he writes about groups of young nihilistic terrorists engaged in quick attacks facilitated by the “cyberspace,” a term he coined. A decade later he described an organization called the Republic of Desire where internet-savvy users conducted pranks for amusement, and sometimes ideological reasons. Actually during the 1994 Zapatista revolution of EZLN in the Mexican state of Chiapas online activists from around the globe attacked various governments, corporations and the WTO in the act of digital civil disobedience and for the support of the rising anti-globalization movement. Similarly, Anonymous rose to public knowledge around the same time as the Occupy Wall Street movement and the whistleblower site Wikileaks.

Both Wikileaks and Anonymous were formed around 2006 but got the global news coverage only in 2010 after Wikileaks published high profile series of leaks connected to wars in Iraq and Afganistan and later US diplomatic cables and after Anonymous launched various DDoS attacks in Wikileaks’ defence.

Since then, both organisations worked in support of each other, tensions would arise only after Anonymous announcement of its own whistleblowing publisher, Par:AnoIA that was established in March 2012. Wikileaks attacked the new competition as unreliable and without adequate protection for the sources (Norton, 2012). On the other hand Anonymous considered Wikileaks as largely defunct due to continuous prosecution of Julian Assange, who was under house arrest in UK on rape allegations in Sweden and fought extradition.

Analysing Anonymous

According to Barrett Brown, the ousted unofficial spokesman of Anonymous, the inner circle of Anonymous has only few dozen members. He sees the collective as a force for good with only 10 percent of members having the goal of just creating pranks on corporations and government and opposing the “the armchair protesting” and moral dimension of activism (Rogers, 2011).

Oxblood Ruffin from the Munich-based Cult of the Dead Cow, one of the oldest hacker organizations that coined the term “hactivism” says: “Hacktivism by our definition has certain rules – if you don’t follow those rules then you’re often committing a crime.” He thinks that “21st-century hackers have a responsibility to safeguard the independence and openness of the Internet” (Luman, 2007).

According to Jeremy Hammond, long-time anti-globalization activist and an arrested member of Anonymous’ spinoff LulzSec that went on a 50 day hacking spree in the summer of 2011, “anything a traditional protester can do-from sit-ins, to graffiti, to general civil disobedience-can be done online.” Hammond was arrested on 5 March, 2012 in connection with December 2011 hacking of security firm Stratfor after being ousted by a cooperating FBI witness Hector “Sabu” Monsegur.

Anonymous first formed around a popular image-based bulletin board 4chan.org and its first targets of DDoS attacks, leaks and humiliations were for example Scientologists[s1]  for their aggressive stance against opponents and abusive techniques. That is a shared similarity with a whistleblower publisher Wikileaks. The main strength of Anonymous is its largely flat, fluid and democratic “structure.” It differs from cyber criminals that use botnets of infected zombie computers for attacks as Anonymous supporters voluntarily rent their computers for DDoS attacks by downloading so-called LOIC program that Anonymous developed. Nevertheless, Parmy Olson in her book wrote that contrary to the media reports at the time of the attacks against financial institutions such as PayPal, Mastercard and Visa, the “LOIC volunteers” accounted only for 10% of the firepower and the rest were 2 to 5 botnets rented by 3 hackers whose main aim was to show off their power.  That undermines the reputation of the Anons, as a collective with a broad volunteer base and shows a rather different picture where few elite hackers with their large botnets accounted for the success of the most famous DDoS attacks (Olson, 2012).

In 2011 Anonymous focused on supporting the Arab Awakening and provided dissidents in Tunisia and Egypt with means of secure communication and manuals, and helped with organizing protests on Twitter and Facebook, as well as launched various DDoS attacks on Middle East governments.

A notable event was a hack of the security company HBGarry and its subsidiary HBGarry Federal by a group of elite hackers who later formed an Anonymous spinoff called LulzSec.  In February 2011, the Financial Times made an interview with Aaron Barr, the HBGarry Federal CEO, where he announced his plan to identify Anonymous members at an upcoming security conference. Shortly after, the group stole all emails from HBGarry using a phishing attack and hacked the company’s webpage and even Barr’s personal Twitter account. HBGarry Federal with other two companies tried to win a business contract for two clients who wished to launch a media campaign against leftist activists and Wikileaks. But as a result of the Anonymous attack the company went bankrupt.

Some of the thousands of stolen emails were discussing various surveillance technology products that were marketed also to Middle Eastern autocrats and Anonymous later focused on exposing what they dubbed a “cyber-industrial complex” of private intelligence contractors and security companies[s2] [LU3] .

