

Marian Majer (ed.)

Security Sector Reform in Countries of Visegrad and Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities

Bratislava 2013

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA)



Supported by

-
- Visegrad Fund
-

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs
Bratislava 2013

With support of participating organizations:

Center for Strategic Analysis (Armenia)

Center for Strategic Studies (Azerbaijan)

Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (Georgia)

Institute for International Relations (Czech Republic)

Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (Hungary)

Polish Institute for International Relations (Poland)

Editor:

Majer, Marian

Authors:

Ditrych, Ondřej

Górka-Winter, Beáta

Kalo, Otto

Majer, Marian

Makili-Aliyev, Kamal

Novikova, Gayane

Pkhaladze, Tengiz

Rácz, András

Rondeli, Alexander

Sargsyan, Sergey

Střítecký, Vít

Cover:

Marek Zahustel

Proofreading:

Marek Šťastný

Printed by:

KO&KA, www.k-print.sk

All rights reserved. Any reproduction or copying of this work is allowed only with the permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978-80-971124-2-4

CONTENTS:

Preface	04
Chapter 1: Armenia	07
Gayane Novikova, Sergey Sargsyan	
Chapter 2: Azerbaijan	23
Kamal Makili-Aliyev	
Chapter 3: Georgia	35
Tengiz Pkhaladze, Alexander Rondeli	
Chapter 4: Czech Republic	55
Vít Střítecký, Ondrej Ditrych	
Chapter 5: Hungary	69
András Rácz, Otto Kalo	
Chapter 6: Poland	83
Beata Górka-Winter	
Chapter 7: Slovakia	99
Marian Majer	
About the authors	114
About CENAA	117

Preface

We are presenting to you the first international publication issued within a framework of the project “Security Sector Reform in South Caucasus.” The Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) became a leading institution of Security Sector Reform in South Caucasus by coordinating research and events of V4 experts and organizations from Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The first phase of the project which took place from October 2012 to October 2013 was based on three key pillars: stabilization, cooperation and transition and focused on three inter-linked factors: First, institutional and personal capabilities-building of participating countries in the field of SSR; Second, use and adaptation of Central European experiences in the field of security sector reform; Third, enhancing cooperation and professional network-building between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the first phase, researchers from V4 countries visited Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and later into the project, South Caucasian expert group visited Central Europe. They conducted research and consultations with representatives from academia and think-tanks, as well as high-level representatives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.

As a part of the project CENAA organized three international conferences: in Bratislava, Warsaw and Tbilisi. This publication is one of the most important outputs of our joint international research. It includes analysis of current status of the security sector reform and the main challenges and future prospects in the Central European as well as the three South Caucasian countries.

It is necessary to note that the end of the first phase does not conclude CENAA’s and its partners’ efforts in the South Caucasus. The opposite is the truth: in the years to come we are planning to intensify the dynamics of our activities. One of the most important challenges is to elaborate tailor-made action plans for each South Caucasian country in the field of SSR. Besides analyzing the current challenges we have the ambition to set up a detailed plan of the Security Sector Reform, complete with proposed changes and reforms, timetables and schedules. As a result each participating country will have a tailor-made manual on how to conduct SSR and the main challenges to address.

In addition to the above-mentioned plans we would like to broaden our research from Central European level to wider European framework, including policy recommendations for V4 group on how to influence the drafting and shaping of foreign and security policies at the European level. We also included to the framework of the project other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly Ukraine.

South Caucasus Security Forum is the most important event to be organized within a framework of our project. Our ambition is to create an annual high-level security conference which will cover not only the South Caucasian region, but also the neighbouring regions

including the Black Sea region, as well as most important countries (Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Russia, etc.) and institutions (NATO, European Union) involved in the security complex of South Caucasus. Our goal is to establish South Caucasus Security Forum as a leading regional conference to bring together decision-, policy makers, think-tank and academia representatives, the business community and journalists.

In closing, allow me to express our gratitude to the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) for the generous support as well as to researchers and representatives of partner institutions (listed in the opening of this publication). This work would remain only a dream, not a reality without their pro-active approach and professional support.

Dr. Robert Ondrejcsák

Director

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA)

Chapter 1: ARMENIA

Gayane Novikova, Sergey Sargsyan

Security sector reforms (SSR) and its governance were among the new challenges for the newly independent states of the post-Soviet space, including those in the South Caucasus. After 70 years of strong control by a totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regime with powerful security forces, especially the KGB, the three newly-independent countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – faced many serious and unexpected problems at the very beginning of the 1990s. Some still constitute challenges to the internal stability of the state entities and provide fertile ground for regional instability.

Reforms in the security sector can contribute to improvement of the security environment in the South Caucasus. However, the successful implementation of these reforms requires shared efforts of the state and society at large. Furthermore, the depth and success of SSR mainly depends upon two factors: the security environment and democratization. In the case of all three South Caucasus states, the security environment plays a critical role and directly influences the level of democratization in each state.

Shifts in the South Caucasus' Security System and Challenges for the Main Regional Actors

The security system of the South Caucasus has changed significantly over the past five years. Several causes are apparent. Through the prism of the analysis of the current stage of SSR, the following factors must be mentioned:

- A sharp shift in the period August-September of 2008, when Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia transformed these two non-recognized *de facto* states into *de jure* semi-recognized states. In parallel with this, the tensions in the area of Nagorno Karabakh conflict increased.
- Russia remains the main regional power in the South Caucasus. It is making serious efforts to integrate the South Caucasus (as well as some other parts of the post-Soviet area) into its global economic projects, above all into the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union.
- There is an apparent trend toward even greater militarization in the South Caucasus; the unresolved conflicts in this area are substantially contributing to an arms race. The military presence of Russia is increasing in Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and the supply of Russian arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan is growing. The latter has intensified its military cooperation with Israel. The U.S. military presence in Georgia and Azerbaijan is also gradually growing.
- The Western European states and the USA are exhibiting a decreasing interest in the South Caucasus. In particular, several internal and external factors have objectively

contributed to the reduction of U.S. attention to this region. For the United States, the South Caucasus is of strategic interest in terms of its proximity to the Middle East and to Iran, in particular. In this regard enhanced stability throughout the South Caucasus area is a priority. However, internal political developments in the three internationally recognized states in the South Caucasus have produced disappointment in U.S. political circles. Moreover, the dynamics of the regional conflicts leave little room for optimism. Thus, realizing the growing conflict potential of the South Caucasus, including the threat of a resumption of a military confrontation in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh, the United States will cooperate – at least in the mid-term perspective – only at a low intensity level with all the states in the region.

- NATO has begun to conduct a more careful and balanced policy in the South Caucasus, above all in regard to Georgia's membership. In spite of the fact that the new Georgian government clearly announced and confirmed that membership in NATO and the EU remain priorities, the U.S. and other NATO and EU member states are becoming, in discussions on this issue, less enthusiastic. Thus, it is likely that the period of intensive lobbying for Georgia's NATO membership is over. The North Atlantic Alliance has declared that it has no intention to be involved either in peace-managing and peace-keeping processes or in the resolution of the South Caucasus conflicts. However, the Alliance is ready to develop partner relations with all recognized states and to participate in post-conflict rehabilitation in the region.
- In the European security strategy the South Caucasus is increasingly handed over to Central European surveillance: In some spheres, including the SSR and SSG (security sector governance), the experiences of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary can be transformed, and or implemented, in other states.

Furthermore, in comparison to the previous five-year period, internal developments in each state and state entity of the South Caucasus increasingly impact the joint – regional – security system. The overlapping of internal and external processes ambiguously influences the dynamics of the region's security and the developments of each state in the South Caucasus.

Owing to this very fragile security and stability environment, the role of the security sector is growing. Moreover, the effectiveness of necessary reforms in the security sector directly depends upon the system of governance of the state, the role of constitutionally established executive authorities, their interaction with each other, the level of responsibility of the state institutions, and upon their interaction with the respective societies, including their relationship to their non-governmental organizations.¹ And, of course, the effectiveness of security sector reforms depends upon the respective education and training.

¹ According to the Armenia-NATO IPAP, among the specific national measures is mentioned the following: "Through close cooperation between MOD, Parliament and the Public Council and NGOs in the field, ensure active engagement of the Civil Society in the effective implementation of Defense reforms with appropriate assistance from NATO. Further development of role of Public Council is needed.

Among the challenges faced by the South Caucasus states it is worth mentioning the involvement of the three states in ethno-political conflicts that have seriously affected – and still influence – their internal and external security. These unresolved conflicts retain an explosive potential, inhibit the creation of a common economic space, and preclude the establishment of an effective security system. Owing to the different perceptions upon conflict resolution by each party to the conflict, there is an absence of any perspective for regional cooperation even in the long term. In light of the current circumstances and the extant dynamics inside and beyond the region, broad democratic reforms cannot be expected.

The second common challenge to the South Caucasus states is related to the different levels of democratization and freedoms, as well as the speed and depth of democratic transformations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. According to the most recent evaluation of the Freedom House (2013 Freedom in the World, 2013) and other independent organizations, Georgia and Armenia are considered partly-free countries. Azerbaijan is listed as a non-free country.

The third challenge is rooted in the existence of different types of security systems in the region. Armenia is a member of CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), and in the meantime has strategic partnership with NATO; Georgia does not hide its desire to become a NATO member, and has the most advanced – of the three Caucasus states – relations with the North Atlantic Alliance. Azerbaijan has the same level of interaction with NATO as Armenia, and uses the Turkish Army as a model.

A fourth challenging piece of the “South Caucasus puzzle” is the mutually-exclusive strategic interests of the regional states, on the one hand, and the complete interdependence of their security systems and on the other. This has unfortunately a negative manifestation resulting in the absence of confidence between the states and the societies involved.

Hence, these factors – different goals and diversified and often mutually exclusive visions of the security environment by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, the level of their democratization, the model of providing security, and the absence of confidence between the main actors of this area – strongly influence the development of a sustainable, homogenous regional security system. Therefore, the intensity and effectiveness of security sector reforms in each state is also influenced.

Armenia’s Security Threats Perceptions

Independent Armenia proclaimed the creation of a democratic state as its main priority, although its citizens had only vague idea about democracy in general and the specific model to be adopted in particular. Currently Armenia undoubtedly follows this initial aspiration as it now attempts to merge democratic transformation with its urgent security needs. However, amid democratization and broad reforms, Armenia finds itself in a very delicate situation: it must balance its security needs with its desire to implement a complementary foreign policy

and to continue its democratic reforms, including those in the security sector. This is not an easy task, especially in light of current developments in the South Caucasus.

Armenia continues to face significant external and internal security threats. They are identified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of Armenia, adopted in 2007.² The key issue among the several external threats to its national security relates directly to the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict. In this regard, as one of the three parties³ to the conflict, Armenia needs to be ready to withstand any use of force from the Azerbaijani side and to provide strong support to the populations of both Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic. The NSS also identifies the resolution of the blockade of the Armenian border by Turkey as involving the use of force. As a general external threat the use of force significantly influences Armenia's maneuvering room in regard to its participation, or non-participation, in political and military alliances. This point will be addressed in more detail later.

A third external security threat involves ethnic conflicts, internal unrest, and military activities in the neighboring states. Since the Russian-Georgian war in August, 2008, this dimension has increased in salience, especially in regard to current developments in Syria and around Iran. Armenia already faces some problems related to the flow of refugees of Armenian descent from Syria into Armenia.⁴ Furthermore, any military action against Iran also will directly affect the security systems of all state entities in the South Caucasus, especially those of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

As external security threats Armenia's NSS also mentions the disruption of transit through the neighboring states,⁵ the weakening or ineffectiveness of strategic alliances, and terrorism and transnational crime. Armenia's isolation from regional projects and its energy dependence significantly – and negatively – influence the economic growth of the country and affect its internal stability. Economic stagnation is causing growing social dissatisfaction.

Against the background of the external threats, the internal security threats seem at a glance insignificant. However, the political system's fragility, insufficient levels of democratic consolidation, low level of scientific knowledge and education in general, as well as negative demographic trends, all exacerbate the impact of external security threats – and hence, decrease the level of Armenia's immunity and general stability. The developments

² A new version of the National Security Strategy of Armenia is in progress.

³ The unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic is a party to the conflict. Without its direct involvement in the negotiations it is impossible to reach any comprehensive peace agreement.

⁴ According to different data, the number of Syrian refugees in Armenia varies between 3,000 and 10,000; and about 400 refugees of Abkhazian descent fled to Abkhazia.

⁵ In particular, the disruption of transit routes via Georgian territory especially after the August war of 2008 directly influence the economy of Armenia, which significantly depends on supplies from Russia. Thus, any improvement of the Russian-Georgian relations will be beneficial for Armenia. The broad economic sanctions against Iran also pose a direct threat to the Armenian economy.

in Armenia on the occasion of the parliamentary (May 2012) and presidential elections (February 2013) foreshadowed enhanced dissatisfaction and require further democratization and broad, sustained reforms in different spheres of life.

Moreover, the existence of serious external and internal security threats demands active participation of the security structures (the Army, Police, Ministry of Emergency Situations, and National Security Service) to maintain both internal and external security of the Armenian statehood and the Armenian society. The success of their defensive mission depends upon the effectiveness of reforms in the security sector. However, owing to the fact that the SSR covers mainly two realms, the Rule of Law and Democratization, it is obvious that, under current circumstances and against the background of the above-mentioned external threats, significant objective limitations restrict the implementation of the security sector reforms.

The Armenian Army and the Political-Military Balance in the Region

Analyzing two critical documents such as the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, it is obvious that the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict remains the core issue for Armenia's security. Against the background of the above-mentioned external threats, especially those involving the use of force, the role of the army in the Armenian security system is significant. It is not surprising that the prestige of the Army in Armenian society ranks highest among all governmental and non-governmental institutions.

The National Security Strategy of Armenia refers directly to the role of the Armenian army in the context of the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict: "Azerbaijan's militant policy vis-à-vis Nagorno Karabakh and its readiness to opt for the military solution of the problem are direct threats to the security of Armenia. Under such circumstances, Armenia needs to have an army with increased defense capability to guarantee its security. The main priority of the army is to safeguard the inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Armenia and to be the guarantor of the physical safety of the peoples of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh" (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, 2007, p. 10). It should be noted that the defensive role of the army is growing not only because of the unprecedented militaristic rhetoric of Azerbaijani officials, but also because of the accelerated militarization of Azerbaijan.⁶ Armenia is involuntarily involved in an arms race with this neighboring state.⁷

⁶ Azerbaijan is visibly intensifying its military-technical cooperation with Israel. At the end of February, 2012, an agreement in the amount of \$ 1,6 billion was signed between the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the Azerbaijani government. The volume of military contracts with Israel is higher than the volume of contracts with Azerbaijan's traditional partners, such as Ukraine and Turkey. However, as yet they do not influence the military capability of this South Caucasus state qualitatively.

⁷ According to the World Bank data for 2011, Armenia's military spending was about 4,0% of the GDP, and Azerbaijan's was about 4,8% of the GDP, reaching \$3,7 billion in 2013. In February, 2013, President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev stated that the military budget of the state for the current year will be \$ 3.7 billion. He mentioned once again that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict will be resolved by military means, if progress is not achieved in a reasonable period of time.

The Armenian Military Doctrine (MD), in comparison to the Azerbaijani one, is defensive in nature: “It is aimed at ensuring the constant protection and security of the fundamental values of national security of the Republic of Armenia, the military security through the capabilities of the military security system of the Republic of Armenia and wider interoperability, and strengthening peace and stability in the region.” (The Military Doctrine of Republic of Armenia, 2007) ⁸

If we pose the question of a possible resumption of military actions in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, there are several factors that could constrain Azerbaijan. Most important is the existing political-military balance in the region and cognizance of unavoidably high material and human losses (including the high probability that destruction of oil and gas pipelines by the Armenian side will occur). A Nagorno Karabakh war will not be a Blitzkrieg: it will spill beyond the borders of Nagorno Karabakh and be immediately transformed from a local to an international conflict.

Furthermore, through the prism of Armenia’s security, the principle of complementarity in the implementation of the national security strategy and foreign policy is critical: “Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia, adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the United States, membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and its intensification of cooperation with the NATO alliance, all contribute to a consolidation of the potential of Armenia’s policy of complementarity.” (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, p. 15)

It must be emphasized that the full involvement of Armenia in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict has the effect of limiting its choices of strategic partners among the regional powers and /or the political-military alliances. In the meantime, in regard to the existing political-military balance in the South Caucasus, and in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in particular, and in line with the adopted policy of complementarity, the Armenian Armed Forces must be viewed as offering a unique example of a dualistic approach to security and national security strategy.

Armenia is the only South Caucasus state that is one of the founding members of CSTO, the political-military organization under the strong leadership of Russia. Armenia also participates in the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Collective Forces (RRCF).⁹ In parallel, since 1994, Armenia is developing a partnership with NATO. The policy of complementarity

⁸ The new Military Doctrine of Azerbaijan was adopted on June 8, 2010, and is offensive in nature: “any political, military, economic, or other support provided to the Republic of Armenia and to the separatist regime created with Armenia’s support on Azerbaijani territory with the aim of [securing] official recognition of the results of occupation will be interpreted as an act directed against the Azerbaijan Republic.”

⁹ In regard to Armenia’s participation in RRF there were discussions in the Parliament. The concern was that Armenia can be involved in a potential conflict in the neighboring states.

in regard to the Armenian Armed Forces was presented in the Strategic Defense Review. According to this document, “Armenia is and will remain a stable contributor to international security. This will be achieved within the framework of OSCE, CSTO, NATO and other UN Security Council mandated missions and international forces. It is anticipated that the country will continue to develop expeditionary forces of the AAF in the framework of CSTO and NATO/PfP. By 2015 it is foreseen that Armenia will be able to deploy abroad and sustain a contingent of up to battalion-size strength with relevant equipment, on a rotational basis, for participation in multinational operations.” (Strategic Defence Review 2011-2015, 2011, p. 6) Of course, the involvement in joint operations contributes to the operability of the Armed Forces of Armenia.

In some circles of the Armenian military establishment the Armenian model of interaction with both CSTO and NATO is considered as a bridge between these two political-military structures. However, it should be acknowledged that in the current security situation, Armenia has few choices: it should have a relationship of strategic cooperation with Russia as one of its main security guarantors. In the meantime, Armenia is attempting to develop a stable partnership with NATO even without entertaining any visible aspiration for membership. In this regard there is a complete mutual understanding between Armenia and NATO.

MG Hayk Kotanjian, one of the ‘fathers’ of the Armenian National Security Strategy, argued that the developing the American NSS model plus the US military doctrine and the NATO-US model of Strategic Defense Review needs to be assessed within the unavoidable realities of maintaining the essential complementarity of Armenia towards its strategic partnership with Russia and the CSTO (Kotanjian, 2012).

Armenia - Russia Strategic Cooperation

According to the NSS, Armenia “views its participation in this organization (CSTO – G.N.) as a component of its security, which is exercised through various levels of ties between its member states. The military component of the CSTO provides favorable conditions for the supply of military equipment to Armenia, which is a key priority. The intensification of the military component of the CSTO is aimed at the establishment of mechanisms for military cooperation and an effective way to exchange information and address international challenges, such as terrorism and trafficking in arms and drugs.” (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, 2007, p. 12)

The next paragraph of this document is related to Armenia-NATO relations: “Armenia’s active participation in the PfP is important both in terms of the necessity for a significant level of relations with European security structures and for the development of bilateral relations with the United States and other allies, but also for Armenia’s policy of European

integration. Armenia is intensifying its dialogue with NATO, and is establishing compatible military units, such as the current peacekeeping battalion, capable of participating in NATO peacekeeping operations. Armenia is also part of NATO's Planning and Review process. The successful implementation of the PfP Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) will foster the greater modernization and efficiency of the Armenian defense system and will bring it in closer conformity with NATO standards." (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia, 2007, p. 12)

To analyze Armenia's maneuvering possibilities between these two different political-military systems with non-coinciding (at times even contradictory) strategic goals, it is necessary to address Russia's involvement in the regional processes and its role as one of the key elements of Armenian security.

Armenia has strong, multilevel strategic relations with Russia on the bilateral level. Russia's military presence plays a significant role in Armenian strategic thinking and vision of national security.¹⁰ It is viewed as one of the strong components of Armenian security and defense. According to Armenian Military Doctrine (2007), Armenia is establishing a strategic cooperation with the Russian Federation. "The Republic of Armenia establishes permanently acting combined forces with the Russian Federation, such as the joint formation of troops (Forces) of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation; 2) active and practical participation in the programs of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)." (The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia, 2007)

Russia's military base is located on Armenian soil, near Gyumri, and it is a significant component in the Armenian defense system.¹¹ In accordance with the signed Protocol on the introduction of amendments to the Treaty on the Russian Military Base in Armenia (August 2010), not only the term of its presence was extended, but also the sphere of its geographic and strategic responsibility was enlarged. In particular, the new version of Article 3 of the Protocol states that, in addition to the function of defending the interests of the Russian Federation, security to the Republic of Armenia across the entire perimeter of its borders will be provided together with the Armenian armed forces. The real threat to Armenia can come only from aggressive actions by Azerbaijan directed against the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. The Armenian-Russian Protocol has actually put an end to speculations on how

¹⁰ According to the Amendments to the bilateral Agreement on the status of Russian Military Base (1995), signed in August, 2010, Russia's lease was extended by 34 years, until 2044. It also enhanced Russia's role in Armenia's security significantly. The about 4,000 Russian troops stationed there will now not only protect the "interests of Russia," but also "ensure the security of Armenia" jointly with the Armenian army. Russia's military presence is irritating for Azerbaijan forcing it to be more cautious in regard to the possible resumption of military actions in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

¹¹ According to the Deputy Minister of Defense of Armenia, "Russian military base is the indivisible part of Armenia's security system, which is highlighted in a number of conceptual documents of the Republic of Armenia such as the National Security Strategy, Military Doctrine."

will Russia respond in case of a resumption of military actions in the area of confrontation: Russia will not participate in direct military operation. Here, several objective reasons are apparent:

- First, de jure the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is considered as an intrastate conflict;¹² thus, the membership of both Russia and Armenia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization will have no bearing on this particular case;
- Second, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are strategic partners of Russia, as the high-ranking Russian political leadership has frequently stressed;
- Third, after recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia, prefers to avoid further aggravation in its relations with the Western powers.
- Fourth, indirectly, Russia's policy of non-interference in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, if it again becomes overt, was confirmed during the visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Azerbaijan in September, 2010.¹³

Nevertheless, an updated version of the Treaty on the Russian Military Base provides Armenia with more space for maneuvering. It stands in accordance with the Military Doctrine of Armenia, which states that Armenia is "a guarantor and supporter of security for the population of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and the course of development it has chosen." (The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia, 2007) Hence, theoretically the joint Armenian-Russian protection of the Armenian border provides the possibility for a greater maneuvering room for Armenia's armed forces to confront the expected and/ or potential aggression from the Azerbaijani side. According to Serzh Sargsyan, President of Armenia, this agreement has expanded a "sphere of geographical and strategic responsibility." Sargsyan added that "the activity of the Russian military base was until now confined to the external border of the former Soviet Union. That restriction has now been removed from the treaty text." Sargsyan also emphasized that the amended agreement commits Moscow to supply the Armenian armed forces with "modern and compatible weaponry and special military hardware." (Soyuzniki, 2012) There is, in other words, a strategic and broad cooperation between the two states.¹⁴

¹² Most probably, Russia's response will be similar to its response during the events in Kyrgyzstan, which reached their peak in June 2010.

¹³ "It is certainly very important for Russia to maintain stability here in the Caucasus. Russia is a Caucasian and Caspian nation. This is the main concept for building relations with our closest neighbor and friend, Azerbaijan. Thus, we are interested in maintaining peace and order in the region. The decision made during my visit to Armenia should be viewed in that light – that of extending the agreement to maintain a Russian military base in Armenia. There aren't any hidden or other considerations. The base is intended to ensure peace and order, to preserve stability, and to lessen all the complications we have today."

¹⁴ There is little possibility that in case of the resumption of the military actions in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, the CSTO member-states will provide support to Armenia. That is why the bilateral Russian-Armenian relations in the defense/ military sphere are of crucial importance.

There was, and still is, speculation on this amendment in political circles and in the expert community in Armenia. However, it is obvious that the Armenian side has received more opportunities to confront the possible aggression from the Azerbaijani side either against Armenia itself or, most probably, against the non-recognized NKR.

Thus, in light of the unresolved conflict, and against the background of broad Russian military assistance and Armenia's membership in CSTO, it is understandable that the reformation of the Armenian army is mainly inspired by the Russian model. Armenia announced the creation of a professional, i.e. contract army as one of its goals in the military sector reform. However, in the current security and economic circumstances defined among other factors by a permanent threat from the Azerbaijani side to resume warfare and by the blockade of the Armenian-Turkish border by Turkey, Armenia cannot limit itself only to a professional army; it should have a conscript army as well. Seyran Ohanian, the Minister of Defense of Armenia, argued that "the economic and financial conditions, as well as regional instability complicate the process of modernization of the Armenian Armed Forces. However, acceleration of the development of the Armed Forces is our logical choice, one that is driven by the necessity to preserve the security of the state and our people, to promote and, if necessary, to enforce peace." (Ohanian, 2011)

Another sensitive aspect with regard to the Armenian Armed Forces is related to the adoption of an Alternative Service law. The Armenian Parliament approved the alternative service amendments in their first reading on March 18, 2013.

Armenia - NATO Strategic Partnership: Main Areas

As a consequence of the growing Russian-Azerbaijani partnership in a variety of spheres, including economic and military ones, as well as across a range of issues in regard to the Caspian Sea (ecology concerns, oil and gas pipelines policies, and the military presence in the Caspian Sea), Armenia is seeking to balance its growing political-military dependence on Russia by increasing its partnership with NATO. This aspect of Armenian defense policy, which is a priority for the government is receiving more support and understanding throughout the society.¹⁵

Partnership with NATO involves several themes. First of all, NATO is a partner in the field of strategy creation and capacity-building (mainly in military education). The Armenian NSS is based on the American NSS models of security thinking, which means that in comparison with the Russian NSS, it is goal-oriented, rather than threat oriented.

¹⁵ The attitude toward NATO is shifting in the Armenian society. Immediately after gaining its independence, NATO was viewed exclusively through the prism of Armenian-Turkish relations. Furthermore, Turkey's position and support of Azerbaijan during the war in Nagorno Karabakh, and a closure of the border with Armenia, contributed to a negative perception of NATO. In the course of time there has been a growing understanding of NATO's role in the European security system. Currently, according to recent sociological polls, supporters and opponents of broader cooperation with NATO are almost equal: approximately 30-35%.

Armenia is gradually intensifying its relations with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP, currently in its third circle - 2008-2013), and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) – albeit without indicating its desire to become a NATO member. According to the most recent NATO-Armenia IPAP, which was agreed to in November 2011, “Armenia’s IPAP is geared towards both strengthening political dialogue between NATO and Armenia as well as supporting Armenia’s democratic and defense reforms. NATO agrees to support Armenia in achieving its reform goals by providing focused advice and assistance. Armenia also makes important contributions to NATO-led operations.” The IPAP envisages the cooperation on democratic, institutional, and defense reforms that would bring the Armenian armed forces into conformity with NATO standards. The role of the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in this process is very significant. According to official documents, “PARP is a core element of Armenia’s cooperation with NATO, which is helping to develop the ability of its forces to work with NATO forces on operations.” The key areas of cooperation are security cooperation, defense and security sector reforms, civil emergency planning, science and the environment, and public information. Achievements in these areas range in success. In 2011, the first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was released. It provides insight into the process “through which the Armenian Armed Forces (AAF) are to be restructured to better meet current security needs and to be able to prevent and confront current and possible challenges” (Strategic Defence Review, 2011, p. 1).

Among the important areas of the Armenia-NATO partnership is peacekeeping. Since 2004, Armenia has participated in peacekeeping operations under NATO leadership in Kosovo (KFOR), in Afghanistan (since 2009 it is currently providing three platoons to ISAF), and within the framework of the US-led mission in Iraq (2005-2009).¹⁶ Armenia is cooperating with NATO and individual allies on facilitating the interoperability of the Armenian Peacekeeping Battalion. There are plans for it to become a brigade by 2015 with associated combat support and combat service support units working alongside with those of NATO countries. This brigade is considered as a basis for the Armenian professional army.

Another important area of Armenia-NATO cooperation is defense and security sector reform. It is worth mentioning that the understanding of “security sector reforms” is very limited in Armenian society. Although Armenia organizes annually “a week of NATO in Armenia,” thereby attempting to raise public awareness of NATO and the country’s cooperation with the Alliance, these efforts are not enough. Moreover, a NATO information centre which has officially opened in Yerevan in 2007 with the support of the Armenian government and NATO also does not work effectively. An absence of qualified experts and professionals in the field of SSR is apparent. The main source of SSR recommendations is thus the OSCE,

¹⁶ In parallel, Armenia participates in all military trainings and maneuvers within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, including Collective Rapid Reaction Force.

which focuses mainly on work with the police.¹⁷ Another supplier of recommendations is the DCAF (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), which works with authorities and to a lesser extent with non-governmental organizations.

When discussing the challenges to the SSR, attention should be called to the existence of two categories of Armed Forces in Armenia. One – the larger one – is a conscript army, another – the smaller (however, rapidly developing) – is a professional-oriented one. As mentioned above, the reform of the first category is proving very difficult to carry out owing to the external security deficits and the need to maintain a large army. The second category currently includes the peacekeeper's battalion with a 100%- interoperability with NATO forces and is in the process of enlargement. The main task now is to prepare the basis for the shift to the fully professional army, a task also made necessary owing to a growing demographic problem in Armenia.

This context is closely related to another challenge facing Armenia: how to maintain the professional army amid the economic crisis. It is obvious that the process of professionalization of the army will not occur quickly. As David Tonoyan has argued, the Armenian government consequently will continue reforming the Armed Forces “on the mixed principle – mandatory and contract – thereby gradually increasing the volume of the latter. Moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will neither impede or slow the rate and volume of defense-related reforms, rather the opposite. The enhancement of the fighting capacity of our Armed Forces, was and still is, our main goal. Military and educational reforms are one of the most important components of success of this process” (Mediamax, 2012).

A key priority for Armenia in the SSR is to ensure democratic control of the Armed Forces. Its participation in the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building serves to strengthen this control. Minister of Defence Seyran Ohanyan has argued: “As a result of a recent Strategic Defence Review conducted by a team from NATO, we have devised a mid-term plan to develop the Armed Forces of Armenia between 2011 and 2015, which guarantees defence management based on their democratic and civilian oversight.”

According to a revised version of the IPAP (2011), which mainly aims to fulfill the goals of the Strategic Defense Review, “Armenia also intends to intensify practical and political co-operation with NATO in order to draw closer to the Alliance. The Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB), the Planning and Review Process (PARP), and consultations with Allies will be important instruments in this regard.” According to this document, “Armenia is committed to develop and strengthen democratic control and

¹⁷ One of the directions to improve the work of the police and to increase trust in the society toward this institution is related to the establishment of the community police. The positive results and shifts were visible during the recent presidential elections in February 2013.

civilian oversight of its armed forces. [It] also intends to promote civilian participation in the development of defense and security policy. In this regard, Armenia places particular importance on encouraging civil society involvement in defense and security issues and improving the education and training of parliamentarians and their staffs. Armenia is also determined to ensure protection of constitutional and human rights within the Armed Forces and will work to improve education, strengthen independent human rights bodies, and bring disciplinary regulations in line with constitutional requirements.” Armenia also aims “to improve the efficiency of its defense planning and budgeting system and to develop affordable, transparent and sustainable defense plans. It also aims to develop expertise in these fields to support the implementation of its Strategic Defense Review and to support improvements in the areas of command and control, equipment and logistics.” (Individual Partnership Action Plan, 2011)

As previously mentioned, a professional military education is one of the key components for the successful implementation of the SSR. In this regard, the Armenian National Security Strategy “serves as a methodological and intellectual foundation for furthering Western “smart power”-oriented security thinking and for pursuing reforms in Armenia’s strategic defense education system.” IPAP has also allowed Armenia to fully involve NATO experts in the process of elaborating the reforms of the defense education system. Armenia has used this opportunity to draft, develop and implement the education and training system of modern armed forces. The Armenian Institute for National Strategic Studies has been transformed into the National Defense (Research) University, based on the U.S. model of military education. The main goal of the Armenian NDU is to modernize the country’s professional military education system by making it compatible with the most effective educational models and the most advanced standards and technologies that incorporate processes of research, education, and training (for more details see Kotanjian, 2012, p. 83-90).

Conclusion

There is a clear understanding in the Armenian society at large of the necessity and urgency for implementation of a broad security sector reform, which is widely believed will significantly further the democratization of the country.

Nevertheless, there are several objective and subjective obstacles in the way. Among them is low level of transparency in regard to the military budget and spending: the government is recognizing this and is adopting structural reforms, but in the process to some extent ignoring the public factor and accountability processes. As a consequence of this approach another obstacle should be mentioned: low level of parliamentary and civilian control over

the Armed Forces.¹⁸ This has taken place as a consequence of the lack of qualified experts in the field of security and defense, as well as a lack of confidence in representatives from the non-governmental sector.

Regional instability and the absence of regional cooperation constitute one of the most serious factors that prevent the full-scale implementation of the SSR in the regional states, and in Armenia in particular. However, even in the current situation in the South Caucasus it is possible to implement several programs on the bilateral level, thereby creating two-partner confidence-building relationships (Armenia-Georgia, Georgia-Azerbaijan) to transfer knowledge and procedures. In this regard the experience of the V4 – Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary – could prove very valuable.

¹⁸ On May 29, 2013 debates on the annual report on the 2012 governmental budget took place in the Armenian Parliament. They touched also upon spending in the Security Sector. The sections related to the National Security Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Police were open to the public; the debates on spending in the Armed Forces took place behind closed doors.

References:

- [1] *2013 Freedom in the World*. 2013, Freedom House Report. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>, 20.4.2013.
- [2] *A joint press-conference on the results of the Russian-Azerbaijani negotiations*. September 3, 2010, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/883>, 3.6.2012.
- [3] *Azerbaijan Adopts Military Doctrine At Long Last*, <http://www.speroforum.com/a/34517/Azerbaijan-Adopts-Military-Doctrine-At-Long-Last>, 10.4.2013.
- [4] Benitez, Jorge, *Azerbaijan sharply increases military spending*, Atlantic Council, February 1, 2013, <http://www.acus.org/natosource/azerbaijan-sharply-increases-military-spending>, 15.4.2013.
- [5] David Tonoyan: *“Armenian-U.S. defense cooperation grows impressively*, Mediamax Agency, August 9, 2011. <http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/interviews/1985/>, 26.4.2013.
- [6] David Tonoyan: *“The unsettled conflict doesn’t impede implementation of defense reforms”*, Mediamax Agency, October 11, 2012, <http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/interviews/6028/>, 26.4.2013.
- [7] *Debates on the Annual Report “On the Execution of the RA State Budget 2012” Begin in the NA Standing Committees*, May 29, 2013, <http://www.parliament.am/news.php?catid=2&NewsID=5943&year=2013&month=05&day=29&lang=eng>, 25.4.2013.
- [8] *Individual Action Partnership Plan 2011-2013 Armenia*, 2011, http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/IPAP-2011-2013-ENG-Declassified.pdf, 10.2.2012. †
- [9] *Interview to the magazine “Soyuzniki. ODKB”* (in Russian), October 14, 2012, <http://www.president.am/ru/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2011/10/14/news-75/&>, 15.4.2013.
- [10] *Israel officials confirm \$1.6b. Azeri defense deal*, February 26, 2012, The Jerusalem Post, <http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-officials-confirm-16b-Azeri-defense-deal>, 13.4.2013.
- [11] Kotanjian, Hayk, *Armenian National Defense University. Promoting Smart Power Cooperation*, Speech at the Annual International Forum “Regional Security Dynamics in the South Caucasus”, November 30, 2012.
- [12] Kotanjian, Hayk. 2012. *Managing Strategic Changes Through DEEP Reforms: A View from the Perspective of U.S.–Armenia “Smart Power” Cooperation*. Connections, The Quarterly Journal, PIP Consortium, Fall 2012.
- [13] Ohanyan, Seyran, 2011. *Foreword to the Strategic Defense Review*. <http://www.mil.am/files/S.Ohanyan-eng.pdf>, 11.4.2013.

[14] *Strategic Defense Review, 2011-2015*, 2011. Public Release, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, <http://www.mil.am/files/SDR-eng.pdf>, 16.4.2013.

[15] *The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia*, approved on December 25, 2007, Ministry of Defense of Armenia, <http://www.mil.am/eng/?page=104&id=&p=0&y=2010&m=10&d=13>, 25.4.2013.

[16] *The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia*, January 26, 2007, http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf, 15.2013.

Chapter 2: AZERBAIJAN

Kamal Makili-Aliyev

Introduction

When it comes to modern state of international relations T.J.Sinclair writes that: “[s]tates remain central actors in the world of global governance, but their claim to primacy is challenged even in traditional spheres like security” (Sinclair, 2012, p. 174). Indeed, as the nature of the security threats is changing, so does the concept of security as a whole, logically followed by the actors that play the main role in its provision and maintenance. However, as Mr. Sinclair rightfully suggests, the former part of the argument is true as well. States do still play the most important role, even in modern world, when it comes to matters of security.

Azerbaijan is surely not an exception and is thus in the position to play a central role in all the security matters and concerns that arise from its existence as a participant of international relations. Multiple security challenges that will be discussed in detail further in this paper have been of critical importance for Azerbaijan since the state has regained its independence only a bit over two decades ago. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has been engaged in the international armed conflict, which although out of its active phase, is still there and constitutes the most important security threat for the state, as considerable part of its territory is still under foreign occupation.

Moreover, being a part of the South Caucasus region, Azerbaijan is in the neighborhood that is surrounded by three major regional powers (Iran, Russia and Turkey) that by themselves constitute infinite inspiration for security studies. One can only try to imagine what kind of security framework the country finds itself in when it is located in the region where interests of these three regional powers collide and overlap. Thus, it was always one of the top priorities of Azerbaijan to develop its security sector that was left in seriously damaged condition after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Further degraded by the active phase of the international conflict, the security sector system of Azerbaijan was also largely outdated and in need of urgent reforms. The first of such reforms found its initial implementation when the situation stabilized in 1993-1994 and will be discussed further here.

This limited study aims to discuss the developments of security sector in Azerbaijan, reforms that are being introduced and provide some recommendations on how the situation can be improved. The paper will discuss the general security framework, indicate the institutions that constitute the security sector in Azerbaijan and analyze reforms and developments that are being introduced. Moreover, it seems important to outline the general direction of cooperation of Azerbaijan with other international actors in the field of security sector

reform and show the strategy that Azerbaijan has taken towards the goal of neutralizing threats through development and effective policies rather than simply by relying on hard power.

To better understand the situation with regards to developments in the security sector and the rationale behind them we should first establish the nature of threats that the country faces relying on the structure of the current security framework.

Security Framework

The number one threat to national security of Azerbaijan is of course the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This particular international armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia was one of the main triggers of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Just after the collapse of USSR this conflict took a form of war between these newly independent states that lasted until the cease-fire agreement reached in 1994 when around 20% of Azerbaijan's territory was occupied by Armenia (Kasim, 2012, p. 94).

The cease-fire agreement resulted in the line of contact between the troops of the conflicting parties that scarred Azerbaijan's territory. This line of contact together with what is left of the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates a frontier that is still very tense and often marked by frequent cross-fire incidents that result in deaths and injuries practically on a daily basis.

Both the occupation and an unstable frontier are major security threats by themselves; however Azerbaijani territories under occupation have become another matter of concern. Turned into the "gray zone" these territories are fertile grounds for trafficking of human beings, drugs and weapons, especially taking into account that 132 km of the border with Iran is currently outside of control of Azerbaijan due to the occupation (11th OSCE Economic Forum, 2003, p.23).

Taken together, these issues are aggravated by the fact that such a lasting international armed conflict by itself is a considerable threat not only to the countries involved, but also to the whole regional security framework. Despite the fact that the conflict is between two parties, it nonetheless affects the adjacent states and neighboring regional players, complicating the security matters for everybody.

For the country with an international armed conflict, providing for border security is a major concern. Being a part of a very geopolitically complicated region considered the most unstable in the former Soviet Union in terms of the numbers, intensity, and length of ethnic and civilian conflicts (Nichol, 2007, p.CRS-6), Azerbaijan is interested in ensuring thorough security of its borders with Georgia, Iran and Russia. That means making a lot of effort in

developing effective strategies for combating organized trans-border crime and participating in the regional cooperation in that field of common interest. The borders with Russia and Iran are ultimately creating a challenge for the security of Azerbaijan due to different set of factors. For example, instability of Russia's Northern Caucasus directly affects the cross-border security, while trafficking problems in Iran constitute even greater concern for the security sector in Azerbaijan. Such situation naturally explains the interest of Azerbaijan in closer cooperation with security sectors in these countries to achieve collective security measures.

The concerns for cross-border security in Azerbaijan are common for many states in the world. These are trafficking in human beings, firearms, child sexual abuse, cybercrime, counterfeiting, money laundering, smuggling, illegal migration, etc. (Makili-Aliyev, 2012, p.160). To address these threats it is crucial for Azerbaijan to concentrate on continual development of institutional capacity and at the same time to strive for greater regional cooperation.

At the same time, due to fair amount of energy resources that Azerbaijan possesses, there is a natural interest in its energy security. Since independence, Azerbaijan has moved forward to becoming an important exporter of hydrocarbons to the West, ensuring both its own energy security, as well as adding value to the energy security of Europe (Rzayeva, 2012, p.124). Taking into account that the vast majority of Azerbaijan's energy export routes reach Europe via Georgia and Turkey, simultaneously bypassing Russia, the importance of energy security for Azerbaijan should not be underestimated. Interests in the free flow of energy towards the West are in concert with the interests of security of its sources. As major part of energy resources of Azerbaijan is located on the Caspian Sea, the country has a very strong interest in the security of its basin.

Comprised of five littoral states, the Caspian basin is one of the major energy hubs on the planet. At the same time being a lake, there are still many questions on its delimitation. While Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia were able to reach an agreement on their Caspian maritime borders, the situation with Turkmenistan, and especially Iran, is not as clear. That in its turn creates both tensions and security threats, as the states enter into disputes over energy sources and their ownership. In addition, the past several years the Caspian basin has seen an unprecedented and rapidly accelerating arms race (Karimov et al, 2011, p.17).

All of these aforementioned factors have found their way into Azerbaijan's National Security Concept adopted in 2007 (hereinafter Concept). This document outlines national interests of Azerbaijan as well as national security threats and main directions of national security policy of the country. When it comes to threats, the Concept names them as follows: 1) attempts against the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the

Republic of Azerbaijan, 2) actions undermining performance of state functions of ensuring rule of law, maintaining public order and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, 3) separatism, ethnic, political and religious extremism, 4) terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 5) regional conflicts and transnational organized crime, 6) actions against energy infrastructure of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 7) external political, military or economic dependence, 8) economic destabilization, 9) inadequate professional human resources, 10) regional militarization, 11) environmental challenges (National Security Concept, 2007, p.1).