Interestingly, the biggest challenge for Anonymous with its Par:AnoIA project, and Wikileaks is not acquiring the confidential documents either through whistle-blowers or via hacking. Far more complicated is to analyse those documents and produce some relevant story that could catch the media attention. Wikileaks relied on its media partners for analysing Iraq and Afganistan war logs and US Diplomatic cables, but the cooperation later deteriorated. Anonymous with its Par:AnoIA, Anonymous Analytics and a project of ex-member Barrett Brown called Panthers Modern rely on the help of volunteers to make sense of the large data dumps. But as of September 2012 Anonymous haven’t yet developed a search tool for its HBGarry emails collection. It is far easier to make news with hacking of major government or corporate targets, but analysing the stolen information seems to be almost an impossible challenge for the hacktivist groups. This creates an opportunity for various corporate, criminal and state actors to fill the void and analyse the leaked information. Thus, the idea of citizens effectively opening up their governments remains largely an ideal for now. The various groups of more elite hackers who stemmed from Anonymous in 2011 and continuous infighting in the collective, damaged its image of human rights activists who supported the Arab Awakening.

      Characteristics of Anonymous:

  • More brand than a structure
  • Liberal values and anarchistic tendencies – Freedom of speech and internet, anti-war sentiments, fight against privacy violations, big corporations, autocrats, organized crime. A rule not to attack media is observed.
  • Use of gamification – game-like elements in their actions and communication
  • Strong use of social media like Twitter and communication in IRC chat rooms
  • Strength: no leadership and appeal to young  people in their teens and twenties
  • Weakness: actions of hackers from various fractions beyond activism damage the brand of freedom fighters
  • Most of the members are volunteers who support the group through social media and let their computers be part of the LOIC botnet
  • Only few dozens of core members who are IRC chat operators have powers to decide on the DDoS attack target and can control the LOIC botnet
  • Since 2011 a strong support of Arab Awakening
  • Since 2011 infighting and retribution attacks in the group occurred and various fractions were formed which later damaged the Anonymous reputation of pro-democracy activists
  • Most damaging hacks – stolen emails of HBGarry and Stratfor, both security companies
  • Two public faces and unofficial spokesmen Barrett Brown and Gregg Housh left Anonymous in summer 2011 after LulzSec started attacking corporations like Sony without any meaningful cause similar to Arab Awakening. Brown continues with his own project Panthers Modern that tries to bring in volunteers to crowdsource the analysis of data on “cyber-industrial complex” of security companies.
  • Members of LulzSec, who went on a 50 day hacking spree in 2011 face charges by FBI
  • Since 2011 more than 230 Anonymous-related arrests occurred, many for the voluntary use of their botnet called “LOIC”, none in the CEE

Affiliated spinoffs of Anonymous:

Anonymous Analytics – focused on “short-selling reports” that discover fraud in corporations, so far three reports produced, Chinese food corporation Huabao International went bankrupt in the spring of 2012 as a result (Fish, 2012).

Par:AnoIA – an attempt similar to previous unsuccessful one time operation OpLeakspin to establish a platform for crowdsourced analysis of leaked information and a competition to Wikileaks

LulzSec, AntiSec – teams of hackers with advanced capabilities

The bigger picture of whistle-blower publishers

Julian Assange was in his teens in a three member hacking group called International Subversives that would get convicted in Australia for hacking telecom companies, among others also military targets, in the late eighties. They were inspired by crypto-anarchist manifesto by Timothy C. May and a movement that wanted to secure the freedom from the state on the internet by means of encryption (May, 1992). They were penetrating corporate networks just for the enjoyment and as a challenge. His family lived a nomadic life and often moved across Australia. After[s4]  he was sentenced to pay a hefty fine, he established a small company, securing corporate networks against cyber attacks. He would later continue to pursue similar lifestyle of his activist parents but on a global level. Julian Assange created Wikileaks in 2006 with the aim to uncover secrets of corrupt regimes and corporations. He first contemplated setting office in Nairobi as Kenya was first country Wikileaks reported on, publishing a secret report of the vast corruption of Daniel arap Moi’s authoritarian regime. Julian Assange was experienced in cryptography and devised a unique way to anonymize his sources. He saw that the report made instant news back in Kenya after it appeared in Western press as Kenyan newspapers were confident to cover what was before considered a public secret (Assange, 2011). Over the years Wikileaks published secrets on The Church of Scientology, private bank Julius Baer, US military purchases, Battle of Falluja, Guantanamo prison manuals and Malaysian politics.