As it can be seen the fact that territorial integrity of Azerbaijan needs to be restored, separatism, trans-border crimes, energy security and even militarization (think Caspian), are all reflected as perceived threats. Even contemporary threats like environmental challenges play an important role in the interests of national security of Azerbaijan. However, today it is safe to say that there are even indications that cybersecurity is becoming more and more acute for the national interests of the country.

In such situation, there is a critical need for strong and effective security sector in the country that would be capable of effectively addressing all these threats and have the capacity for continual development.

Security Sector

To describe the security sector in Azerbaijan it seems appropriate first to define it. As there is no universal definition of terms such as “security sector” or “national security” it is generally accepted that states define these terms for themselves in their own legislations or, in some instances, collectively in bilateral or multilateral treaties.

As Azerbaijan is not currently a part of any military or collective security alliance, it is thus safe to assume that the definition of its security sector can be found not in the international treaty, but in the national legislation of the country. Indeed, as with many states, if we take a look at the different areas of legislation, it is impossible to find one single act (or any other type of document) that will paint the whole picture of national security of the state or its security sector. Thus a brief, though thorough, analysis of the current legislation is in order.

The framework of the security sector of Azerbaijan can be found in the “Law on National Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan” adopted in 2004 (hereinafter National Security Law). Analysis of Article 10 provides that state bodies and forces that ensure national security of the state are institutions that are created by the state, functioning within the boundaries of the current legislation with the purpose and capability to maintain national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the same time the same article provides a non-exhaustive list of the executive bodies charged with duties to ensure national security of Azerbaijan. These are

1) Azerbaijan's Armed Forces and other military units created in accordance with current legislation, 2) Azerbaijan's special service agencies, 3) police, prosecutor's office, customs, tax office and other bodies charged with the maintenance of public order and 4) other bodies that are charged with the security of industrial, energy, transportation, communications and information sectors that participate directly in the maintenance of national security (Law on National Security, 2004, Article 10).

While the aforementioned article enumerates the bodies responsible for the implementation and enforcement of national security in the security sector, it does not cover anything related to the policy or decision-making when it comes to security. Here there is a need to refer to the Constitution of Azerbaijan adopted in 1995 (hereinafter Constitution), which stipulates that the basis of the security and respective legislative decisions are vested in the powers of the Parliament of Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, when it comes to policy-making the role of the President is specifically noted in the Constitution. First of all, the President decides which special service agencies (or special security bodies) should be created. However, more importantly the President of Azerbaijan has powers to form the Security Council that "provides the conditions for the realization of the constitutional authorities of the President on the protection of people's rights and freedoms, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan" (Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1995, Article 109). Basically, the Security Council is the policy-making body that is chaired by the President of Azerbaijan and consists of the Speaker of Parliament, Prime-Minister, Head of the Office of the President, State Adviser for Foreign Policy, State Adviser for Military Affairs, Prosecutor-General, Defense Minister, National Security Minister and Internal Affairs Minister.

At the same time the National Security Law stipulates that the maintenance of national security is conducted in political, economic, military, social, information, environmental, scientific, cultural and other relevant spheres (Law on National Security, 2004, Article 15). This provision is in concert with the Concept that dedicates separate articles to strengthening of defense capability, economic and social development, information and environment security policies as well as the development of cultural and scientific policies (National Security Concept, 2007, pp.1-2). As it can be seen, the security sector in Azerbaijan covers a wide range of security issues and plays an important role when it comes to public administration and legislation.

Based on the aforementioned, it can be discerned that Armed Forces play a key role in the security sector of Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, other military units of importance also include: 1) Internal Troops (Ministry of Internal Affairs); 2) Border Troops (State Border Service); 3) National Security Troops (Ministry of National Security); 4) Troops of the Ministry of Justice; 5) Troops of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and 6) National Guard (Special State Guard Service).

The role of Armed Forces in the security sector of Azerbaijan is defined by the “Law on Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan” adopted in 1991 (hereinafter Armed Forces Law). In accordance with its provisions Armed Forces of Azerbaijan serve to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability interests by military means, to prevent armed attacks against the state and respond to any aggression. This act of legislation also stipulates that Armed Forces consist of land, air and air defense and navy forces (Law on Armed Forces, 1991, Articles 1, 4).

Azerbaijan’s Land Forces consist of around 57,000 troops and include 23 motor rifle brigades, an artillery brigade, a multiple rocket launcher brigade, and an anti-tank regiment, while it’s Air and Air Defense Force consists of around 8,000 servicemen and represents a unified branch of Armed Forces with around 106 aircraft and 35 helicopters. In addition, Navy Force of Azerbaijan employs around 2,200 personnel and around 22 vessels (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011, p. 87). As can be seen, Azerbaijan has quite a large army compared to the country’s size which can be attributed to the fact that its perceived security threats include international armed conflict including a situation of foreign military occupation.

Second in importance of the security sector in Azerbaijan comes only the Border Troops. They are formed under the auspices of the State Border Service and provide military protection of the border, covering all the Azerbaijan’s borders not affected by the conflict, which is in the remit of the Armed Forces. At the same time there are also Internal Forces that play the role of gendarmerie and are directly subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan. They usually deal with internal emergencies, restoration of public order and provide some internal safeguards. In parallel with their activity, the National Guard under subordination to Special State Guard Service provides security to important governmental institutions as well as the maintenance of information security and communications. Other ministries indicated above maintain small military units for the purposes of ensuring effective functioning.

Reforming the Security Sector in Azerbaijan

With a large security sector comes a large share of responsibilities and challenges. One of them is to conduct a comprehensive set of reforms to shape the security sector in accordance with standards that are acknowledged on the international level. Due to the long Soviet past, the defense and security sector in Azerbaijan still carries a lot of burden of an outdated system, however now it can safely be said that Azerbaijan has the strongest Armed Forces in South Caucasus. The military expenditures of Azerbaijan have risen from \$175 million in 2001 to more than \$2 billion in 2011 and continue to rise reaching toward the \$3 billion level (Goodrich et al, 2011, p.83). Investments in other areas of the security sector have also increased dramatically since a decade ago.

With financing increased, efforts of reforming the security sector have gone in multiple directions; however due to the limitations of the scope of the study here we concentrate on two major influences for reforms according to the standards of international organizations – NATO and the European Union (hereinafter EU).

When it comes to NATO, Azerbaijan was one of the first countries of the post-Soviet space to establish relations with the Alliance and joined its Partnership for Peace (hereinafter PfP) program. Today Azerbaijan cooperates with NATO in such areas as military cooperation, defense modernization, democratic control of the armed forces, political consultations on security issues, peace support operations, security sector reform, civil emergency planning, security-related scientific, economic and environmental capacity building. Azerbaijan has implemented the first two Individual Partnership Action Plans (hereinafter IPAPs) of 2005 and 2008 and at the time of this writing is in the process of implementation of the third one for the 2012-2013 period.

NATO standards have been implemented in the training patterns of the defense sector and in the military education. NATO teaching methods have been implemented in military educations system since 1997, while NATO-trained officer staff serving in Armed Forces and other military units came about since 2001. Moreover, Azerbaijan has already implemented NATO-standard reforms of command and control structures within units up to the level of army corps. Former command structures, heritage of the Soviet period, remain only within the ministry and at army corps level (Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform, 2008, p.9, 16).

Azerbaijan is also in close cooperation with NATO on fundamental transformation of the State Border Service (SBS) from military institution into a law-enforcement organization. Large-scale plans have been implemented for the reinforcement of technical capabilities and improvement of human resources management of the State Border Service. Furthermore, there are legislative initiatives underway to amend national legislation to introduce practical policy related to the career development of civilian personnel within the defense system. The plan is to contribute to further strengthening of civilian control of the Armed Forces in Azerbaijan (NATO International School Azerbaijan, 2013, p.1).

International Crisis Group also reports a high level of cooperation between individual NATO members and Azerbaijan when it comes to providing assistance in reforming the defense sector: “[United States] help has mainly been aimed at improving maritime and border security in the Caspian by upgrading the naval forces, border guards and an airbase (Nasosnaya) and setting up mobile radar systems to prevent arms proliferation and drug trafficking. Turkey has provided extensive support in training as well as modernizing

barracks and has been the NATO “contact point” for over sixteen years. The UK prepares some 30-40 officers a year for peacekeeping operations and gives English language training” (Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform, 2008, p. 17).

Bilateral cooperation of Azerbaijan with EU also holds mutual interests in the reforms of the country’s security sector. Engaged in the Eastern Partnership Framework, Azerbaijan is highly interested in the implementation of the best practices of the EU, especially in the field of border security. In its own turn, there is a strong interest from the EU side to see through the reforms in the security sector of the countries it wants to be closely associated with, not least because that would mean more transparency on its borders with these countries.

Taking that into the account, it is only logical that the EU is imposing country-specific requirements on Azerbaijan (Roadmap 2012-2013 Bilateral Dimension) both in terms of security as well as institutions when it comes to the political association. The EU puts special emphasis on the “institutional strengthening” when it comes to reforming the security sector. The same logic applies to the priorities of the security cooperation such as border management. That area of development includes the creation of Integrated Border Management (hereinafter IBM), proper border demarcation and full implementation of existing international treaties concerning borders. Currently, Azerbaijan has undergone the whole process of implementation of these requirements. Several amendments to the legislation concerning borders were introduced to prepare the country for the introduction of EU standards and increase its flexibility. Moreover, Azerbaijan has made strides in combating trans-border crime and introduced automated information search system of “Entry-exit and registration” to increase the capacity of information-sharing between institutions of the security sector and fulfill one of the preconditions of IBM. Recognizing illegal migration as one of the security threats in the Concept, Azerbaijan has taken considerable steps to enhance its migration policies to effectively combat illegal migration. To assist Azerbaijan and other regional countries with the implementation of IBM, the EU has teamed up with United Nations Development Programme and introduced the South Caucasus IBM project that enhances the inter-agency as well as international cooperation. The project ended in 2012 and resulted in serious advancements in both institutional awareness as well as the functioning of State Border Service and new legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of Border Troops. At the same time it facilitated digitalization of infrastructure of the institutions that deal with border management (Makili-Aliyev, 2012, pp.158-167).

The patterns of cooperation between Azerbaijan, NATO and EU quite logically indicate that the interaction with the Alliance’s initiatives leads to the enhancements in the defense sector, while integration policies of the EU demand implementation of standards mostly in the non-military sector. However, in areas such as civil-military relations such initiatives can overlap

with each other, yet demand a comparable levels of reforms to be put in place.

Conclusions

All in all for a country that is part of the post-Soviet space, regained its independence fairly recently and was left with an international armed conflict on its territory, Azerbaijan was able to go a long way when it comes to the development of its security sector.

Azerbaijan's defense capabilities are currently greater than those of any other country in the region and its military budget is by far the largest. Employing the help and assistance of NATO and other strategic partners, Azerbaijan was able to implement a great deal of Alliance-level standards to its own Armed Forces including command and control structures and the management of military units. Reforms touched upon other military units such as Internal Troops and National Guard. Their training, service conditions and logistics are now on par to the standards promoted by NATO in various action plans that Azerbaijan has implemented.

At the same time close cooperation with the EU on border security has resulted in considerable headway in combating trans-border crime by the security sector of the country. In addition, implementation of the EU standards has increased the institutional capacity of State Border Service that is now in the process of transformation to the law-enforcement organization as well as improved the effectiveness of migration policies.

However, there is still some room for improvement in all the areas of the reforms. As there are no limits to perfection, so it is in the responsibility of the country to always strive towards ever better policies and standards. Azerbaijan needs to work on further enhancing the capacities of the civil oversight over its Armed Forces and other military units, and introduce new systems of civilian control over military. At the same time there is a need for the promotion of the civil-military relations starting at least on the basic level such as implementation of the Ministry of Defense website and digitalization of unclassified information of the Armed Forces. Next steps would be to further proceed with the re-structuralization of the Ministry of Defense according to the NATO standards. However, such steps are complicated by the ongoing armed conflict in the sense that they raise concern that command and control system may be weakened by the transitional process.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan needs to further proceed with efforts to transfer the military portions of the security not associated with Armed Forces into the law-enforcement system of institutions, using the models provided by the EU. Such transformation would greatly increase the effectiveness of the inter-institutional communication and cooperation in the security sector and create additional capabilities for the implementation of EU-level standards.

As there is still some way to go, it is quite clear that Azerbaijan remains dedicated to the introduction of effective and pragmatic reforms in its security sector and to cooperation with its strategic partners in this area.

References:

- [1] *11th OSCE Economic Forum on Trafficking in Human Beings, Drugs, Small Arms and Light Weapons: National and international economic impact*, 2003, Country Report: Azerbaijan.
- [2] *Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform*, 2008, Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°50, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4265.pdf, 16.4.2013.
- [3] *Azerbaijan-NATO relations*, 2013, NATO International School Azerbaijan, <http://nisa.az/content/view/36/62/lang,en/>, 16.4.2013.
- [4] Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1995), Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, http://azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/constitution_01_e.html, 15.4.2013.
- [5] Goodrich, Lauren, Zeihan, Peter, 2011, *A Crucible of Nations. The Geopolitics of the Caucasus*, STRATFOR, Austin.
- [6] Karimov, Reshad, Chausovsky, Eugene, Makili-Aliyev, Kamal, 2011, *Caspian Basin: Geopolitics and the Future Balance of Power*, SAM, Baku, <http://www.sam.az/uploads/files/SAM%20Review%204.pdf>, 12.4.2013.
- [7] Kasim, Kamer, 2012, *The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Regional implications and the peace process*, in: *Caucasus International*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring), 93-110.
- [8] *Law on Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan*, 1991, Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, №210-XII.
- [9] *Law on national security of the Republic of Azerbaijan*, 2004, Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan, № 712-IIQ.
- [10] Makili-Aliyev, Kamal, 2012, *Eastern Partnership and Border Security: Perspective of Azerbaijan*, In: Frappi, Carlo & Pashayeva, Gulshan (eds.), *The EU Eastern Partnership: Common Framework or Wider Opportunity?* EGEA, Milan.
- [11] *National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan* (2007), President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Instruction No.2198, http://www.un.int/azerbaijan/pdf/National_security.pdf, 12.4.2013.
- [12] Nichol, Jim, 2007, *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81353.pdf>, 11.4.2013.
- [13] Rzayeva, Gulmira, 2012, *The Southern Corridor: Azerbaijani Perspective from Well Head to End Users*, In: Frappi, Carlo & Pashayeva, Gulshan (eds.), *The EU Eastern Partnership: Common Framework or Wider Opportunity?* EGEA, Milan.
- [14] Sinclair, Timothy, 2012, *Global Governance*, Polity Press, Cambridge.
- [15] *The Military Balance*, 2011, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London.

Chapter 3: GEORGIA

Tengiz Pkhaladze, Alexander Rondeli

Threat Perception of Georgia and its Implications for Security Sector: Georgia's Russian roulette

The security sector of Georgia went through a critical test during Georgian-Russian war in 2008. The bitter experience of the August war revealed both negative and positive aspects of the country's security system.

The South Caucasus is characterized by extremely turbulent security context – internal as well as external one. The security environment of Georgia evolved to certain extent since 2008 but the main external security threat remains the same – Russia's attempts to position itself as a dominant military and political actor in the South Caucasus. Georgia, strategically located in the center of the region is considered by Moscow as a key country for exerting successful control of the South Caucasus as well as the whole Caucasus region. The 2008 war was the attempt of Moscow to gain strategic dominance in the region and draw a red line in order to define its sphere of special interest, which Russians call “a sphere of privileged interest.” Russia's, action also was to hinder Georgia's attempts to join NATO.

Russia remains the main obstacle in Georgian perception of external threats. The fact that Russia, seeing the security environment in the region through the prism of “zero-sum” game, decided in August 2008 to defend its perceived national security interest by force and invaded Georgia, means that Moscow is capable of doing it again if Kremlin feels that it is necessary. The fact that the 2008 Russian action against Georgia has been so far the first open military conflict with a former Soviet republic after the collapse of the USSR means that Moscow considered using force a preferable political instrument to achieving its strategic objectives in the post-Soviet space. Russia's military action against Georgia in 2008 revealed that Moscow, if it considers it necessary, can use force to alter interstate boundaries. If in 2008 Russia justified its action in respect of the highly debated R2P principle (Responsibility to Protect), there is no guarantee that in case of perceived threat to its interests in the region, Russia would act in the same way, this time seeking to justify its actions in line with other generally accepted principles. Once Russia managed to stage an operation against Georgia without paying serious political costs (Western reaction was not harmful to Russia), Georgian perception is that the next time Moscow will do it again without a fear of paying high political or economic costs.

Another serious external threat emanating from Russia is the instability in the Russian Northern Caucasus. Serious deterioration of security there may harm the neighboring Georgia because of the possible spill-over effect. Before the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games

one can expect tighter security control in the Northern Caucasus but after the Olympics and the NATO's exodus from Afghanistan, when Russia will definitely try to strengthen its military and security measures in the Central Asian direction, it would be logical to expect the possibility of deterioration of the security situation in the North Caucasus.

Georgia is multiethnic and multi-confessional society and the country is going through a democratization process. All this contributes to the already weak socio-political cohesion of its population and makes the country more sensitive and vulnerable to internal ethnic, religious and social cleavages. This also increases the threats of separatism and even armed conflict in case of support from neighboring states, as it happened already in two former Georgian autonomous regions - Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are recognized by Russia as independent countries but, seen by Georgia and the international community as occupied territories. Hence, possible threats to internal stability of Georgia may come not only from the above-mentioned breakaway provinces but also from other areas populated by ethnic and religious minorities. From this point of view the state-minority relations must be among the most important problems of Georgia's security system in order to prevent internal tensions and separatism threats.

Because of the widespread poverty and high level of unemployment, the socio-economic conditions also create risk of internal instability in Georgia. Georgia is not isolated from the global economic processes and global economic crisis naturally has a negative impact on the country, contributing to even greater deterioration of socio-economic conditions and increasing the risk of domestic disorder.

Serious threat to Georgia's security may also come from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which in the case of its awakening can trigger another Armenia-Azerbaijan war, with the involvement of more powerful player in the conflict (Eugene Kogan. *The South Caucasus Countries and their Security Dimension In Neighborhood Policy Paper* by Dimitrius Triantaphyllou (Ed.) CIES, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, #11 March 2013, p.2). First of all it would be Russia, which is linked to Armenia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and by a bilateral defence treaty. One cannot also rule out a possible Turkish involvement in the conflict, making Georgia's security situation extremely sensitive and dangerous because Russia would put its support behind Armenia, using Georgia as a military transit route, threatening Georgia's sovereignty.

In addition, ensuring cyber security is a serious challenge for Georgia. When a hostile country is exerting a pressure on another state, a cyber attack is extremely effective and relatively inexpensive instrument to do so. Georgia has its own bitter experience in this regard during the 2008 war and faces a challenge to create critical infrastructure for ensuring cyber security. The creation of cyber security critical infrastructure should be considered as

an urgent task. Unfortunately, Georgia's security system at the time of this writing lacks either technological or human resources, which adds even further to problems of ensuring the security of National cyberspace. It should be noted that neither the National Security concept, nor the Defence Strategy Review pays enough attention to defence of National cyberspace.

Summing up, the main external threats to Georgia's security still come from the Russian Federation given that Georgia's determination to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures – mainly NATO – is seen as unacceptable by Russia. This fact increases even further the threats and challenges coming from Moscow. Possible deterioration of the regional security environment (re-escalation of the Karabagh conflict, critical situation in the Russian Northern Caucasus, conflicts concerning other regional countries) would pose serious threats to Georgia's security.

Institutions/SS-Coordination: The “doomvirate” lacks coordination

The Russian military aggression of 2008 revealed vividly the need of close cooperation between the security sector institutions. After 2008 the reform of the National Security Council (NSC) took place and it acquired real significance. In addition to the already existing advisory functions, the NSC was tasked with managing all crises related to National Security at the highest political level (The mentioned changes were reflected in the legislation approved in May 2011). To elaborate strategic documents defining common policy in the security sphere, permanent interagency committee for coordination of the drafting of national security strategic documents was established at the NSC following the Presidential Decree of October 16, 2008.

The October 2012 elections created a reality when the whole government and the majority of the parliament became filled with people from the Presidential team. The government, including the NSC permanent members represents the Georgian Dream coalition, while the President and the NSC Secretary, the United National Movement. The peaceful cohabitation between these two political forces is quite dire and the situation has created obstacles to effective cooperation between security institutions.

In the aftermath of the elections, the Minister of Defence was appointed the vice-Prime Minister. This should have aided the improvement of coordination between security agencies. This did not materialize and already in January of 2013, the Minister of Defence was stripped of that function and the post of vice-PM in charge of coordinating security agencies within the cabinet was abolished (Officially there are still two vice-PMs, but they have different functions).

In the light of the difficult process of cohabitation, this abolishment created even more difficulties in coordinating security institutions. However, we can say that the problem is not of institutional nature. The mechanism of coordination and cooperation is exactly outlined in the legislation, but its effective implementation completely depends on the existing power balance between the political subjects and their political will. Regrettably after the change of government, the NSC meetings have not been convened (based on the data of March 2013). Despite that the coordination and cooperation has not been interrupted at the middle level between agencies, and the coordination under the framework of NSC on the level of political appointees of the agencies is less visible. The coordination format is more or less present in the governmental meetings, even though it cannot fully substitute for the functions of the NSC.

It is important that the above-mentioned shortcomings are eliminated in the near term, including the operational issues. In addition, timely creation of the various strategic documents, envisioned by Georgia's National Security Concept would be helpful.

Civil-Military Relations and Parliamentary Control of Armed Forces: More civil control is underway

The implementation of democratic control over the armed forces is one of the defining factors for Georgia's Western aspirations and approximation with NATO standards. The mechanisms of control are described in the legislation: The head of the Ministry of Defense is a civilian; the functions of the Ministry and the Joint Staff are clearly defined and distinguished from one another. Moreover, there is a Defence and Security Committee within the Parliament responsible for the implementation of democratic control over the armed forces. Also, there are several non-governmental organizations operating in the military-defence field that successfully cooperate with the Ministry of Defence.

Despite that, the last indexes of the Transparency International Ranking put Georgia into the D category, right among the countries with the risk of high level of corruption in the defence sphere. This is mainly due to the lax transparency of procurement procedures and tenders, HRM policy, compensation and benefits system, and equality issues, as well as the parliamentary democratic control over the armed forces. After the October 1st parliamentary elections, several complaints have been lodged regarding suspicious agreements signed in the defence sphere.

In order to perform civilian control effectively it should be understood that democratic control is not limited to parliamentary control, but also encompasses control by the society as well. There are several proven and successful models of inclusion of the civilian sector in NATO member states to achieve cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces which can be adopted in Georgia in order to establish Western best practices.

The initiatives, currently in the working format are remarkable and the cooperation with the Ministry of Defense increased significantly. In March 2013 the Cooperation Memorandum between the NGOs had been signed between the Parliamentary committee of Defence and security, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The establishment of thematic groups is also being considered with the formats of cooperation including different spheres in order to improve transparency, reforms, human rights protection, NATO approximation, education, and to also ensure the preparation of strategic documents.

One of the crucial factors in introducing the system of democratic control is total depolitization of the Armed Forces. Special Services, Armed Forces, and law enforcement agencies and structures in general should be free from the ideological-political influence of any group, including the ruling political party. The structures should be politically neutral and perform under the control of democratically-elected government. It should be highlighted that the above-mentioned approach already appeared in the *Minister's Vision 2013-2014*, with the current minister of defence giving up his party responsibilities, as soon as he got appointed, which is also remarkable.

In order to raise awareness among the society about the latest developments in the defence sphere, not only holding briefings and press conferences is important, but also the introduction of regular *White Papers*. These have been issued only twice, and included a very general description of the defence policy continuum and no clarifications on any actual issues, including the defence budget spending. According to the Minister's Vision 2013-2014, after a long pause "White Paper" is to be issued. It should take into account the past mistakes, interest of the society, and the best practices of NATO countries (e.g. Great Britain).

Professionalization vs. Conscription: Can we afford a professional army?

According to the new Georgian government's declaration, after 2016 Georgia should have a professional army. The commitment towards the full transition to army's professional standards is reflected in *Minister's Vision 2013-14*. The first step in this direction has already been taken. Past 2013, the term of compulsory service in the Armed Forces is reduced from 15 to 12 months. Nowadays, service in the Armed Forces is as follows:

- Professional army – 4 year contract with the extension possibility. No more than 37, 000 servicemen in total.

- Compulsory military service for 12 months – conscription takes place twice a year (in spring and autumn). All young men between the ages of 18-27 not enrolled in universities are subject to military service, if deferment does not apply. The cost of 18 month deferment is 2000 GEL (approximately 900-1000 EUR). Postponing of conscription is permitted only twice until the age of 25 years.

- Reserve – 45 days of service per year. This obligation applies to every male between the age of 27-40, which applies to approximately 300, 000 people.

The talks about the professional army are on-going over the last years. According to the government plans, as of 2009 Georgia should move to the professional army system, though the previous government was not able to uphold the above-mentioned goal. Shortcomings in the military sphere (including the HRM), low remuneration and inexistence of social package for contractors as well as the Russian invasion in 2008 were the main reasons for not fulfilling these promises.

As a result of the above-mentioned considerations, since 2010 the government increased the term of service in the armed forces from 12 to 15 months. The government argued that this was to fulfill the tactical, theoretical as well as physical training program. However, the majority of the field experts cite the low motivation to serve in the conscripted armed forces that led to army's staffing problems.

In 2012, the transfer process to the professional army was rejected. President Saakashvili officially declared the necessity to maintain the overall conscription, stating that in the country like Georgia, a professional army as well as conscripted military service should co-exist (Press Office of the President, 2012).

The changes in positions as well as unfulfilled promises show that the action plan for the transition to the professional army needs further work, which in turn needs extensive public discussion in order to reach a consensus. The army should reflect the demands of the country, taking into account current as well as future risks. The implementation of the model of professional armed forces hinges on a number of important issues.

Troop level – Georgia should determine the optimal number of armed forces that would allow the country to meet its international obligations as well as defence needs. In this regard, it needs to be taken into account that 20% of the country's territory is occupied by a foreign state (Russia). Therefore possible resumption of military operations should be considered as one of the important factors.

Economic factors and attractive conditions for the military staff imply adequate remuneration and social benefits package. Professional army requires additional expenses associated with the following factors: a) Country's economic development and b) rational defence budget spending and minimizing unplanned for costs as well as taking various reforms (e.g. to root out corruption).

Reserve system should also be transitioned to the professional level, which implies the existence of adequate remuneration and social package for reservists, which also requires additional expenditures.

Capacity-building and training system for professional, high qualified military staff is still in the process.

Qualified human resource management, maintenance of professional staff as well as full de-politization of the armed forces and institutional sustainability – since 2004 until present Georgia has changed the structure of armed forces several times and replaced 8 times the Chief of Joint Staff. Significant changes were undertaken in terms of heads of different divisions of the staff. Each issue requires serious study and pragmatic decisions. Study of the practice of different states and inclusion of local as well as international experts in formulating the action plan is one of the important approaches, besides each decision being based on consensus.

Defence Planning and Resources Management: Never a dull moment!

In April 2006 the parliament of Georgia approved the Law on Defence Planning (№4130, changes adopted 12/17/2010). The above-mentioned document forms the basis of defence planning and defines specific requirements and responsibilities. The law, among other stipulations foresees the elaboration and revision of legal acts on the strategic level of defense planning, as well as elaboration of documents on defense planning on agency-specific level. The strategic level documents on Defence Planning are: National Security Concept of Georgia, National Threat Assessment Document, and National Military Strategy. The agency-specific documents on Defense Planning are: Workbook on Defense Planning, Core Programs on Military Development; Annual Plan; Operational Plans, concepts, doctrines, regulations and directives of the Minister of Defence of Georgia.

Due to the changing realities, these documents require constant revision and improvement. The above-mentioned issue became acute brought about by the August 2008 war and the occupation of part of the Georgian territory. In 2009, with coordination of the Georgian National Security Council, the process of revision of the National Security Concept of Georgia got under way in order to establish unified governmental approach and institutionalize the security policy of the country. The process includes the development of a package of conceptual and strategic documents in three phases: the drafting of the fundamental strategic documents, adoption of agency-specific strategies, and the drafting of the National Security Strategy of Georgia.

The fundamental strategic documents are The National Security Concept of Georgia, and Georgian Threat Assessment Document 2010-2013. As for the agency-specific strategic documents these are: Georgian National Military Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2013 (SDR), which is based on National Security Concept of Georgia and Georgian Threat Assessment 2010-2013. Most of these documents should be revised by 2014.

From the agency-specific documents the most actual one is the Workbook on Defense Planning; the document based on the National Security Concept of Georgia and the Minister's Vision (MV). The document is elaborated for the Ministry of Defence in order to give detailed instructions for the fiscal year and make calculations for the next three years.

The aim of the document is to support the drafting of the budget 2013 and development of 2014-2017 defence program. The document defines the defence goals and tasks and prioritizes the resources necessary for supporting these goals. Based on the Workbook on Defense Planning, MoD is mandated to create Defence Development Programs to create a unified integrated program that spans a 4 year period (fiscal year +3 years).

According to the "Minister's Vision 2013-2014," the improvement of defence planning and resource management system is a key priority of MoD. In this regard MoD has gone through various reforms during previous years; however establishment of a long term planning and resource management system remains a challenge. Based on MV's directive, MoD conducts detailed study and assessment of the existing resource management and acquisition system. One of the critical challenges in this area is related to the lack of properly trained and qualified personnel. To remedy this, MoD plans to organize specifically tailored training programs to enhance professional capacity of the employees in the areas of resource planning and management.

In order to study and evaluate the existing system adequately, it is important to involve invited specialists who are not restricted by the intra-ministerial culture. This will create the grounds for maximum transparency of the process (with consideration for the Ministry of defence specificities), of conducting realistic and objective analysis of the existing situation. In this case there will be an opportunity to fully assess the system's strengths and the weaknesses. One of the key components in this sphere is the increasing personnel qualification. Investment into this sphere brings serious material benefits for the country, because rational planning and effective management of resources is a precondition for moving to savings, and development of highly effective and smart defense system.

Parallel to this process, it is important to adopt best practices from other countries and conduct regular consultations with the states that successfully managed to solve similar problems. The best examples are Eastern European countries - they have managed to conduct important decreases in the budget as well as reorientation of the whole defence doctrine. An important challenge for these countries was the elimination of consequences of the Warsaw Pact and establishment of the Western systems. They managed to achieve it with the support of partner states, with the process ending with the Eastern European states entering the NATO alliance. Today Georgia stands on the same track, but has even more complicated challenges to resolve, because in addition to the heavy legacy of the Soviet Union, the

situation is compounded by Russia's military presence on 20 % of Georgia's territory and unstable security situation in the South Caucasus. That is why it is even more important for the country in the transformation period to have the support of the allies and to share in their best practices. Based on the evaluation and adoption of best practices, the country will be able to create a suitable modern strategy of resource management and planning.

Georgia's Defense Budget: Ups and downs

Since the Rose Revolution of 2003, defense budget started to grow slowly, but already in 2006 – 2008, it grew dramatically and was among the fastest growing military budgets in the region. This can be explained primarily by the special attention given by the Saakashvili government to the country's security system reform and the modernization of the Georgian armed forces in particular. Georgian army, ill-equipped and badly clad and fed before Saakashvili government came to power, received serious amounts of resources in order to buy more modern weapon systems, ammunition and other military hardware. Dramatically increased payments to servicemen aimed at making the armed forces more attractive and effective. Significant financial injections were made in the construction and reconstruction of military infrastructure (air bases, ammunition depots, barracks, etc). One more serious reason for such large-scale investments in the armed forces was the growing fear of possible resumption of armed conflict (with *de facto* Russian involvement) in the conflict areas (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the hope of the Georgian authorities that small but well-equipped and well-trained Georgian army would make Russians and separatists think twice before embarking on military actions against Georgia.

The 2008 August war with Russia revealed many weaknesses of the Georgian armed forces and inflicted serious damage to military and military infrastructure of the country. Almost one fourth of Georgia's military hardware and the bigger part of its military infrastructure was destroyed or seriously damaged.

After the war, Georgian authorities tried to compensate for the damage but economic crisis and certain post-war economic and political conditions did not give Tbilisi much possibilities and economic resources to pay serious attention to its armed forces. Military budgets became smaller and smaller and reached the lowest point in 2010.

Defense Budget	GDP	Defense Budget	GDP
Year	(GEL)	(GEL)	%
2004	9 824 300 000	172 177 721	1.75 %
2005	11 620 900 000	366 765 145	3.16 %
2006	13 789 900 000	684 039 590	4.96 %
2007	16 993 800 000	1 494 535 313	8.79 %
2008	19 074 900 000	1 547 183 106	8.11 %
2009	17 986 000 000	869 015 694	4.83 %
2010	20 743 400 000	728 007 459	3.51 %
2011	24 229 000 000	728 427 012	3.01 %
2012	26 967 500 000	728 500 000	2.70 %
2013	29 291 700 000	660 000 000	2.25 %

\$ 1 USD = GEL 1.69

Defence Transformation – Trends and Challenges: Transformation is our motto!

Defence transformation is one of the key tasks before Georgia on the way to its membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. One may say that since it gained independence, the country has been in search of effective defence model. During this period a number of plans and concepts have been developed; even the structure of the armed forces has been changed several times. There were subjective and objective reasons behind these efforts. On the one hand, it was justified by the need of development and reforms and on the other hand, it was linked to the often-changing leadership with subjective ideas on various issues and their ambitions to carry out reforms better than their predecessors. However, in some cases the quality of “better reforms” was defined by subjective feelings rather than pragmatic calculations based on analysis of the existing shortcomings.

Presently, the issue of transformation and reforms still remains the key challenge for Georgia. Defence Transformation Process is guided by the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Major reform plans are reflected in the bi-annual “Minister’s Vision (MV)” document. The SDR sets mid-term priorities for GAF transformation. Critical elements of Georgian defence transformation are institutional, structural, and systemic in nature. According to “SDR 2013” and “MV 2013-2014” improvement of the GAF command and management capabilities are envisioned through the following structural changes:

- Restructuring Joint Staff into General Staff;
- Abolishment of the Land Forces Command;
- Establishing East and West Operational Commands;
- Establishing J-5 Strategic Planning Department within the General Staff;

- Establishing Maritime Planning Department within the General Staff;
- Establishing the Military Inspection Office (Force Readiness) aimed at monitoring the readiness level of forces;
- Establishing of the Aviation and Air Defence Command to streamline command and control mechanisms and properly utilize the existing aviation and air defence capabilities.

Establishment of the armed forces fully compatible with NATO is one of the key tasks. With this goal it is important to introduce the following changes: a. establish identical structural organization of the armed forces in peace and wartime; b. the method of top-to-bottom force planning scenario (centralized planning with decentralized implementation); c. Put accent on command development programs; d. form small, well organized and trained forces with modern equipment.

The analysis of opportunities shows that presently the land forces need additional resources to carry out conventional operations of territorial defence. It is necessary to improve mobility, air defence and anti-tank capacities, command and control, gathering of the intelligence information, ensure provision of equipment and logistics. In addition, there is a need to improve training in peace time through the following: development of the programs of the necessary tasks and doctrines meeting the needs of the armed forces, improvement of professional development programs for sergeants and commissioner officers, procurement of communications equipment and investments in modern training technologies.

In line of the afore-mentioned, the new initiative to abolish the command of land forces and to establish the east and west command instead is of high importance. This initiative has already been highlighted in the SDR. In the opinion of the Ministry of Defence and the command of the Joint Staff, the mentioned approach will make the existing system more effective. The east and west commands in the areas of their responsibility will be able to carry out operative command and control of detachments under their command; it will eventually contribute to the improvement of the process of planning, coordination and implementation. In addition to establishment of the territorial commands, transformation of the Joint Staff into the General Staff is also being considered as part of the structural changes into the armed forces of Georgia and with the goal to optimize the command and control mechanisms.

Development of the air defence is also of importance. Russia's invasion in 2008 has clearly showed the full power of threats coming from the air. We can distinguish two approaches in the organization of the air defence: "structural" and "systemic." The "structural" approach implies development of air defence detachments according to the types of forces: air defence of military-air forces or air defence forces as a separate type, air defence of land forces (so-called troops air defence), and air defense of the navy. Military experts point out that in case

of the “structural” set-up, interaction among the air defence is weak, there are unnecessary command structures for various types of forces and have limited authorities.

In this case, the command is disintegrated and ineffective. It’s difficult to ensure security both in peace and war times. They frequently disturb each other and do not take any measure hoping that another structure will do so. With such approach, there is no unified system of state air defence and it only has a declarative character (see Salukvadze, 2013).

Transforming to the “systemic” approach is reasonable to achieve a more rational and effective usage of air defence means. “Systemic” approach implies subordination of air defence means to one person based on territorial principle. For a country with small geographical area, it is reasonable to organize air defence means into one type.

The air defence system of NATO is split into territorial zones, districts and sectors. The task for Georgia is not to establish the air defence system that is only technically compatible with NATO but also to form a structure that could be easily incorporated within NATO system in case Georgia’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Human resources, expert potential, military education: All we need is skills!

Human Resources and professional personnel as a whole represent one of the important challenges for Georgia. This issue is also acute in the Defence sphere. This refers to the civilians in the Ministry of Defence, as well as to the GAF. Unfortunately in Georgia a vicious tradition of changing high rank as well as mid-level personnel whenever the head of department/agency is changed still persists. Between 2004-2012 eight Chiefs of Joint Staff and the same number of Ministers of Defence have been appointed in Georgia. Each of these changes was followed by the personnel changes and shake-ups affecting the whole system. The only exception was the last change of the defence minister in November 2012 when the core working team within the ministry was left untouched.

Becoming a Defence professional takes time and that’s why MoD considers human resources the most important asset of Georgia’s defence system. Due to the specific character of the defence system and limited experience in managing defence institutions, MoD has been facing challenges in human resource management. Despite external assistance in HR management, MoD needs to concentrate considerable attention and resources on HR related areas, such as training, education and institution-building.

Human Resource Development and Management issues are widely addressed in “Strategic Defense Review 2013” and “Minister’s View 2013-2014.” Activities to be implemented in the sphere of human resources, professional military development and training and education are highlighted in SDR IP, and are as follows:

- MoD plans to improve conceptual framework to support MoD HR management, professional military development and education systems;
- Maximize employee engagement in developing a modern HR system;
- Introduce or update necessary regulations and manuals;
- Maximize effectiveness of foreign professional development programmes;
- Build and strengthen local training and educational institutions including national defence academy, cadet school etc.;
- Introduce appropriate mechanisms to support consistency and sustainability of institutional memory;
 - Enhance social and health care system of military personnel and civilian employees;
 - Utilize outside expertise (NGOs, think tanks, academic community) in order to fill existing gaps in different fields.

Today the HR management and Educational Systems are under unified management and are monitored by the deputy minister of defence. Such management underlines the prioritized position of HRM issues within the ministry. Important steps are being taken in the directions of development of military as well as civilian personnel management systems. The concepts and strategic projects on HRM, as well as organizational and job descriptions and additional qualification requirements for the base units have been elaborated.

Special attention is placed on development of the educational system. It is important that the component of academic education has a valuable place within the military education system.

It is also necessary to adopt best practices from successful countries according to which the military servicemen interchangeably study and serve during their career.

During the last three years the military education reform was ongoing with high intensity. At this point all the officer schools have been united under one organization: National Defense Academy. It is highly recommended that the system is split into three parts. Specifically, the initial educational component for the officers should stay within the academy, the Captain Career School should turn into independent organization, and the Command and General Staff School would be a separate college. It will accept the majors and vice colonels with a 4-5 year service interval; thus one is considered the continuation of another, the credits shall be united and after graduation from the School of Advanced Defence Studies the Masters Degree would be awarded.

At this stage of reforms the bachelor degree component of the academy has been completed and the Captain Career School has undergone significant changes. If earlier it was made up of several independent courses, now it has moved under united management. Therefore the programs have been improved and the resource optimization has been done. It is important to continue these changes and reach the stage at which it would include not only the learning

programs, but also ethics and new standards in learning. More inclusion of international advisors in the process of program improvement, adoption of new procedures, improvement of legislative basis, etc. also planned.

An important component of Officer Education is Command and General Staff School. For this purpose a 9 month full course has been elaborated. The school has merged with the Command and General Staff College and awaits further development.

The School of Advanced Defence Studies is at the planning stage and is to represent a higher level of the command and general staff college. Most of the programs and a management plan have been prepared, the Human Resources have for the most part been staffed, accreditation procedures are passed, within the framework of operational arts, close cooperation with partner state institution is established, and most of the work is already concluded. The School of Advanced Defence Studies should be the highest component of the military educational system of Georgia, with the graduates of this institution receiving a Masters' degree.

Key drivers of Security Sector Reforms - external and internal: It is great to become an aspirant

The fundamental reform of the security sector in Georgia was carried out after the Rose Revolution in 2003. As a result, the state gained qualitatively western type of security system instead of the post-Soviet one. During this period, the reforms have been carried out at the Ministry of Defence; the position of the Minister of Defence was staffed by a civilian and accordingly the functions of the Minister of Defence and Joint Staff were split.

The reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs proved to be successful. Full dismantling of Soviet security system (KGB) was also successfully carried out. Security Council, border management, foreign intelligence, protection service, system of justice and other segments of the state security were reformed as well. It's true that it was not possible to reach the same level of success in all fields but in general an entirely different system of security was created, one that has nothing common with Soviet and post-Soviet systems of the 90s.

The next wave of reform is connected with 2008 and the following period. Here one of the important factors is the military aggression of Russia against Georgia that has significantly changed the security environment in Georgia and in the region as well. All the mentioned aspects have preconditioned radical transformation of the means and opportunities that are meant to eventually strengthen the national security of the state.

National Security Concept of Georgia was revised and approved in 2011; the document defines national interests, values and elaborates the basic directions of the security policy. According to the document, the main challenge of the country is the occupation of the Georgian territories and the threat of new aggression from the Russian Federation. Therefore,

the main priorities of Georgia's security policy are as follows: de-occupation of occupied territories, restoration of territorial integrity, strengthening the state sovereignty and the development of defence and security systems.

Georgia's desire for NATO and European Union membership is the second important factor and implies a lot of "homework" in various fields, among them in the security sector. Georgia is successfully implementing the Annual National Program – an important instrument for integration into NATO. The format of Georgia-NATO commission operates successfully as well. Together with the annual national program, the commission is the main mechanism for implementation of the Bucharest Summit conclusions and facilitation of Georgia's membership into NATO. However, despite permanent progress in the way of reforms Georgia understands that it needs more efforts than other aspirant countries in order to integrate into the North Atlantic Alliance. Only successful reforms can change the negative security environment that was created as a result of the Russian invasion.