Wikileaks received global press coverage in 2010 after he set base in Iceland, a country that begun to champion journalistic freedoms, where he started to focus on US and NATO interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. His team produced a video from a classified military footage of a helicopter that accidentally killed a group of civilians, including two Reuters reporters they have mistaken for militants. He named the video “Collateral Murder” and wanted it to showcase the cruelty of modern warfare. Thus Wikileaks made a shift from more-less neutral whistle-blower publisher to an anti-war activist organization. He used to face opposition and threats from lawyers for his previous leaks, but this time he faced the anger of US Administration of Barack Obama. Later he published thousands of leaked military field reports that Wikileaks named Afghan War Logs and Iraqi War Diaries. These reports depicted the daily lives of soldiers during both wars and brought new revelations that increased the number of civil casualties and showed that US soldiers knew about the rampant abuse of arrested militants by Iraqi forces. The biggest furry of US Administration was caused by the release of secret diplomatic cables, the communication of US Embassies around the world. All three major releases were published in coordination with big Western newspapers that analyzed the leaks for interesting stories that they could follow and redacted the content for sensitive information like the names of dissidents. But later on, the relationship with media partners frayed over various disputes, and at one point Wikileaks released the whole cache of unredacted cables. The information about corrupted autocrats form the Middle East, that the cables revealed, helped to spark the Arab awakening in Tunisia and Egypt.

All three US related leaks had one alleged source – a young US military analyst Bradley Manning[s5]  who was later arrested after he contacted a hacker, who he found online as financial contributor of Wikileaks and therefore he trusted him and consulted with him his actions (Singel, 2009). The hacker tipped him later to FBI. Manning wasn’t exposed because of the security flaw on the side of Wikileaks. But a string of human errors that made the list of Wikileaks’ supporters public and later made Manning trust the hacker, proved that technology alone cannot promise anonymity for whistle-blowers. After the so-called CableGate US Administration was trying to establish a case against Assange, whom they suspected of directly collaborating with his source, Manning. Previously a long-term Wikileaks member Daniel Domscheit-Berg split with Julian Assange as he disagreed with the high profile leaks and ideologization of Wikileaks and established his own publisher OpenLeaks. As was previously mentioned, Anonymous attacked financial institutions that refused to process contributions to Wikileaks after the 2010 releases and later when Assange was sought by Swedish authorities on sexual assault allegations, they attacked also various websites of Swedish government. The DDoS attacks were supported by hackers with 2-5 botnets of tens of thousands of hijacked computers. A voluntary Anonymous’ botnet called LOIC wouldn’t be effective according to Parmy Olson’s recent book (Olson, 2012, p. 120). After the Anonymous actions in support of Wikileaks around 230 people were arrested since 2011. Majority of attackers came from USA. The second biggest number was from Germany, but interestingly no arrest was made as German authorities have different approach to cyber-policing (Paget, 2011).

Throughout 2011 the support of Anonymous for Wikileaks intensified, with operation OpLeakspin that was supposed to crowdsource the analysis of published secret files but failed to attract enough contributors. The cooperation culminated with the theft of emails of the security and private intelligence company Stratfor that Anonymous’ spinoff LulzSec submitted to Wikileaks for publishing. The leaked emails didn’t bring major revelations, only showed relationships of Stratfor sources to official diplomats and brought evidence of activist profiling. But since HBGarry and Stratfor hacks, Anonymous and other hacker groups like Telecomix with their Blue Cabinet documentation project and Panthers Modern focused on revealing the “cyber-industrial complex” of private security companies. They found out that often those companies market their products also to autocratic governments and thus help to prosecute dissent and sometimes violate sanctions, even if indirectly through e.g. Dubai resellers (Greenberg, 2011).

In the summer 2012 the relationship between Anonymous and Wikileaks deteriorated as Julian Assange attacked the competitor Par:AnoIA for insufficient whistle-blower protection. Later even Wikileaks itself became a victim of a DDoS attack.

Wikileaks with similar outfits like OpenLeaks, Par:AnoIA, privateintelligence.org, and others are part of an on-going effort by more mainstream actors such as NGOs, activists and researchers who promote higher transparency in both public and private sectors. Organizations like Transparency International and Sunlight Foundation champion the notion of Open Government and both civil society and private sector promote the use of open data, which are easily searchable, comparable and provide a source for analysis and visualisations. But activists are lagging behind corporations in the ability to analyze big data sets. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter are essentially Big Data companies and corporations like Google and IBM and have various powerful tools to crunch big volumes of data in real time and make use of them in combination with their robust Business Intelligence tools. Some Anonymous members could have advanced hacking capabilities but they lack the expensive software and seem unable to find enough volunteers to process the leaked data, analyse and visualize them and make news stories in the same quality as traditional media.