Georgia also understands that the main obstacle on its way to western integration is the threat coming from Russia. Therefore, all the efforts of the security reform are directed to convince Georgia's western partners that Georgia is committed to solving the existing territorial problems only through peaceful means. It should be underlined that European and Euro-Atlantic course of Georgian foreign policy serves first of all the sustainable democratic development and the security of the country and is not directed against any other country.

Today the main directions of Georgia's Security Policy are as follows:

- Reoccupation of the occupied territories and settling relations with Russian Federation
- Development of state institutions and strengthening democracy
- Implementing Policy of Inclusion
- Development of Georgia's Defence and Security Systems
- Becoming a member of NATO and integration into the European Union

And last but not the least, the most important factor to conduct the modernization of the security system and reforms is the strong public will of Georgian society to create a state, which ensures free, peaceful and successful development of its citizens and society. That is why security is considered not only from the military-political scope, but also includes all the segments necessary for democratic development of the state and society.

Missions abroad

Georgia is an active contributor to the Euro-Atlantic security. In 1999-2008 Georgian troops served alongside NATO troops in the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo providing a company size unit as a part of the German brigade and an infantry platoon within a Turkish battalion task force. Georgia had 2,000 troops deployed in Iraq, making it the third largest

contributor of forces. Moreover, Georgian forces in Iraq were not merely guarding bases, but controlled an entire province of the country on behalf of the US-led coalition and conducted full-scale combat operations, albeit with significant US assistance. The US commanders in Iraq often preferred to operate with Georgian units over those from other coalition partners because Georgian units could be used without national caveats and were allowed to perform actual combat operations and did so with a high level of tactical skill.

Currently Georgia provides two full infantry battalions serving with the US forces, an infantry company serving with the French contingent in Kabul, instructors for training the Afghan National Army, medical personnel to assist ISAF within the Lithuanian Provincial Reconstruction Team, and some individual staff officers. With a total of around 1,600 military personnel, Georgia remains among the largest contributors to ISAF among NATO partner countries. Georgia also participates in NATO's Operation Active Endeavour, a counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean, primarily through intelligence exchange.

Place of Armed Forces within security sector - mission, raison d'être: Still much to do

Objectives of Georgian Armed Forces (GAF) are outlined in the National Military Strategy. The mission of the GAF is to protect independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, participate in international operations and assist civil authorities during natural and natural disasters. The types and composition of GAF is defined by law. The structure of the Armed Forces is approved by the President of Georgia, while the strength and size of the Armed Forces is approved by the Parliament of Georgia.

Besides the functions described in the legislation, it is important to know that the function of GAF has gone through qualitative transformation and its main goal is not loyalty to specific regime, but the defence of the country and shared values. It can be stated that the GAF today has become a part of society and not the mechanism of repressions. The GAF is financed and created by the people, and the society is involved in the building and development process. Therefore, GAF should serve the society and fulfill its requirements.

Of course the primary goal of the army remains to defend the state interests and ensure its security. On one hand the army has a status of the state defender, guarantor of sovereignty and national pride, but on the other hand it is a symbol of strict power and might appear as the potential threat to human rights and freedoms, and as a mechanism of repressions. Georgia has managed to change the perception of security and state interests; as a result the task of GAF has been defined in accordance with the democratic state. To put it into a scheme, the Soviet Security Model: The security of a sovereign + regime security = state

security has transformed into the democratic model: citizen security + security of the society = state security.

Georgia, despite the occupation of its territories and high security risks in the region in general, does not consider the GAF as a foreign policy instrument. The new government officially confirmed its commitment to non-use of force, which the President of Georgia has announced on November 23 of 2010 in Strasbourg, during his speech in European Parliament (see resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on Main Directions of the Foreign Policy of Georgia, March 7 2013). This is why most of the politicians and experts talk about renaming GAF to Georgian Defence Forces.

As for the participation of GAF in international operations, Georgia perceives this as a part of its own security, because in doing so it shares the responsibility of participation in collective efforts to react against the challenges the world faces. Georgia is not only a consumer of the international security system, but also one of serious contributors to the system. That is why contribution to the peacekeeping, police and civil operations is considered one of the important components of defending national interests. Therefore the main National Security priority is integration to NATO. Defence Policy of Georgia is aimed at defending the country from direct aggression and reaching approximation with NATO standards.

The main goal of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia (MoD) is to create agile, mobile, modern, fully professional and NATO interoperable Armed Forces. The Ministry puts special attention to measures directed towards the development of the national military forces to respond to challenges of the modern world and stand for the defence and security of their country. These measures aim to introduce contemporary standards in the education and training system to further develop the personnel management system, improve the command and control system, increase interoperability with NATO, and to foster Euro-Atlantic integration.

References:

- [1] *Composition of the National Security Strategic Documents*, <http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/legislations/kanonqvemdebare%20normatiuli%20aqtebi/strategiuli%20dokumentebis%20SemuSavebis.pdf>, 15.4.2013.
- [2] *Corruption Perceptions Index 2012*, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>, 15.4.2013.
- [3] Kogan, Eugene, 2012, *Armenia's and Georgia's Security Agenda*, Internationales Institut für Liberale Politik Wien. SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTLICHE SCHRIFTENREIHE, Wien, July 2012.
- [4] Kogan, Eugene, 2013, *The South Caucasus Countries and their Security Dimention*. In: Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios (ed.), *Neighborhood Policy Paper*, CIES, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, #11 March 2013, p.2.
- [5] *National Military Strategy of Georgia*, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, <http://mod.gov.ge/assets/uploads/files/58267NMS-2007.eng.pdf>, 25.4.2013.
- [6] *National Security Concept of Georgia*, National Security Council of Georgia, <http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/National%20Security%20Concept.pdf>, 20.4.2013.
- [7] *On Approval of Threat Assessment for 2010-2013*, National Security Council of Georgia, Decree of the President of Georgia N 707 September 2, 2010 Tbilisi http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/legislations/policy/threatassessment2010_2013.pdf, 10.4.2013.
- [8] *On the Approving the Regulation and List of the Office of National Security Council of Georgia*, National Security Council of Georgia, The Decree of President of Georgia, 31 December 2010, http://nsc.gov.ge/files/files/legislations/kanonqvemdebare%20normatiuli%20aqtebi/aparatis_debuleba.pdf, 15.4.2013.
- [9] *Planning, Programming and Budgeting System*, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, <http://mod.gov.ge/en/PPBsystem/>, 10.4.2013.
- [10] Salukvadze, Amiran, 2013, *Methods of Gradual Development of Air Defence Systems and Recommendations*, <http://army.ge/?p=1184>, 11.02.2013.
- [11] *Strategic Defence Review 2013-2017*, 7 July 2012, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Press Office of the President, 20.4.2013.
- [12] *The Georgian President introduced a new Minister of Defence*, 4 July 2012, <https://president.gov.ge/ge/PressOffice/News?p=7676&i=3>, 21.4.2013.
- [13] *The Law on Defence Planning*, Parliament of Georgia, (changes adopted in 12/17/2010 №4130).
- [14] *The Military Balance*, 2012, IISS, London, Routledge, 2012.
- [15] *The Ministers Vision 2013-14*, Ministry of Defence of Georgia, <http://mod.gov.ge/assets/uploads/files/947442Ministers%20Vision%20Eng.pdf>, 25.4.2013.

Interviews:

[1] Andro Barnovi – Former Rector of National Defence Academy of Georgia, February 27, 2013.

[2] Batu Kutelia – Deputy Secretary of National Security Council of Georgia, February 21, 2013.

[3] Levan Dolidze – First Deputy Minister of Defence of Georgia, March 26, 2013.

Chapter 4: CZECH REPUBLIC

Vít Střítecký, Ondřej Ditrych

This chapter aims to observe the security sector reform in the former Czechoslovak Republic and one of its successors, the Czech Republic. It begins with the overview of the transition process which was characterized by the efforts to rapidly abandon the system based on internal control of the Communist Party and external control provided by the Red Army and its advisors. After introducing the transition that has generally been considered successful, the chapter will highlight some critical issues that have often remained hidden behind the good reputation of professionals operating in foreign missions. From this perspective the chapter will mainly focus on the virtually non-effective strategic planning, which is opening room for several informal practises that are gradually corroding the system from within.

Transition Process in the 1990s: An Overview

In this section, the processes focusing on the reform of Czech(oslovak) armed forces in the early 1990s are surveyed. The narrative is structured around 4Ds: De-politicization, De-sovietization, De-militarisation, and Doctrinal Change (Eichler, 2004). At the end of the section, several remarks are included on the topic of transition of the intelligence and police apparatus that largely resulted in the disbanding of the State Security (*Státní bezpečnost*, StB) which had operated in both areas.

Needless to say, the first concern for the leaders of the opposition in the revolutionary days of 1989 was to ensure that the Czechoslovak People's Army (*Československá lidová armáda*, ČLA) – until then ideologically framed as the 'iron fist of the labour class' (in other words, of the authoritarian regime) – would not stand in the way of transition to democracy. Whereas it is presently close to impossible to reconstruct the exact decision-making processes of the high-ranking military (and security) professionals in this period due to lacking documentary evidence,¹ it appears that the idea that the army should be used to avert the regime's collapse was not seriously considered.² This, however, must be in part due to the lack of foresight by the makers of the far-reaching reforms that were soon to come.

The first among these reforms was the *De-politicization* of the armed forces. The de-politicization had an institutional, personal, and (governmental dimension. Institutionally, Communist Party organisations within the army were soon disbanded, and the positions of

¹ For a notable effort to reconstruct the processes involving primarily security professionals see Suk, 2003; and for an early account featuring conspiracy theories about willingness of the security professionals to allow the regime to collapse see Bartuška, 1990.

² This despite the fact that several influential apparatchiks including the ideological secretary of the Communist Party Vasil Bilak and Minister of National Defence Milán Václavík rhetorically called for reckoning with the 'rightist elements'. The army leadership, lacking clear instructions from the disoriented political establishment and approached by the opposition, took no action against the popular movement.

‘political officers’ (informally known as *politruks*) were abolished. This was paralleled by organisational changes at the Federal Ministry of Defence, in particular the dissolving of the ‘main political administration’ (*Hlavní politická správa*) – a body through which control was exerted over the military affairs by the Communist Party (in the broader context of centralisation of power in the party, rather than state institutions, which was characteristic of the socialist authoritarian regimes in the CEE. On the personnel level, the de-politicization meant cutting the links of primarily officers with Communist party membership (in the 1980s, 82% of the officer corps had been party members) (Tuma, 2006, p. 6) and purges which befell primarily the political officers and the top brass – by 1993, almost no generals appointed before the Velvet Revolution were left in active service. The institutional and personal changes finally facilitated a (govern)mental reform away from the previously deployed technologies of the ideological indoctrination of the armed forces, and towards assuming a standard role assigned to military in democratic states.

De-sovietization stood for the removal of Soviet advisors planted in the armed forces, paralleled by the (geo)politically significant withdrawal of Soviet troops occupying Czechoslovakia based on an agreement reached in February 1990. It also referred to initial restructuring of the military soon to be followed by doctrinal changes (see below). This restructuring meant turning away from the Soviet model of dividing the armed forces into large organisational units, armies and circuits, forming together a ‘*front*’ – the only non-Soviet front existing in the former Eastern bloc, deployed alongside the border with the aim of engaging in intense ‘defensive’ (but actually offensive) warfare.

The third reform was one of *De-militarization*, instituting civilian control over the military (and defense in general). This entailed several tasks. First, the ministry of defence had to be put in charge. Second, it had to be made into a civilian institution, which meant substitution of military personnel by civilian staff in many positions (predicated on the creation of a pool of civilian expertise in defence policy, which had been lacking entirely) and instituting a civilian head of the ministry. Luboš Dobrovský, a former dissident and a close associate of President Václav Havel, became the first civilian defence minister not immediately, but in the fall of 1990, succeeding Gen. Miroslav Vacek who had been chosen to the office as the former Chief of Staff in the last Communist government but retained his position in the first transition government of Marián Čalfa. Instituting civilian control over the military would normally include also establishing mechanisms for review of defence policy and military budgets, which until that time had been under virtually no scrutiny in Czechoslovakia. However, due to the persistence of informal practices and lack of civilian expertise, these two tasks were not achieved at this stage (Eichler, 2004).

The profound geopolitical change that Czechoslovakia underwent with the fall of the Eastern bloc and the subsequent ‘return to Europe’ must have by necessity triggered the process of

Doctrinal Change in the Czechoslovak, and later Czech armed forces. Hence, as soon as 1990, the first revision of the military doctrine was adopted. It reflected the growing obsolescence of the Warsaw Pact and the fact that the Czechoslovak People's Army no longer played only a dependent role in the Soviet military planning. Interestingly, this version of the military doctrine reflected the newly gained emancipation and an ambition to achieve independent defence capability against attack from any quarter, with some understanding of the need to maintain expeditionary force to be deployed in U.N. operations in which Czechoslovakia was now taking part. This started with UNAVEM I Angola and UNTAG Namibia - already before the Velvet Revolution and continuing with the *Desert Storm* and UNGCI in Iraq, and later UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia (initially, a volunteer army force was being assembled and deployed in the operations). The consequences of this re-organisation were relocation, restructuring and some reduction of forces including the limiting of the numbers of tanks or artillery materiel. Following this initial period, the geopolitical objective for the country became the integration with NATO. It was a gradual process. Initially, the preference of President Havel, under the influence of his fellow dissident and independent Czechoslovakia's first foreign minister, Jiří Dienstbier, was drafting a new and comprehensive security architecture building on the CSCE framework (hence Havel occasionally spoke of it as 'Helsinki 2') headquartered in Prague and with the USSR as a member (Havel, 1991). But reflecting on the possible repercussions of the USSR's internal crisis for the ongoing transition in the CEE and under the influence of close collaborators such as Alexandr Vondra, Michael Žantovský and Karel Schwarzenberg, during 1991 Havel came to see integration into NATO as the best guarantee that the political and economic reforms in the region will continue (even before the membership in the EU). Thus he reconceptualised the NATO as a symbolic institutional manifestation of Euro-Atlantic values (Ditrych, 2013). The military doctrine reflected this turn in gradual diminishing of the importance of the territorial defence – albeit it could be argued that it remained inter-subjectively the key consideration in the military circles for some time to come (that despite the fact that in the Soviet strategy only limited capability was once to be dedicated to the territorial defence whereas a mass of Czechoslovak forces was to be thrown into the Western offensive). This was confirmed by a white paper and the new military strategy (1995) including the concept of 'two-level' armed forces that put more emphasis on the expeditionary army in approximation to and in view of coordination with NATO (and also against the background of the security environment in the Balkans, where the Czech army contingents would be deployed since 1996 under the lead of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR).³

Regarding the transformation of the armed forces, it is important to point out several relevant contexts which had a bearing on, if not the direction, then the pace and modality of the 4D reforms. First, the military reform was not a priority of any of the successive government

³ On the transformation of Czech military thinking see also Khol, 2000.

in this period, while doctrinal reform followed political decisions taken on the integration in the NATO. Second, the political conditioned the military reform also in promoting a (govern) mentality of resistance to long-term planning, which was considered inappropriate on the (neo)liberal ideological grounds in all spheres of state policy. Third, whereas the pool of civilian experts in the administration was successfully created in this period (see above), there still remained – and admittedly remains to this day – little expertise in military matters in the parliament, limiting the capability for public oversight. Finally, the reorganisation was significantly influenced by the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Federation – with the military assets divided in general according to the 2:1 ratio in favour of the Czech Republic – and the creation of a new army (*Armáda České republiky*, AČR) in 1993.

In the first years following the Velvet Revolution, the reform of the intelligence community was a major task conditioned on overcoming the previous regime's civil intelligence and counterintelligence functions falling under the auspices of the much feared State Security (in the broader sense of the word encompassing 1st and 2nd Directorate of the Federal Ministry of Interior) (see Cerny, 2007; Zeman 2007). Following its disbanding in 1990 new institutions were created: The Bureau of Foreign Relations and Information (*Úřad pro zahraniční styky a informace*, ÚZSI), initially under the Federal Ministry of Interior and since 1993 under the Czech Ministry of Interior, several successive institutions performing civil counter-intelligence (ÚOÚD, FIS and FBIS under the Federal Ministry of Interior and BIS, *Bezpečnostní informační služba* under Czech Ministry of Interior since 1993), Intelligence Service of the General Staff (*Zpravodajská služba generálního štábu* (ZSGŠ) performing military intelligence activities and succeeded in 1994 by Military Intelligence Service, *Vojenská zpravodajská služba*), and finally Military Defensive Intelligence (*Vojenské obranné zpravodajství*, VOZ). It is worth mentioning that while the military counterintelligence, formerly the 3rd Directorate of the Federal Ministry of Interior (VKR) was newly subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, attempts to emancipate the successive civil counterintelligence services from the Ministry of Interior's reach were unsuccessful. In 1994, an “overarching law” 154/1994 Sb. was passed, which interestingly, among other provisions defined a legal framework for the activities of civil and military intelligence. On the other hand, in practice the capacity for public overview of the services' operations remained very limited. In all services, a degree of personal continuity was preserved, dictated by the necessity to retain the existing know how and avoid having to create new services from scratch. Purges were conducted, however, only after sanction by review committees.

The disbanding of State Security (StB) also affected policing, now conducted exclusively by the Public Police (*Věřejná bezpečnost*, VB), which has since 1991 transformed into Czech Police (*Policie České republiky*, PČR). The so-called Vigilant police units under the Auxiliary Public Police (*Pomocná stráž VB*) as an instrument of regime's surveillance were

disbanded. In 1991, however, a new law on municipal police (553/1991 Sb.) was passed, which made it possible for municipalities to establish autonomous policing units. No gendarmerie force was created despite its tradition going back to Austria-Hungary and the interwar Czechoslovakia.

False Impression of Formal Reforms

The consolidation of the Czech armed forces has recently been reviewed as successful (Kříž 2010, Tuma, 2006). Kříž has convincingly showed the shift to the legitimate political control over the military as well as that the characteristics of the legal framework are not different from systems functioning in traditional democracies. Additionally, he has argued that a stable and sustainable consensus has been reached among the political elites and the military regarding the general political orientation of the country (Kříž, 2010, p. 634-637). He has concluded that several problems still continue to exist (such as corruption, the lack of public interest, and the lack of political will to invest more into defense); however, these do not significantly deviate from the situation in other European consolidated democracies (Kříž, 2010, p. 643).

As the previous section suggested, the Czech Republic could be viewed as a post-communist country with relatively settled security policy and consolidated armed forces. Although several critical issues have repeatedly cropped up during the last two decades following the Velvet revolution, they have been almost always attributed to the complicated process of post-communist transition. The consolidation of the Czech armed forces has been, to a large extent, perceived through the successful performance of elite army units in various external missions. However, this attention has overshadowed several serious problems that have afflicted the system from within.

After introducing the phases of security sector reform of the Czech armed forces, the chapter will focus on the problematic issues. Namely, the Czech defense acquisition practices in a wider context of the Czech strategic defence planning. As the White Paper on Defence of 2011 (White Paper on Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011), by far the most in-depth and critically oriented reflection of the Czech defence sector, maintained, the internal conditions of the Czech defence sector in certain areas reached the existential threat level. Although the internally odd system was covered up by the relative successes and professional conduct of the elite units, recent economic realities definitely underlined the need to introduce reforms that would make the system sustainable.

In line with the traditional theoretical approaches (Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1961) the previous part has shown how the crucial issue of political control over the military was established and how within this context the civil-military relations were developing. This

perspective has been dominated by the analysis of legal and institutional frameworks (Bruneau and Tollefson, 2006; Born, Capalini, Haltiner and Kuhlmann, 2006, Watts, 2002). Another part of the civil-military literature focuses on the actual functioning of the planning and decision-making processes. This literature is based on the liberal democratic framework that provides a crucial context for these inherently political issues (Schiff, 1995; Burk 2002). From a wider perspective, the latter part of the civil-military relations features various accounts of the existence and functioning of security and strategic cultures (Klein, 1991, p. 3-23; Gray, 1999; Hyde-Price, 2004; Katzenstein, 1996).

The following part will attempt to show that the institutionalist perspective focusing on formal processes of control and day-to-day management provides an incomplete picture and overlooks some crucial dimensions related to the invisible political economy of the defence sectors. Indeed, a closer look at the functioning of the Czech acquisition system in a wider context of strategic defence planning will reveal some essential problems explaining the recent difficulties and the need for essential reforms.

The establishment of the structures for civilian political control of defense policy and policy-making faced several challenges, shared with other countries of the post-Communist Central Europe. Andrew Cottey has aptly summarized the challenges as follows: shifting de facto control of defense policymaking and implementation from general staffs to ministries of defense; civilianizing defense ministries, which had been almost entirely military organizations; building up cadres of civilian expertise in defense policy; putting mechanisms for meaningfully reviewing defense policy in place; and securing detailed control over defense budgets and expenditure (which had previously been “black boxes” under the control of the military, if anyone at all) (Cottey, 2007, p. 278; Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, 2002, p. 31-56). After introducing the process of security sector reform in the previous part it could be concluded that in the Czech case the first three mentioned challenges were tackled successfully, however the consolidation in the other two failed. It happened not because of the lack of legal and institutional arrangements but due to the informal practices hidden behind the formal arrangements.

After achieving the 4Ds mentioned above the most important part of the reform processes became practically connected with NATO enlargement (Simon, 1996; Khol, 2000; Tuma, 2006; Khol 2004). The emphasis on gradual convergence with NATO became clearly reflected in the *Czech White Paper and Military Strategy* approved in 1995 (White Paper on Defense of the Czech Republic, 1995; National Defense Strategy of the Czech Republic, 1997). In line with the reform processes of NATO itself these documents introduced the strategic plan to build two-level armed forces that were meant to be ready to protect the Czech territory as well as to contribute to external missions. At the same time the

“NATOization” was also stimulated by the involvement in supporting programs such as the Partnership for Peace. More specifically, the Czech air defense was transformed to be incorporated into the NATO common air defense system and the unification also affected the logistic norms as well as weapons systems. The most visible changes were to the structure of the army that became divided into four pillars. The first operational pillar consisted of forces under the NATO *Command*, the second included forces *Assigned* for NATO, the third encompassed the forces *Earmarked* for NATO, and finally the last pillar operated under the national command. The first three pillars were planned to become flexible, highly operable and capable of high firepower. Nevertheless, despite the reform endeavor strategically aimed at creating a “balanced army”, the Czech army was only able to commit to fulfilling a mere 22 % of 132 goals obtained from NATO after the accession and failed to meet even the revised Force Goal 2000.

It could be argued that the Czech reform endeavour to a large extent depended on mechanical copying and imitation of Western institutions and formal practices. Whereas large parts of the 4D processes were driven by internal dynamics, the re-structuring of the forces as well as the formation of adequate frameworks of civil-military relations resulted from external pressure and transfer of know-how (learning). Paradoxically, despite being understood as a prerequisite for successful post-Communist transformation by the new post-Communist elite, radical interference into the army by external political powers was evaluated critically by some Western observers (Watts, 2002).

Despite a decisively positive impact of external motivation on the Czech entry to NATO, the essential problem with the mechanical emulation of mature NATO members lies in the fact that it has given the impression about a *fully* successful consolidation of the Czech Republic. Such a view hinged on the discourse which reiterated the single goal of the country of being re-integrated to the Western security community. However, this project did not finish after the Czech accession to NATO, but has translated into enduring Central European Atlanticism. In the political reality, it has become manifested in many subsequent issues and engagements and has reached the level of discursive hegemony in the Czech Republic (Hynek and Střítecký, 2010a, p. 179-187); Hynek and Střítecký, 2009, p. 19-30; Hynek and Střítecký, 2010b).

With Atlanticism being used as an automated answer to and justification for all key decisions concerning the Czech defense sector, the country’s defense procurement and acquisition policies have become broken and virtually reform-resistant. The post-Communist reforms aimed at consolidating the Czech military were considered to be accomplished through successful and internationally appreciated engagements in external missions: the primary priority of Czech Atlanticists (Střítecký, 2012; Střítecký, 2010). The point here is not to criticize the Czech strategic direction, but rather to show how these externally driven the

efforts and mechanical copying of the West on the surface, boosted by specific political narratives, prevented the defense sector from undergoing critical introspection or “lessons learned.” While the Czech Republic has gained credit for its professional performance in Allied external military involvements, other dimensions of the Czech strategic planning have become irrelevant, losing almost any significance for strategic choices and policy conduct.

Czech Defence Systemic Acquisition Failures

The following part illustrates that the Czech defense acquisition policy has been conducted without a proper strategic framework, not least in the area of capabilities development. Moreover, the non-inclusion of strategic planning to defense acquisition decisions has produced major inconsistencies and inefficiencies at best and tremendous waste and depletion of resources at worst. Indeed, the practices in the area of defence acquisition clearly constitute the reverse side of functioning of the Czech security sector.

The post-Cold War defence acquisition environment has been characterized by the so-called capabilities-based approach to strategic planning (Davis, 2002). Standard application of the capabilities-based approach takes place in four steps. First, the documents should recognize the nature of the geopolitical and geo-strategic environment. The post-1989 Czech policies have been heavily informed by geopolitical assumptions which have not been underpinned by sound analysis (Drulák, 2006). Second, the planners should review the current state and future prospects of capabilities that may be available to potential enemies. Third, ideas gathered during the first two steps should provide the opportunity to define several contingencies and subsequently set the requirements. Finally, the financial budgets should be estimated and reflected in the midterm planning. In effect, the priorities, future investments and defense procurement and acquisition policy ought to follow from such specific requirements. The entire analysis does not require any particular threat assessment.

That said, the Czech strategic acquisition has not followed a specific capabilities-based logic. Nevertheless, the process has not been completely random or chaotic. Indeed, a closer look at the situation reveals that the entire system have been to a large extent driven by a certain logic which we shall call here a product-based approach. The logical reasoning behind this approach did not begin with a strategic assessment but instead focused on the product that could be purchased by the security agencies. It logically follows that such an acquisition strategy could hardly be efficient in terms of both public expenditures and strategic appropriateness. Furthermore, the conditions under which such a system operates creates a fertile soil for various shady and corruption practices.

It should be emphasized that there is a difference between the domestic and foreign acquisitions. From the domestic perspective the product-based logic might not be fully exceptional given that many states tend to support their industrial base through domestic

acquisitions. Quite often, the efficiency of such a decision is evaluated based on calculating the wider economic and political benefits. Even in these cases, however, the product that should be purchased is mostly required by the armed forces. The potential ineffectiveness with regard to public expenditures then lies simply in the absence of international competition. However, the Czech experience provides ample examples where the decisions to procure was preceded by the explicit refusal from the end user.

In case of foreign acquisitions, the product-based logic might be considered as irrelevant as the foreign supplier would not qualify for any national support. Nevertheless, despite this legitimate idea, this practice has actually prevailed in the Czech Republic. The explanation lies in the specific legal environment defined by the Act 38/1994 that was amended no sooner than in 2010. According to this norm, all foreign acquisitions in the area of defense must be mediated by the legal entity registered in the Czech Republic. Given the minimal potential of the Czech market, it is not surprising that none of the major foreign industrial actors registered in the Czech Republic is able to trade directly with the state agencies. As a result the crucial role was attributed to the Czech mediators that became the neuralgic points of the entire acquisition system (Střítecký, 2010, p. 104-106).

The provisions of the Act 38/1994 had certain legitimacy in the early 1990s during the massive transformation, where the links to the procedures and processes in NATO have not yet been fully established. After this specific period the provision became clearly redundant. It must be mentioned here that this law was unique and was not in effect in any other NATO or EU member state. More importantly, the mediated deals often became synonymous for, mildly put, non-transparent conditions. The results of these acquisitions have been largely questionable in terms of costs and contractual conditions that followed from the diverging interests of the state and mediating companies. Moreover, many of the products that were procured were not needed by the armed forces. Rather they were forced to accept these unwanted solutions. In practice some of the acquisitions strongly resembled a situation where a mediating company was able to induce the demand at the Ministry of Defense and very quickly broker an offer from a foreign supplier.

To illustrate the above-mentioned practice the chapter will now briefly allude to some cases that raised many questions regarding the cost and utility of the purchased items. In April 2008 the Topolánek government approved the acquisition of four CASA C-295M military transport aircraft. The product, worth 3.5 billion CZK plus 5 L-159 planes, was selected without an open competition. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence agreed to pay an extra one billion CZK for the three-year service support to the Czech Omnipol Company - also chosen without public and open competition. Even during the period preceding the final decision, the Chief of the General Staff openly refused the aircrafts due to their insufficient capacity

and flight range (Střítecký, 2010, p. 104-110). Additionally, the Czech Republic had to face a serious threat of being charged by the European Commission for not honoring the EU legislature regarding free competition.

In September 2009 the army accepted the first 17 armored personnel carriers Pandur produced by the Austrian-American company Steyr and established the Czech state-owned military service company. This was followed by the signing of a contract between the Ministry of Defence and the winner of the repeated public competition, the mediating company Defendia CZ, according to which the Czech state would purchase 107 vehicles for 14.4 billion CZK by 2013. Quite interestingly, the Czech Republic in the end planned to acquire 199 vehicles for 21 billion CZK. The purchase was justified by the alleged needs of units serving in foreign missions, namely Afghanistan. However, in the end the deployment of Pandurs in Afghanistan has been marginal since, as the experts had rightly criticized, they were not suitable for the Afghan environment.

Another public competition that was lacking a fair acquisition procedure was organized in the end of 2009. In October the Ministry of Defence announced its intention to buy Iveco light armored vehicles for 2 billion CZK in a deal with the Slovak army. The price was increased several times and the press report made public on 23 December 2009 (!) called for 90 vehicles at the total cost of 3.62 billion CZK – completely dismissing the previous agreement, making the argument that this fast acquisition was advantageous. It should be noted that the contract was legitimized by the previous purchase of 15 Iveco vehicles for 499 million CZK that was signed along with the acquisition of 15 Dingo 2 armored vehicles, brokered by the MPI Group. Even a quick glance at the acquisition cost shows that the Ministry managed to negotiate a unique “quantity hike,” since the per-unit price for the 90 vehicles was roughly 20 % higher than was the case with the first 15 vehicles. Even if the price of the advanced military equipment is a complex issue dependent on technical specifications, the Norwegian army purchased Iveco vehicles for a quarter of the Czech price (for details see Střítecký, 2010, p. 109-110).

These few cases are by no means exhausting. They were meant to illustrate the commonalities and practices typical of the activities that heavily drained the Czech defence budget in the last two decades. It should be stressed that these and other cases were not products of “mere corruption” but they resulted from the gap in the Czech strategic defence planning that allowed for quick decisions driven by mediating companies and supported by weak supporting arguments often imposed on end-users. These mechanisms clearly worked within the formal institutional and legal setup that was consolidated already in the early 1990s. In this sense the Czech case clearly suggests that informal processes functioning below the formal arrangements can have an essential impact on the overall state and functioning of

the defence sector. It provides a great lesson learnt for countries undergoing reforms in the security and defence sector.

References:

- [1] Bartuška, Václav, 1990, *Polojasno*, Praha, Ex Libris.
- [2] Born, Hans, Capalini, Marina, Haltiner, Karl W. and Kuhlmann, Jurgen (eds), 2006, *Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change*, London, Routledge.
- [3] Bruneau, Thomas C. and Tollefson, Scott D. (eds.), 2006, *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military relations*, Austin, University of Texas Press.
- [4] Burk, James, 2002, *Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, *Armed Forces and Society*, 29.
- [5] Cerny, Oldrich, 2007, *The Aftermath of 1989 and the Reform of Intelligence. The Czechoslovakian Case*, in Born, Hans and Caparini, Marina (eds.), *Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants*, London, Ashgate.
- [6] Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, Timothy and Forster, Anthony, 2002, *The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations*, *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 2002 vol. 29 no. 1.
- [7] Cottey, Andrew, 2007, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in the New Europe*, *OSCE Yearbook 2007*, Hamburg, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy.
- [8] Davis, Paul K., 2002, *Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-based Planning, Mission System Analysis, and Transformation*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation.
- [9] Ditrych Ondřej et al., 2013, *Understanding Havel*, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 4.
- [10] Drulák, Petr, 2006, *Between Geopolitics and Anti-Geopolitics: Czech Political Thought*, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 11., No. 3.
- [11] Eichler, Jan, 2004, *Bezpečnostní politika ČR: výzvy a problem*, Praha, Ministerstvo obrany.
- [12] Gray, Colin S., 1999, *Strategic Culture as Context: the first generation of theory strikes back*, *Review of International Studies*, 25.
- [13] Havel, Václav, 1991, *Address at the NATO Headquarters*, 21 March 1991.
- [14] Huntington, Samuel, 1957, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- [15] Hyde-Price, Adrian, 2004, *European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force*, *European Security*, 13, 4.

- [16] Hynek Nik and Střítecký Vít, 2010, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Site of Ballistic Missile Defence*, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43(2).
- [17] Hynek Nik and Střítecký Vít, 2010, *The Fortunes of the Czech Discourse on the Missile Defence*, In: Braun, Mats and Drulák, Petr (eds.), *The Quest for National Interest: a Methodological Reflection on Czech Foreign Policy*, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang Verlag.
- [18] Hynek Nik and Střítecký Vít, 2009, *Divided We Stand: Limits of Central European Atlanticism in the New Era*, *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* 4.
- [19] Janowitz, Morris, 1961, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 2nd edition.
- [20] Katzenstein Peter J., 1996, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post-war Japan*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- [21] Khol, Radek, 2000, *Old Strategic Thinking in the New Strategic Environment: Problems of Adaptation of the Security Policy of the Czech Republic*, Rome, NATO Defense College.
- [22] Khol, Radek, 2004, *Czech Republic In: Security Handbook 2004. The Twin Enlargement of NATO and EU*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
- [23] Klein, Yitzhak, 1991, *A theory of strategic culture*, *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 10, Issue 1.
- [24] Kříž Zdeněk, 2010, *Army and Politics in the Czech Republic Twenty Years after the Velvet Revolution*, *Armed Forces and Society*, <http://afs.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/04/05/0095327X09358649>.
- [25] *National Defense Strategy of the Czech Republic*, 1997, Ministry of Defense.
- [26] Schiff Rebecca L., 1995, *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered? A theory of Concordance*, *Armed Forces and Society* 22, 1.
- [27] Simon, Jeffrey, 1996, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
- [28] Střítecký, Vít, 2012, *Security and Securitization in Central Europe*, In: Drulak, Petr and Sabic, Zlatko, *Central Europe in Global Politics*, Palgrave/MacMillan.
- [29] Střítecký, Vít, 2010, *Security Dimension of the Czech Foreign Policy* In: Kořan, Michal et al., *Czech Foreign Policy: 2007–2009*, Prague, Institute of International Relations.
- [30] Suk, Jiří, 2003, *Labyrintem revoluce*, Praha, Prostor.
- [31] Tůma, Miroslav, 2006, *Relics of Cold War: Defence Transformation in the Czech Republic*, SIPRI Paper No. 14, Stockholm, SIPRI.

[32] Watts, Larry L., 2002, *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control*, *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 30, 1.

[33] *White Paper on Defence*, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, 2011, <http://www.army.cz/ministry-of-defence/newsroom/news/the-white-paper-on-defence-2011--63155/>, 13.7.2013.

[34] *White Paper on Defense of the Czech Republic*, Ministry of Defense, 1995.

[35] Zeman Petr, 2007, *Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic: Current Legal Status and Its Development*, http://www.uzsi.cz/uploads/cis_2006.pdf, 13.7.2013.

Chapter 5: HUNGARY

Otto Kalo, András Rác

Introduction

This study intends to provide a comprehensive overview of the security sector reform in Hungary, addressing both the police and military aspects. The analysis is prepared in the framework of the research project led by the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), supported by the International Visegrad Fund. The aim of the study is to pinpoint those experiences and practices that could be used by the three South Caucasus countries, and particularly by Armenia.

The preliminary study, conducted in 2012 pointed out the needs of the three South Caucasian countries in the field of security sector reform in the broader sense, e.g. concerning both the armed forces and the police. As the project operates with responsibilities shared between the Visegrad countries, this paper aims mainly at elucidating those experiences that may be useful for Armenia. In line with the broader interpretation of the term ‘security sector’, though the study focuses on the armed forces. In addition, it briefly examines the situation of the police and – when published sources permit – of the security services as well.

The article is composed of four main parts. First, the 1989 situation is briefly overviewed, e.g. those conditions, from which Hungary had to start its security sector reform following the democratic transition. The second chapter focuses on the main institutional and structural changes that took place during the reform. The main objective of the project is policy advising, besides some best practices mentioned, the third chapter examines steps and practices that turned out to be either unsuccessful, or completely failed during the Hungarian security sector reform. In the fourth, concluding chapter concrete policy recommendations are made.

The starting point after the 1989 transition

Before the 1989 transition, the Hungarian Armed Forces – then called Hungarian People’s Army - were under the direct control of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, and thus indirectly of the Soviet Union. The Communist power structure was involved in each and every level of the military-related decision-making. The armed forces had domestic tasks as well, namely ‘supporting the rule of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party.’

The army was formally under the control of the Ministry of Defense – even in spite of the fact, that almost all ministers were active or former soldiers, and that there was hardly any military decision-making autonomy in the context of the Warsaw Pact (Szemerényi, 1998, p. 194-195). There was no civilian or democratic oversight of any kind: The Parliament had

no meaningful powers over the army, and civil society was non-existent. The ruling party and the MoD Directorate General for Political Affairs managed to keep strict control over all army-related social activities and initiatives (Molnár, 2002, p. 30-31).

As a result of the Soviet subordination, the General Staff of the Hungarian People's Army was separated from the Ministry of Defense, and the only common point was the minister himself. This structure guaranteed the army a very wide autonomy and practical immunity from any civilian oversight, including budgetary questions. Not surprisingly, the People's Army was haunted by extreme cases of corruption and misuse of public resources, often committed by high-ranking officers, including Minister of Defense, General Lajos Czinege.

In addition to this Sovietized army, large Red Army contingents were stationed in Hungary. Since the anti-Soviet revolution effort in 1956 these troops have been hardly visible to the average Hungarian citizens, and they have refrained from any direct political interference. However, their presence was obvious even without any demonstrative showing, and they constituted an important political tool in the hands of Moscow.

In the pre-1989 period, the size of the Hungarian People's Army exceeded 100,000 soldiers, composed largely of conscripts. Such a large armed force was far from sustainable for Hungary, a country of ten million people. This oversized armed force lagged far behind the Western armed forces due to the general economic hardships of the 1980s and inefficient, often not properly planned reform efforts - both in terms of organizational structures and equipment (for more information, see *A Magyar Néphadsereg a Kádár-korszakban 1956-1989*).

The police of the pre-1989 era was a highly centralized and militarized organization. Besides common public policing functions, it also had political tasks, namely the control and repression of any domestic opposition or protest movements. Due to its militarized structure, the police was almost completely detached from the society. In line with the anti-democratic nature of the Communist regime, public support for the police was not important at all. The security services functioned under direct control of the Communist power via the ministry of interior.

When the democratic transition came, and the reform of the security sector became necessary, the new democratic government had to face a number of crucial challenges, both internal and external. The most important internal challenge was due to complete lack of regulatory expertise. There was practically no knowledge available on how to reform ex-Communist armed forces, particularly amidst the economic and social hardships of the democratic transition.

Institutions and personnel were also missing, both from the government side, and from the

newly formed political parties. There were no civilian professionals with any expertise in security and defense policy, thus the decision-makers had to rely on the expertise of active and former *siloviki*. The nascent civil society faced similar problems.

Not surprisingly, the old security sector elites were highly committed to maintaining their old positions and privileges thus were seriously opposed to any meaningful structural reforms. Their administrative resistance was another important hindrance factor.

In addition to all these obstacles, the civil war in Yugoslavia also affected the Hungarian security sector reform, and particularly the armed forces. The full-scale war underway in the direct neighborhood of Hungary in 1992-1995 and also the subsequent Kosovo conflict had an asymmetric effect on the Hungarian armed forces. In terms of equipment, the threat of war did a lot of good, as the government was pressed to procure new armaments (MiG-29 fighters, tanks, APCs, etc.). However, in terms of organizational structure, the war significantly slowed down any meaningful structural reforms.

The security services have been the most efficient in resisting the reform efforts of the democratic governments. One could observe certain continuity with the pre-1989 era, both in terms of leadership and organizational structures. There were a few cases even well after the transition when the services interfered in the domestic politics. However, in spite of the numerous scandals, no lustration (vetting based on previous regime-affiliation) took place almost at all, even until today. Files of the Communist secret services are still not made public, and the public still has only very scarce information about the Communist collaborators, agents and such. The lack of a large-scale, systemic lustration is a unique phenomenon in Central Europe, and may be interpreted as a gauge of just how powerful the still existing pre-1989 structures have been.

Structural and institutional changes in the Hungarian security sector

Following the democratic transition, quick de-politicization took place in the Hungarian army, renamed to Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). This was conducted in conjunction with a large-scale reduction in personnel and equipment. The security policy background changed as well: after units of the Soviet Red Army left Hungary in the summer of 1991, and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the Hungarian government decided to pursue integration to NATO.

As it was mentioned earlier, the civil war in Yugoslavia contributed to the modernization of HDF armaments, but prevented any significant institutional changes inside the army. Following the end of the war in 1995, the HDF started to participate in international crisis management missions. The first mission for the HDF was the IFOR (International Force) operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fundamental structural reforms came only after Hungary joined NATO in 1999. A year later finally the General Staff could be integrated into the Ministry of Defense, though only following serious staff conflicts resulting in the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff. Through integration to the Alliance full and complete civil control could finally be ensured. The level of reforms in the legal environment (defining the army-related rights and competences of the state bodies, etc.) was set up already in the 1990s, with the integration of the General Staff as the last necessary step.

Besides, in 2004 conscription was brought to an end, and the HDF switched to a fully professional model. The length of service for conscripts had gradually been reduced from 18 to 6 months since 1989, but the system remained inefficient, expensive and unable to meet the requirements of a mission-centric NATO army.

Currently the HDF keeps approximately 1000 soldiers serving in international crisis management missions. The largest ones are the operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. The commitment to maintain this relatively high contingent (compared to the overall strength of approximately 28,000) has been highlighted by the new National Military Strategy, adopted in December 2012 (Governmental Resolution No. 1656/2012 on the adoption of the National Military Strategy of Hungary, Article 38).

The most important challenge the HDF has to face is linked to the serious, lasting shortage of financing. Instead of the 2% defense spending proscribed by NATO, currently Hungary spends less than 0,8 per cent of its GDP on defense purposes. Moreover, as envisioned by the new Military Strategy, this extremely low level of spending will be maintained in the strategic sense as well. Even in ten years' time (by 2022 the aim is to reach only 1.39 per cent of the GDP (Governmental Resolution No. 1656/2012 on the adoption of the National Military Strategy of Hungary, Article 55).