Characteristics of Wikileaks:

  • Also more brand than a structure, founded  and controlled by Julian Assange
  • Positions itself as a vanguard investigative publisher, less “corrupt than old media”
  • Liberal values: strong anti-secrecy and anti-war sentiments
  • Abstract mission of fighting for “truth and justice”
  • Was able to create strong media partnerships, but later alienated newspapers such as Guardian and New York Times
  • Strength: anonymization know-how and tools for  whistle-blowers
  • Weakness: Controlled by a single person – Julian Assange who has a strong personality and currently faces extradition to Sweden on sexual assault allegations

Examples of visualising data from War Logs published by Wikileaks:

(available in .pdf)

Implications and recommendations for security community

Due to on-going economic crisis, both military and law enforcement budgets are shrinking and young people in the West face an increased risk of unemployment and social unrest. Therefore a narrative for approaching digital activism needs to be carefully crafted without general assumptions and labelling. Phenomena like Anonymous cannot be regarded as uniform structured organizations. They are rather just brands or symbols that provide lowest common denominators for different actors with various motivations. Some supporters might have pure motives of fighting for freedom of speech and supporting dissent in oppressed regimes. Others might use the collective to showcase their hacking skills and pursue illicit goals. People like Barrett Brown, the ousted unofficial ex-spokesman of Anonymous didn’t hesitate to face powerful Mexican Los Zetas Cartel and called for an operation that would reveal secrets of its members to illuminate the on-going drug wars. Other hackers used the opportunity of DDoS attacks on financial institutions to showcase the power of their own botnets of hijacked computers.

Therefore a sensitive soft security approach is needed in order not to alienate the majority of activists who pursue democratic values and don’t engage in explicit criminal activities. In the United States DDoS attacks are illegal, but other countries view such voluntary protests merely as virtual sit-ins that occupy certain webpage for a limited time and thus draw attention to a particular cause. Modern hactivists equipped with social media prowess and digital skills are able to launch effective “swarming strategies” that engage an adversary on various fronts and from all angles and employ myriad of different actors and tools to achieve the chosen objective. Rand Corporation anticipated and described this process of modern warfare strategies in their 2003 paper called Swarming & The Future of Conflict[s6]  (RAND, 2003). Therefore, NATO should develop its own media doctrine for dealing with future leaks of classified documents and instead of demonizing the whistle-blowers, it should seek a way to acknowledge possible mistakes and minimize the damage through some proactive communication and search for a common ground and principles.

Young hackers should be sensitized to take responsibility for redacting the information that could be dangerous for e.g. dissidents in oppressed regimes or misused by organized crime. A framework of European Council Convention on Cybercrime should be taken into account and cybercrimes should be assessed against the financial damage they caused (RAND, 2012, p. 43). As mentioned previously, a new united narrative could tone-down the ideological dimension of various adversaries and drum up the organized crime elements of the enemies that fall under the notion of non-state hybrid threats. In this way one doesn’t get punished or ostracized for the expression of more radical political thoughts, but only the groups of individuals that engage in organized law breaking and violence would be singled out and punished. NATO should design its own channels for whistle-blowers, who would otherwise fear to expose the misconduct of their superiors and fellow soldiers. The already rampant over-classification hinders investigations and terrorism prevention and should be reduced, not reinforced (Gallagher, 2012). There are 845 thousand people with top secret clearances in the USA alone (Shachtman, 2012). A third of them are private contractors. Therefore it is impossible to prevent future leaks of government secrets with proactive measures. During the recent Security Jam 2012 that produced recommendations for NATO Chicago Summit an idea to recruit “white hat” (defence) hackers was mentioned (Dowdall, 2012, p. 21). Nevertheless, the more data are leaked, the less they mean. Instead, a more sensitive and focused soft security approach is needed as a reactive measure in the post-leak communication. Also a support of education and ICT infrastructure e.g. in Afghanistan can help to increase the soft security and image of the Alliance towards young people.

Social media play an increasing role in our daily lives and the security community needs to clearly define its approach and policies in the new field of SOCMINT in order to balance the privacy concerns with the crime prevention and ensure that private security companies follow the same guidelines (Demos, 2012, p. 56). The similar applies to various security software products and their export to rogue regimes.