The police was much less affected by the reforms, particularly in the 1990s. The old, militant attitude was preserved, and no meaningful reforms took place. The first structural change took place in 2004, with the integration of the Border Guards into the police following the EU-accession.

Three years later in 2007, when Hungary joined the Schengen Zone, additional changes took place. As Hungary became the South-Eastern edge of the Schengen zone, border control on the Eastern and Southern sections of the Hungarian border had to get significantly strengthened. This resulted in a temporary shortage of personnel in the affected zones.

Besides, Hungary became a buffer zone for international migration to Western Europe. The increasing migration pressure meant a considerable challenge for the police, and had a negative effect on human rights, concerning particularly the rights of the detained migrants.

The police reacted to the new challenges by modernizing the border control systems and strengthening crowd management units. These new units are able to handle larger migrant inflows as well; they operate detention centers, refugee stations, etc. Conditions there are far from ideal: Hungary is frequently subject to international criticism due to the treatment of the detained migrants.

Another new challenge was connected to the riots in Budapest in the autumn of 2006. As the police was largely ill-prepared to properly handle massive, violent riots, the rioters were able to capture and set fire to the building of the Hungarian State Television, causing severe losses to the police - both in terms of equipment and prestige. A month later, on 23 October the police again could not handle the crowd that gathered to protest against the government and to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. Though many protestors again turned violent, most of the crowd was peaceful. Nevertheless, the police – still not properly trained and equipped – used indiscriminate violence against them. Hundreds were arrested and dozens heavily beaten. Inquiries and trials for compensation were going on for years.

However, the government and the police learned the lesson well. Following the 2006 events, units of the riot police received extensive training (both in terms of operational tactics and human rights!) and brand new equipment. The reforms were so successful that now the Hungarian riot police provides crowd management trainings to many other national police forces, including the ones from the Western Balkans.

Since 2010 a new trend has emerged in the Hungarian police, often called as a ‘Strong State’ concept. The government of Viktor Orbán (in power since 2010) established a united, centralized, large counter-terrorism unit, the Counter Terrorism Centre¹ responsible also for numerous traditional police tasks, such as the capture of violent suspects, etc. Besides, significant additional resources were dedicated to the police, both in terms of personnel and financing. At the same time, political control over the organization became generally stronger.

Following the democratic transition, important reforms took place in the security services as well. After the Soviet advisors left Hungary, the de-politicization of the secret services became of primary importance. First and foremost, domestic intelligence (earlier aimed against the political opposition and dissidents) was immediately terminated. Second, the subordination of the services was changed in order to further de-politicize them. Instead of belonging under the Ministry of Interior, the separate position of a Minister without Portfolio Responsible for the Secret Services was established. By detaching the secret services from the Ministry of Interior, their political neutrality could be better ensured. From time to

¹ For more information see its official website.

time certain services were re-subordinated to different governmental bodies (for example, there was a period when the external intelligence belonged under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the military services belonged under the MoD, etc.)² however, in the authors' opinion so far the best solution was the Minister without Portfolio. Another check in the new institutional structure is that the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (a body responsible also for the oversight of the secret services) has been always headed by an MP from the opposition parties.

In addition to these, numerous methodological changes took place in the sector as well. The main focus area has shifted from the West to the East and the South (e.g. the Balkans). This required new expertise, new field knowledge, new language skills and technical modernization. However, in spite of these changed requirements, the services were able to avoid large-scale, fundamental personnel changes and the internal structures remained mostly unreformed.

An interesting aspect was that the new Western partners requested Hungary to disclose former leaders of the Communist secret services and uncover the former networks. However, Budapest refused to oblige, mainly in order to maintain the trust inside the services. The West quickly accepted this decision.

There have been several ups and downs particularly in the organizational background of the services.³ Right after the transition, the idea was to separate them from each other in order to ensure a more effective civilian control. Thus in the 1990s Hungary had five separate secret services. However, a new trend of concentration can be observed, as two military services (military intelligence and military counter-intelligence) were recently merged.⁴

The best and worst practices – mistakes not to be repeated

The two decades of the Hungarian security sector reform contained not only success stories. There were also several mistakes that were made along the way. Most of them were connected to the sheer lack of experience and routine, though there were a few cases, when particular group-interests played a decisive role.

The need for consensus and public legitimacy

A general lesson of all reforms conducted in the post-1989 period is that wide political consensus is absolutely necessary for any successful reforms to stick. In the case of the army, the will to join NATO, and later, to fulfill NATO requirements provided the necessary motivations and consensus. Thus far, since the first free elections in 1990, in the Hungarian government there was never any party with an anti-NATO agenda. All governing parties

² On the critique of the current system of control, see Hetesy, 2013, p. 24-26.

³ For a concise overview, see Boda, 2013, p. 52-53.

⁴ On the effects of the merger, see Kovács, 2013, p. 87-90.

always agreed on strong NATO commitment of Hungary, and this provided the political power necessary for the structural reforms.

The situation of the police was very different. In this case there was no such widely agreed, general political consensus. Consequently, the political will to conduct reforms could never be comparatively strong. The only meaningful exceptions were the Schengen-accession of Hungary and the need to upgrade riot police and crowd management capabilities following the events of 2006.

Another lesson learned was that without meaningful civilian oversight and strongly enforced respect for human and democratic rights, it is nearly impossible to gain lasting public trust. Regarding the police, the 2006 events demonstrated that obvious disrespect for human rights can quickly erode the public trust in any organization. On the contrary, the experience of the police reform in Georgia demonstrated very well the crucial importance of transparency and accountability.

The Hungarian security services have faced somewhat similar challenges - every time it was held that they interfered in the domestic politics: public trust eroded quickly, and criticism was further strengthened by the lack of transparency. The army is in a slightly better situation regarding the respect for democratic and human rights: in the fully professional army there is nothing similar to the infamous *dedovshchina* occurring in the Russian armed forces. Even in the pre-2004 conscript army, the treatment of newly enlisted soldiers was far from brutal, and has very rarely exceeded inconvenience.

Problems of rigid hierarchies and over-centralization

The reforms conducted in the 1990s in the HDF demonstrated also the strong ability of the rigid hierarchic structures (inherited from the Warsaw Pact) to either prevent, or significantly slow down any changes. As it was said before, the General Staff could successfully avoid getting subordinated to the Ministry of Defense for twelve years following the democratic transition! Particularly the higher echelons of the hierarchy tend to be very rigid and inflexible, with higher ranking officers and public servants doing their best to protect their positions and benefits. This has affected both the army and the police. The result is that the ranking structures have long been very unhealthy in the armed forces, suffering from an irrationally high number of generals and colonels, while at the same time there was a shortage of lieutenants and NCOs.

Another experience, concerning particularly the police is that over-centralization of the decision-making structures slows down the reforms and often prevents the introduction of meaningful changes. Besides, it blocks local initiatives, harms horizontal coordination, and prevents local decision-making even on the smallest of issues. Moreover, too quick a centralization empties the peripheries of talented and skillful officers. In the long run, it also

leads to counter-productive personnel selections, as creative, smart, dynamic people tend to leave the organization.

The importance of civilian expertise

Besides, as it was visible particularly in the 1990s, civilian expertise on security matters is of crucial importance. As long as policy-makers could not rely on civilian expert on security and defense matters, they had to work with *ex-silovik* advisors, who often represented the interests of their original organizational affiliation instead of expressing the will of the civilian- political leadership.

Hence, in order to gain the necessary civilian expertise, from 1999 on, the former Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University started to offer courses for civilian students as well, including B.Sc. and M.Sc. programs in security and defense policy, engineering, defense administration, and other areas. Thus, the university became a hybrid structure that trained both military and civilian students. This mixed model was so successful and civilian programs so popular that in 2011 the university had 2,691 civilian and 620 military students, thus civilians constituted 81.3% of all students (Report on the inspection of the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2012, p. 33). As was pointed out by an audit conducted by the State Audit Office of Hungary in 2012, besides supplying the central administration with trained civilian experts, this mixed model was also useful for maintaining the educational capabilities of the Defense University that would have decreased significantly parallel to the overall decrease of the armed forces (Report on the inspection of the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, 2012).

According to the Hungarian experience, well-educated civilian advisors are highly necessary for conducting equipment procurements as well. In the 1990s and early 2000s the HDF procured certain weapon systems that were either unnecessary, or had serious compatibility problems (see for example Nem vette át a Honvédség a katonai rádiókat, 2004). Without going too much into details, in many cases it could be said that ex-military advisors simply misled the untrained and inexperienced civilian decision-makers (for detailed analysis see Varga, 2006).

How to set up efficient research background?

Finally, the authors would like to stress that proper scientific and academic research with proper backing of institutions supporting security and defense-related decision-making is of crucial importance. The Hungarian experience shows that the main challenge is to find the right balance between academic independence and policy relevance. Independent institutions hardly have access to governmental information on ongoing reform or procurement projects, thus the policy relevance of their recommendations is often questionable. On the other end

of the spectrum, government-operated institutions may (though not always!) have access to the necessary internal information, but because of their affiliation often cannot make critical remarks. Yet another key issue is whether political decision-makers listen to the research institutions (including the governmental ones!) at all.

In Hungary, there is a well-functioning cooperation between the decision-making and the research sphere in issues of security and defense policy. Civilian researchers and analysts have the means to channel-in their opinions into the central defense administration, including at times highly critical remarks. Moreover, the decision-makers learned to rely on this expertise and use even the criticism in an efficient way. This cooperation is functioning well in spite of the fact that both competent centers are institutionally dependent on the government.

The key factor is the organizational culture and will that enable institutionally-dependent researchers to think, criticize and thus contribute to the decision-making independently. Governmental affiliation provides researchers with access to relevant information and decision-making channels, while the open, co-operative attitude of the central administration permits independent thinking. An important element of this success is the mutual knowledge of official structures and research centers. Many officials of the central security and defense administration have a background in the research sphere, and some fellows of the research centers have experience in working in the administration, thus they know the system from within.

Possibilities of experience transfer

Based on the factors discussed above, Hungary may contribute to the security sector reform in the South Caucasian countries in five main fields.

The first one is related to the institutional aspects of civilian and democratic control of the armed forces. The starting point for the Hungarian defense sector was highly similar to the one of the South Caucasian countries, and particularly to the ones of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Though the armed forces inherited from the Soviet times already went through certain reforms, particularly following the 1994 ceasefire, there is a long way to go to establishing meaningful democratic control over them. Hungary has rich experiences to offer, and not only limited to simply establishing the necessary legal and institutional structures, but also in operating them.

The second area where Hungarian experiences may be helpful is the training of personnel for international crisis management missions – namely NATO, UN, OSCE or EU framework. The Hungarian army has been participating in international crisis management missions since 1995, and considerable experience has been accumulated since then. Moreover, the HDF has a rich routine not only in mission participation, but also in providing trainings

to the officers of foreign – mostly NATO partner – armed forces. The same is true for the Hungarian police.

The specialty of Hungary is the training of military observers, both for UN and OSCE missions. The comparative advantage of being trained in Hungary is that such programs are much cheaper than in the West, while standards are the same. One has to add though that the Safarov-case (including the death of Armenian officer Lt. Gurgen Margaryan in Budapest in 2004), and the subsequent decrease of trust may pose a problem in this area that can be overcome only by joint efforts from both sides.

As a third area of possible experience transfer, one needs to mention the rich possibilities that can be offered by the Hungarian police. Hungarian police has accumulated a wealth of experience in operating the liaison officer system both in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, such as the EUROPOL, FRONTEX, INTERPOL, OLAF, and the competent EU Working Groups.

In addition, the already mentioned experiences and procedures in riot control and crowd management may be another valuable contribution. This includes a wide variety of tasks, ranging from securing mass events, sporting events (both local and international), various demonstrations and protests, etc. The latter would be particularly relevant for Armenia. The Hungarian police already provide crowd management and riot control trainings to several Western Balkans police forces and to some EU police forces. If such a request comes, taking into account the high number of police personnel who need to receive tactical training, probably the most cost-effective approach would have the Hungarian instructors travel to Armenia.

In addition, the Hungarian riot police have the capability for advanced rapid reaction and massive mechanized high-mobility capabilities as well. In the recent years, Hungary organized a country-wide, unified system of high-mobility rapid reaction troops. The organizational and operational experiences of this system have already attracted the attention of several Western partner countries, and may be relevant also for Armenia.

Management of cross border police operations, including surveillance, control deliveries and operating joint investigation teams may also be relevant for Yerevan, concerning, of course, mostly the police cooperation possibilities with Georgia. The Hungarian police also have rich experience in controlling illegal migration via in-depth control and advances inter-agency cooperation. Hungary may also transfer the know-how of operating common law enforcement contact points on the borders, as Hungarian border control officers have long been working together with their Austrian, Slovakian and Romanian colleagues on the borders. In the Armenian case, these experiences may again be relevant for the Armenia-Georgia border.

The fourth field of possible experience transfer relates to higher education, concerning both military and police. On the national level, in the former Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, considerable experience was gained in integrated education of military and civilian students, and in training civilian experts for the security and defense sphere. Its successor, the National University of Public Service may transfer the experiences of the integrated military, police and public administration education.

On the international level, besides receiving international (both civilian and military) students at the National University of Public Service, the Hungarian police may also provide important lessons learned about the operational experiences of the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA)⁵ and the Central European Police Academy.⁶ This way Hungary could contribute to the development of Armenian military and police education.

The fifth, final area Hungarian experiences may be relevant for Armenia is the practice of integrating civilian research into the national level security and defense policy decision-making. Transfer of these experiences would be the easiest and the most cost-effective of the five fields mentioned above, as it requires only study visits.

Of course, when we discuss the possibilities of cooperation in the security sector between Hungary and Armenia the recent negative developments in bilateral relations cannot be ignored. The Safarov-case indeed inflicted considerable damage on Hungarian-Armenian relations. However, low level, de-politicized cooperation projects, such as the transfer of practical experiences in SSR may help to rebuild the mutual trust and understanding between the two countries.

⁵ See more at www.ilea.hu.

⁶ See more at www.mepa.net.

References:

- [1] *'A Magyar Néphadsereg a Kádár-korszakban (1956-1989).'* [The Hungarian People's Army in the Kádár Era (1956-1989)] In: Kollega Tarsoly, István (ed): *Magyarország a XX. században.* [Hungary in the 20th century] I. kötet, <http://mek.oszk.hu/02100/02185/html/85.html>, 23.6.2013.
- [2] *'Nem vette át a Honvédség a katonai rádiókat.'* [Hungarian Defense Forces did not take military radios], 8 April, 2004, <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20040408nemvette.html> Last accessed: 25.6.2013.
- [3] *A Kormány 1656/2012 (XII. 20.) Korm. Határozata Magyarország Nemzeti Katonai Stratégiájának elfogadásáról.* [Government of Hungary: Governmental Resolution No. 1656/2012 (XII. 20.) on the adoption of the National Military Strategy of Hungary.] Budapest, 2012, Magyarország Kormánya. Article 38, http://www.kormany.hu/download/d/05/c0000/2012_1220_NKS.PDF Point 38, 27.6.2013.
- [4] Boda, József, 2013, *'A Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat helye és szerepe a titkos információgyűjtés rendszerében'*. [The place and role of the Special Service for National Security in the system of secret information gathering] *Hadtudomány*, 1-2.
- [5] Hetesy, Zsolt, 2013, *'Másodlagos nemzetbiztonsági kihívások'* [Secondary challenges to national security] *Hadtudomány*, 1-2.
- [6] *International Law Enforcement Academy Budapest.* www.ilea.hu, 25.6.2013.
- [7] *Jelentés a Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem ellenőrzéséről.* [Report on the inspection of the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University] State Audit Office, 2012, <http://www.asz.hu/jelentes/12105/jelentes-a-zrinyi-miklos-nemzetvedelmi-egyetem-ellenorzeserol/12105j000.pdf>, 25.6.2013. p. 33.
- [8] Kovács, József, 2013, *'A Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat az egyesítés után.'* [The Military National Security Office after the unification] *Hadtudomány*, 1-2.
- [9] *Mitteuropäische Polizeiakademie*, www.mepa.net, 25.6.2013.
- [10] Molnár, Ferenc, 2002, *'A haderő demokratikus ellenőrzése és a civil társadalom Magyarországon.'* [Democratic control of the armed forces and the civil society in Hungary] In: Védelmi Tanulmányok. No. 49. Bp, SVKK, 2002. p. 74.
- [11] Szemerkenyi, Réka, 1998, *'Polgári-katonai kapcsolatok Közép-Európában és a NATO bővülése.'* [Civil-military relations in Central Europe and the NATO enlargement] In.: Joó, Rudolf – PATAKI G., Zsolt (eds.): *A haderő demokratikus irányítása.* [Democratic Control of the Armed Forces] Bp., Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem Leszerelési és Civil-Katonai Kapcsolatok Központja. pp. 193-210.
- [12] *Terrorelhárítási Központ*, www.tek.gov.hu. Last accessed: 27 June 2013.
- [13] Varga, László, 2006, *A honvédelmi tárca beszerzési tevékenységének elemzése, értékelése és korszerűsítésének néhány lehetősége.* [Analysis and evaluation of the procurement activity of the Ministry of Defense, and possibilities of its improvement] Ph.D. dissertation,

Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem, http://193.224.76.4/download/konyvtar/digitgy/phd/2006/varga_laszlo.pdf, 25.6.2013.

Chapter 6: POLAND

Beata Górká-Winter

Threat perception and its implications for security sector

As is believed by Polish expert community and expressed in the most important documents including security threat assessments, in a short-term perspective Poland will not face any major or dramatic shift in its security environment, both in a regional as well as global dimension (see National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2007 and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2009).¹ Rather, it is assumed that the consequences of pending phenomena, as listed below, will influence more or less substantially the security situation around Poland in the near future. Among the most important external factors there are such developments as:

- Globalization, IT revolution;
 - Growing competition for natural resources (especially in energy sector, but also food and water shortages);
 - Negative impact of economic crisis in the US and the EU, which will influence political unity of the EU and NATO and their capabilities to meet the security challenges;
 - Growing loss of political and military interest and commitment to European security by the United States, with its strong reorientation towards the Pacific; loosening ties of the U.S. with Europe and transatlantic community due to ongoing demographic changes in the U.S.;
 - Possible negative consequences of transformation of international order from the uni-polar to multi-polar world, in which several “centers of gravity” would arise and reshape the architecture of alliances;
 - Increasing influence and political and military assertiveness of “new powers” (Russia, China, India) and their impact on the regional and global stability;
 - Relative weakening of the institutions which were supposed to guard the international peace and order as the United Nations, the OSCE etc.;
 - Erosion of arms control regimes;
 - Uncertainty stemming from dramatic political changes in the Middle East that may generate future regional and global conflicts;
 - Worrisome demographic trends in Western countries;
- Growing influence of non-state actors of different characteristics in shaping international order;

¹ In addition to NSS and DS, most up-to-date and complex assessment of the threats and challenges for the state security is presented in the outcome of the National Security Strategic Review which was held between 2010-2012 by the presidential National Security Bureau. Based on this review, the first White Book on Defence in Polish history was published in June 2013.

- Climate change;
- New threats and challenges as: cyber-terrorism, proliferation of WMD etc.

This complex and multidimensional landscape is determining Polish assessments and thinking about the future security of the country. Over the last few years there has been a substantial change in Polish approach to selecting methods, which should be used in achieving declared goals in foreign and security policy. Most importantly, there is a growing consciousness in the security community that Poland cannot rely on one “instrument” alone. There is a solid consensus among all major political parties that NATO and the strategic alliance with the United States as an ally with the greatest power projection capability within the North Atlantic Alliance is and will remain a cornerstone of Polish security policy. Nonetheless, the growing awareness that such a multidimensional and complex security landscape forces the government to implement a broader range of instruments to achieve security policy goals. The most important change is the increasing determination of political elites to strengthen the political position of Poland within the European Union (including CSDP) and enhancing regional cooperation (by adding more substance to the initiatives such as V4, the Weimar Triangle etc.). Over the last couple of years “the European focus” is presented by political elites as of paramount importance for realization of Polish security interests.

Perhaps of greatest importance, since Poland joined NATO in 1999, there was also a specific logic presented by subsequent governments while they were formulating tasks and missions for the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). There was a simple assumption that if Poland would engage substantially in out-of-area operations run by the North Atlantic Alliance (which resulted in putting emphasis more on the development of expeditionary forces than on territorial defence) it may count on some kind of “reciprocity” when Polish territory is to be threatened in a conventional manner (automatism of article 5).² As many developments over the last few years revealed, these assumptions were not entirely correct. Poland and other countries from the CEE region faced many difficulties convincing other Allies about the need to invest in the development of substantial NATO infrastructure in the region. Ultimately, the so-called contingency plans for Poland and Baltic states were finally adopted by NATO and the new Lisbon strategy brought an extremely important “reassurance package,” but the belief that Poland needs more careful and meticulous approach to national defense planning has been already conceived in Polish decision-making circles (Górka-Winter, 2011). As it is stated in the White Book on National Security a model of national autarky in the sphere of defence as well as total reliance on international organizations as NATO should be avoided. Poland should develop both: national capabilities and interoperability with the North Atlantic Alliance and other security organizations which we consider as security providers.

² As revealed by Wikileaks, these assumptions were well-known in the U.S. administration as reported by the then U.S. Ambassador to Poland Victor Ashe.