Hactivists have their origin in the cyberpunk literature of the 80’s and Anonymous may partially resemble the symbolic of postmodern Zapatista revolution of 1994 and[s7]  draw on the anti-globalisation and recent Occupy movements. Instead of looking at a unified group one should see individuals with various skills, beliefs and motives. A force that has the potential to move towards a direction of a new generation of NGOs and civil society but also can backtrack towards chaos and sometimes childish irresponsible pranks at the expense of governments and corporations.

Resources:

Assange, J. (2011). Julian Assange: The Unauthorized Autobiography. Edinburgh: Canongate Books.

Demos. (2012). #Inteligence. Eidhoven: Lecturis.

Dowdall, J. (2012). A Security & Defence Agenda report. Bussels: Geert Cami.

Fish, I. S. (2012, April 26). Financial (Secret) Services. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Foreign Policy: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/26/financial_secret_services

Gallagher, S. (2012, July 31). How FBI technology woes let Fort Hood shooter slip by. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Technology Lab: http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/07/how-fbi-technology-woes-let-fort-hood-shooter-slip-by/2/

Greenberg, A. (2011, December 26). Meet Telecomix, The Hackers Bent On Exposing Those Who Censor And Surveil The Internet. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Forbes: http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/12/26/meet-telecomix-the-hackers-bent-on-exposing-those-who-censor-and-surveil-the-internet/

Luman, S. (2007, July). chicagomag.com. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/July-2007/The-Hacktivist/index.php?cparticle=2&siarticle=1#artanc

Norton, Q. (2012, July 13). Par:AnoIA: Anonymous Launches WikiLeaks-esque Site for Data Dumps. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Threat Level: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/paranoia-anonymous/

Olson, P. (2012). We Are Anonymous. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Paget, F. (2011, October 21). The Rise and Fall of Anonymous. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from McAffee Labs: http://blogs.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/the-rise-and-fall-of-anonymous

RAND. (2012). Feasibility Study for a European Cybercrime Centre. Santa Monica: RAND.

RAND. (2003). Swarming – The Future of Conflict. Washington: RAND.

Rogers, T. (2011, March 23). D Magazine. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from http://www.dmagazine.com/Home/D_Magazine/2011/April/How_Barrett_Brown_Helped_Overthrow_the_Government_of_Tunisia.aspx?page=2

Shachtman, N. (2012, August 12). Trapwire: It’s Not the Surveillance, It’s the Sleaze. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Danger Room: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/trapwire-strafor-biz/all/

Singel, R. (2009, February 18). Wikileaks Forced to Leak Its Own Secret Info — Update. Retrieved September 8, 2012, from Threat Level: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/02/wikileaks-force/


 [s1]Myslim, ze by bolo dobre spomenut, ze anonymny odpor prebrali ludia okolo 4chan pre velmi agresivne postupi scientologov proti svojim oponentom. Stalking, narusanie sukromia, psychycky natlak cez sukromie a blyzke osoby.

 [s2]Bolo by vhodne spomenut aktivitu blue cabinet, ktora sa hlavne zameriava na informacie IT, ktore pomahaju autoritativnym rezimom kontrolovat internet.

 [LU3]Na 9tej strane spominam Telecomix, pridal som zmienku o Blue Cabinet

 [s4]Velmi podstatne na dokreslenie obrazu AS a vobec hnutia haktivistov by bolo spomenut kryptoanarchysticky manifest.

 [s5]Toto je silne tvrdenie, kedze sa stale nepriznal ze je povodca. Navrhoval pouzit dovodne podozrivy, alebo podorzrivy

 [s6]Swarming & The Future of Conflict

 [s7]Opat by som spomenul kryptoanarchysticky manifest

 

Šimek, Jakub , 2012, Hacktivists and Whistleblowers – an Emerging Hybrid Threat? In: Majer, M. – Ondrejcsák, R. – Tarasovič, V. (eds.): Panorama of global security environment 2012. Bratislava: CENAA, pp. 663-679.

This analysis was written by

Šimek Jakub – who has on this site

Jakub Šimek (1984) has a master’s degree in international relations from University of Economics in Bratislava and since 2010 works as a program coordinator for Kenyan projects focused on ICT for development at Pontis Foundation. Between years 2007 – 2011 he has worked as a financial reporting specialist for international projects of the foundation. He writes articles and blog on international relations, organized crime, security and development issues.