Institutions and coordination

As in other democratic states, the role and tasks of core and non-core security institutions are regulated by law. As it is stated in Polish Constitution - the president of Poland is the head of the armed forces. As Article 126, section 2 of the Constitution states: “The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory.” Additionally, the President is also representing the State in “foreign affairs.” As provided by other regulations in the Constitution, the President:

- On request of the Minister of National Defence, shall confer military ranks as specified by statute (art. 134, section 5);
- In the case of external threats to the State, act of armed aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland or when an obligation of common defence against aggression arises by virtue of international agreement, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, declare a state of martial law in a part or upon the whole territory of the State (art. 229);
- In the case of threats to the constitutional order of the State, to security of the citizenry or public order, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, introduce for a definite period no longer than 90 days, a state of emergency in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State (art. 230, section 1).

The presidential competences in relation to the defense sector were already provided in the act of 21st November 1967 on the universal duty to defend the Republic of Poland (Law Journal Laws, 2004). As the article 4a, section 1 of the act provides, the President shall:

- Approve, on request of the Prime Minister, the national security strategy;
- Issue, on request of the Prime Minister, the Political and Strategic Defence Directive of the Republic of Poland as well as other documents needed to carry out the national security strategy;
- Approve, on the request of the Council of Ministers, plans for the national trainings related to defence system and be in charge of their implementation;
- Make the decision, on the request of the Prime Minister, concerning the introduction or change of particular defence readiness of the state;
- May address all public, governmental and self-governmental administration entities, heads of other organisational units and social organisations to obtain information important to state’s security and defence;
- Initiate and provide patronage for ventures directed at developing patriotic and defence-related attitudes in the society.

The President may also order, on request of the Prime Minister, general or partial mobilisation and use of Armed Forces for the purpose of defending the country (article 136). The President also acts as a supreme commander of the Armed Forces. He outlines, on request of the Minister of National Defence, the main directions of Armed Forces' development and their readiness to defend the state (article 5, item 1) and may also take part in the briefings of Ministry of National Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland briefings (article 5, item 2).

Moreover, "Whenever, during a period of martial law, the Sejm is unable to assemble for a sitting, the President of the Republic shall, on application of the Council of Ministers, and within the scope and limits specified in Article 228, par. 3-5, issue regulations having the force of statute. Such regulations must be approved by the Sejm at its next sitting" (article 234). The President may also, requested by the Prime Minister, decide about using units and sub-units of the Polish Armed Forces in order to restore normal functioning of the state, if the forces and resources applied so far have been exhausted (article 11 of the act on the state of emergency, 2002).

The president also plays a specific role as far as the use of Polish Armed Forces abroad is concerned. Apart from the Constitution, which sets the general framework for the use of Polish armed forces, basic rules and procedures concerning involvement of Polish military in international operations are provided by "Law on the principles of use or temporary stay of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland outside country's borders" (Official Journal, 1998). A distinction between the use and temporary stay of the units of the armed forces outside Polish territory is made in this document. The first type of involvement includes several forms of engagement: participation in armed conflict or reinforcement of allies; peacekeeping operation (stabilization and peace support missions); actions concerning prevention of terrorism or mitigation of consequences of terrorist acts. Temporary stays involve non-combat actions such as participation in training and exercises, S&R and humanitarian missions etc. As the temporary stay is concerned, the decision about sending troops is made by Council of Ministries or the minister responsible for particular forces (usually the minister of national defense). For external use of Polish army (collective defense, peacekeeping etc.) the final decision is made by the President on the request of the Council of Ministers.

As provided by these regulations, president of Poland has broad competences and prerogatives at his/her disposal as well as obligations to monitor the threats and challenges to the security of the state. He may issue proposals for the documents and specific actions concerning the defence sector and monitor their implementation. To make these possible, the Constitution also appoints the National Security Council (composed of key state officials) as

an advisory body to the President within the scope of matters relating to internal and external security of the state. Moreover, also the National Security Bureau is supporting the President in performing the above-mentioned tasks.

As far as the Minister of National Defence is concerned, the Constitution equips him with the right to realize the supremacy over the Polish Armed Forces during peacetime. The Chief of the Staff and the commanders of the armed forces are subordinated directly to the Minister of the National Defence. Among the most important tasks and responsibilities of the Minister are:

- Management of the Armed Forces during the peacetime;
- Preparation of the assumptions of national defence;
- Realization of the general assumptions, decisions and directives of the Council of Ministers in the area of national defence;
- Execution within the scope of powers given by the Council of Ministers, general supervision over the realization of defence-related tasks by the agencies and bodies of the State Administration, State institutions, local authorities, economic entities etc.;
- Overall leadership in matters connected with the execution of the common national defence duties;
- Fulfillment of international agreements, stemming from the decisions of the Council of Ministers, pertaining to the participation of Polish military contingents in international peacekeeping missions and humanitarian actions and military exercises conducted jointly with other countries or international organizations.

The Minister also supervises, manages and controls the MOD budget, he/she is responsible for human resources and personnel policy, maintaining the armed forces in combat readiness by proper training, maintaining defence cooperation with different international partners etc. In executing all these tasks and duties the Minister is supported by the Chief of the General Staff, the Secretary or Secretaries of State, and the Undersecretaries of State.

The “division of labour” between the President, who is a crucial figure in the Polish constitutional system and the government (especially Minister of Defence) stipulated by the Polish law seems to be quite clear. Nonetheless, many problems may arise when the President and the government represent different political views and this “cohabitation” is not running smoothly due to some fundamental differences in their political perceptions. Such a discord took place at the time when president Lech Kaczyński backed by Law and Justice party and the government formed by the Civic Platform were trying to cooperate on foreign and security policy issues. A deep distrust between these two institutions had severe consequences as these two centers presented completely different visions on crucial issues concerning security and defence issues (with the more pro-Atlantic stance presented

by the President who was also advocating an ambitious political agenda towards the Eastern Neighborhood and a “European focus” of the government). Infinite disputes concerning the competences of the president and the government in the security and defence sector have been waged frequently at that time. Such a situation shows that apart from the clear solutions provided by law, if the defence sector is to be run smoothly, the high level of political maturity of all stakeholders is of paramount importance.

Key drivers of security sector reform – external and internal

Before 1999, when Poland finally joined NATO, the aspiration to join the North Atlantic Alliance was the main driver behind the security sector reform in Poland and it showed all characteristics of SSR in the transformational context. After the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact the countries from CEE region regained sovereignty and were free to formulate their foreign and security policies. In Poland, as in other countries in the region, the security sector reform was implemented in the broader context of transformational social and economic agenda which was handled in an entirely peaceful manner, though not without serious and vigorous debate about the shape and tasks of different security sector institutions. The main challenge for the security sector was the elimination of all negative phenomena inherited from the previous system designed to wage a large-scale military confrontation with the use of conventional forces and capabilities. Cutting the number of troops, limiting the extensive procurement programs, dismissing huge bureaucracies, dissolving internal security services used as a tool for political oppression and implementation of “good governance” rules to eliminate corruption, lack of professionalism, and extensive waste of resources were of paramount importance. In this context, the main focus of the reform was around reforming institutions of the state, but over the years there was also a growing role of non-state actors like media, NGOs, think-tanks etc., which became more and more active in generating debate in this domain. It is also due to their active engagement that Poland finally declared membership in NATO as the main goal of its security policy. NATO became a major driving force behind the SSR in Poland as it formulated concrete standards to comply with.³ In September 1995 it adopted a document, which set the most important criteria for candidate countries to meet. These are still valid and a positive evaluation of the progress within SSR remains a condition sine qua non for all prospective candidates for NATO membership.

After Poland joined the North Atlantic Alliance in 1999 NATO has remained the main driving force for SSR. As some experts claimed, acceptance of some countries as NATO members at that time was politically driven, taking into consideration limited military capabilities they were equipped with (security providers *versus* security consumers). As a

³ On much smaller scale the driving force for the transformation in military domain were such organizations as: the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

result, the main political focus for subsequent Polish governments was to present Poland as a reliable ally, willing and able to participate in NATO missions. It meant putting emphasis on professionalization of armed forces (Poland finally abandoned conscription in 2008 and initiated a startup of building a fully-professional army of 100,000 soldiers with National Reserve Force of additional 20,000 troops) and training them mostly for expeditionary operations (with special emphasis on Special Forces). Such an orientation generated also serious consequences for acquisition programs and raised questions about the rationale of investing mainly in expeditionary capabilities while at the same time the program of modernization of Polish Armed Forces was slowed down mainly due to budgetary constraints. Many experts pointed out the inherent dilemma (out-of-area engagement *versus* modernization) since not all expeditionary capabilities may be used for territorial defence. At the same time some doubts arose over the validity of security guarantees provided by NATO as political cohesiveness in the Alliance was weakening especially during the times of the G.W. Bush administration when it started the controversial military intervention in Iraq. Sharp divisions in threat perceptions were revealed among allies and some countries, Poland among them, were criticized for over-engagement with the United States in Iraq, while neglecting the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (which finally resulted in boosting the Polish contingent in this country up to 2,500 soldiers and withdrawal from Iraq).

After more than a decade of permanent expeditionary engagement, there was a growing conviction in the Polish security community that Poland should start to focus more on modernization of its armed forces and initiate an ambitious program, which would boost the lacking or vanishing capabilities (like A&M defence). The main drivers behind this decision were manifold. As it was already mentioned, new threats emerged in the meantime, like growing assertiveness of Russia toward its neighborhood in conjunction with some negative trends within NATO and the EU. There was also a conviction that too much of the Alliance's attention goes to the spots with an indirect impact on the security of the whole NATO. It was believed that it creates a potentially dangerous situation since it limits the possibilities of quick and adequate Alliance reaction within the allied territory when such a need arises. As the most evident example of NATO's "overfocus" on South-Eastern Asia and broader Middle East some experts pointed at complete confusion most allies felt when Russia decided to intervene in Georgia in August 2008. This dramatic event showed two things: firstly, the scenario of a conventional war, which was almost completely ruled out from the national security strategies of NATO countries proved to be not so unlikely as it was assumed in Europe over the last decade; and secondly that the NATO intelligence community neglected monitoring of risks coming from the regions in the closer vicinity to NATO borders.

As an important factor affecting many important decisions concerning the security sector reform in Poland one should also consider a need to sustain the country's economic growth,

partly by streamlining the quite substantial financial resources for the development of Polish military industry. As one of the few countries in Europe, Poland is not facing such a dramatic need to cut its military budget. Quite the contrary, in 2012 the government decided to initiate the biggest and most ambitious program of modernization of Polish Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War by allocating around \$40 billion in military procurement programs (see below). This is not only an effect of reflection of the current threat assessment but these plans are also aimed at giving a boost to Polish economy since many of these contracts are to be realized by national defence industry in cooperation with scientific institutes, foreign partners etc. Innovations and new technologies are expected to be invented and implemented in the process, allowing Polish business to be more innovative and competitive.

As all these developments have proven over the last two decades, the key drivers for the security sector reform in Poland were of external rather than internal nature, reflecting the evaluation of threats and challenges for Polish security, as well as the perception of the effectiveness of the alliances Poland belongs to. Only in recent years an important internal premise (a need to stimulate economic growth by rising military spending) was of a paramount importance for SSR and triggered some changes in the approach to military procurement.

Place of Armed Forces within security sector – mission and raison d’être

The Polish Armed Forces have always been perceived as a key element of Polish national identity and played a crucial role in preserving the national tradition, and the continuity of the Polish state. They were treated by the society as a symbol of national virtues and a major force which allowed Poland to regain independence after 1918, and finally decided about the shape of Polish borders and assured their stability until WWII. The symbolism attached to military victories (but also defeats) of Polish army has always constituted an essence of Polish national identity and was widely popularized in the society (more on this see Terlikowski, M., Madej, M., Górka-Winter, B., 2013). As it is believed, the armed forces have always been a great defender of the society and its national values against foreign aggressions and occupation, excluding the episodes, when, during the communist times, they were used by the communist regime against the rioting workers. In the public discourse, serving in the military was perceived as a honorable duty, though, during the communist regime, when compulsory service encompassed a period of up to two years, many young conscripts refused to join the army ranks either for ideological reasons, or because it was believed as a waste of time in face of other interesting career alternatives. Abandoning conscription in 2008 finally ended this dilemma as Polish army became fully professional. Nonetheless, serving in the military is now perceived by young people rather as a career choice offering long-term stability and social benefits in an uncertain situation of pending

financial crises rather than a show off of patriotic attitude. Noteworthy, the armed forces have always been perceived by the society as a profession held in high esteem. In 2011 the opinion polls showed that almost 80 % of the society has confidence in the military and the armed forces ranked second in reliability among the state services (the first ranked the fire brigades with 89% of support) (Zaufanie do wojska na wysokim poziomie, 2011).

From an official point of view the mere existence of the armed forces has never been questioned after the end of the Cold War. While in many Western countries there was a strong tendency to benefit from the so-called “peace-dividend” resulting in huge limitations of the armies’ size and capabilities, it has never been the case in Poland. As mentioned above, Polish society is strongly attached to the army not only as a symbol of national identity but also as a major force to defend the country in the face of aggression, preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As stated in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, “the size, organization and assets of the armed forces will be continually adapted to defense requirements, allied and international commitments and the social economic potential of the State. As the nature of security threats evolves, static armed forces designed for territorial defense will be gradually phased out in favor of advanced, mobile, highly specialized units. The nature of new risks necessitates cooperation between the armed forces and civilian structures within the scope of response to non-military threats, as well as in rescue and antiterrorist operations in the homeland and outside its borders.” As reflected in the above- mentioned documents there are several core tasks for the PAF today:

- Providing the defense of the state and facing aggression in the framework of commitments stemming from Poland’s membership in NATO;
- Participation in the stabilization operations as well as crisis management and humanitarian missions;
- Supporting internal security of the state and assisting the population if the need arises.

As such, the *raison d’être* of Polish Army has never been questioned by any serious political force (excluding some marginal anarchists associations). Nonetheless, the continuing debate around the current mission of armed forces is taking place, as some of the tasks performed by Polish soldiers are being questioned especially when confronted with diverging interpretation of Polish security interest. Contrary to positive opinions coming from different NATO governments, the engagement of Polish soldiers in Iraq, and in Afghanistan was seriously contested by some political parties and the Polish society. About 75% of respondents held a negative attitude towards Polish engagement in Afghanistan (Communique BS/127/2009, 2009). It is widely believed that this engagement of PAF is politically motivated (by the willingness to strengthen the ties with the major Polish ally – United States) and has very little to do with the real Polish interests in the area of security. Also, many experts point

to the substantial financial costs of this operation which is seen as a factor hampering the process of modernizing PAF and introduce ambitious procurement plans (see for example Bilski, 2009). Especially the Alliance of Democratic Left questioned the rationale for this engagement and pressed for ending the mission already in 2009 (see Uchwała Rady Krajowej SLD nr 23 w sprawie wycofania polskich wojsk z Afganistanu, 2009). Some experts also underline that the experience gained by Polish soldiers in the Afghan military theatre is of no use in a situation if Polish territory is somehow threatened.

As a result of these reflections, in recent years the evaluation of tasks for the PAF has changed substantially. It was openly expressed in many official documents as well as underlined by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, who announced quite recently the buildup of Polish Deterrence Forces, which are to be equipped with modern weaponry enhancing their deterrent potential (Speech of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament, 2013).

Armed Forces restructuring – main trends and challenges

Over the last two years Polish government boosted its efforts to modernize and professionalize the armed forces to meet the requirements of the modern battlefield. In spite of the general decrease of the size of PAF to just 100,000 soldiers (with additional 20,000 soldiers in National Reserve Forces), the level of their combat capabilities is increasing mostly due to the participation of the substantial military contingents in the operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to some extent also, in the Balkans where they were tasked with many different duties including direct combat missions. As one of the few NATO members, Poland also maintains the level of defense spending of around 1.95% suggested by the Alliance (Doran, 2013 or Szatkowski, 2013). In recent years, the armed forces were equipped with quite a substantial set of modern weapons: F-16 fighter jets, CASA transport aircrafts, Rosomak armored personnel carriers, etc., which allows Poland to actively participate in NATO operations and serves to gradually reduce their reliance in this respect on other allies (mainly the U.S.). Unfortunately, the need of equipping military contingents taking part in foreign operations led to a situation in which some other crucial capabilities were neglected (like A&M Defence, completely obsolete in a couple of years, leaving Polish territory prone to attack from the air and from ballistic missiles). There is, however, a rising awareness among the decision-makers that restructuring of PAF requires long-term planning for defence procurement, which will encompass not only equipment for out-of-area operations but also reflect the needs stemming from the protection of Polish territory. Also, as was stressed by Polish Ministry of Defence for some time already, every NATO ally should not rely on article 5 of the Washington Treaty alone (meaning hoping for allied support in case of being attacked) but focus on implementing article 3 which stresses that “in order

to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (Kupiecki, Przeciwrakietowa układanka, 2012). This focus on the need to develop national capabilities to defend Polish territory as a major priority for the PAF and building expeditionary capabilities as an additional task for the PAF is often referred as “Komorowski doctrine” as it was first revealed by the presidential National Security Bureau.

In this spirit, in 2012 two crucial documents in this sphere were approved to support this line of thinking: “Program of Development of Polish Armed Forces for years 2013-2022” and the “Technical Modernisation Plan” (signed on December 11). As it was stressed by Minister of National Defence Tomasz Siemoniak “What we want is modern and efficient armed forces which will always be able to defend the sovereignty of our country, support the Allies and help in crisis. The percentage of resources allocated for the most modern armament and the most important operational capabilities is rising” (Przeciwrakietowa układanka, 2012).

According to these plans in the period 2013-2016 Poland is going to spend about 135.5 billion PLN (approximately \$40 billion) on defence procurement and technical modernization. In addition, from 2017 until 2022 the military spending will amount to about 273.2 billion PLN (102.1 billion for technical modernization). In these assumptions several critical capabilities are given a paramount importance:

- Command and control;
- Reconnaissance;
- Destruction and action support capabilities;
- Mobility, survivability and protection of forces;
- Capability to support non-military system in crisis situation including natural and humanitarian disasters;
- Air defence;
- Maintaining combat capabilities of the Navy;
- Effective logistics;
- Developing IT infrastructure and robotization.

On the planned purchase list there are, among other things: complex upgrade of Poland’s air and missile defense capabilities (treated as a priority, with the appropriation of 20 percent of planned expenditures), UAVs, helicopters, command-and-control capabilities, tanks, anti-ship missiles etc.

Defence planning and resource management

One of the most important changes in defence planning is currently being implemented. As

argued by the main architects of these reforms – the government and the National Security Bureau, it is aimed, apart from the rationalization, at enhancing the effectiveness and adjusting the defence planning and management to Western trends and standards, and strengthening the civilian control over the armed forces. Last but not least, economic calculations are also of paramount importance in these reforms. Starting from 2014 the reform foresees instead of 4 separate commands of the Army, the Navy, the Air Forces and Special Forces only 2 Joint Commands: the General Command responsible for commanding the military during peace-time and the Operational Command, responsible for commanding the military during the war-time and time of crisis. In addition, it is envisioned to command the contingents engaged in foreign deployments. In the current situation it is the Minister of Defence who is commanding the armed forces via the Chief of General Staff. As a result of the reform, the General Staff will concentrate on strategic defence planning and preparation of long-term plans of development of the PAF, instead of current command duties, and will also act as an advisor the President and Minister of Defence. In peace-time, the Minister of Defence will command the armed forces with the assistance of the General Commander, the Operational Commander and the Chief of General Staff, who are answerable to the Ministry of Defence (see National Security Bureau, 2013).

Civil-military relations, parliamentary control over AF

Civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces means the AF are subordinated to democratically elected civilian authorities. Therefore, the quality of this control is determined by the functioning of these authorities, their subordination to the law and the principles of “good governance.” As such, the level and quality of civilian control over the AF in western societies is treated as an important measure of the democratization of the state. In principle, the military should be treated as an important instrument of foreign and security policy but it should act as an individual, political actor in the state (Puchała F., 2012).

Poland has undergone a remarkable evolution towards the western model of civilian control over the Armed Forces as in principle, historically the military has always been an important player on the Polish political scene. It was connected with the role the military played in the process of regaining independence after so many years of partitions and later on, in the aftermath of WWII, with its position in the very specific political environment set by the Cold War. As mentioned above, the level of trust towards the military has always been substantial in the society - even after the tragic events during the communist times when the armed forces were used to suppress the riots in 1950 and 1976 (Madej M., Terlikowski M., Górka-Winter B. 2013). Since that time, much has changed towards the so-called western model. Shortly after the collapse of the communist system, the long and rather painful process of transformation to the civilian control over the PAF has started. An important incentive came from the Alliance and Polish aspirations to become a member. Nevertheless, the discussions

about the competences of the civilian and military components, their roles and tasks were very vigorous over the years, and, to some extent still exist. In general, however, the core principles as political neutrality of the Armed Forces and their subordination to the civilian authorities are assured (Trejnis Z., 1997; Wągrowka 2007). Any single state institution does not possess an exclusive control over the Armed Forces to prevent using them for political purposes. The Parliament, in addition to setting the laws, exercises control over the financing of the military and has the right of inquiry concerning all issues important to the functioning the Armed Forces (their mission, out-of-area deployments, procurement policy etc.). Also, the transparency of the military budget is assured by presenting it to the public. By expert opinions, the civil-military relations and democratic control over the PAF are in solid shape and are not endangered by isolated incidents of insubordination or exceeding the competences.

Human resources, expert potential, military education

The problem of human resources in the Polish defence sector is a very complex one. As far as the Polish Armed Forces are concerned several factors will influence their future capabilities. As it was already mentioned, the new generation of young people which has no duty to serve in the armed forces perceives the military as a professional option rather than a service. Many capabilities within the armed forces are already privatized. Suspending conscription had the same effect as in other countries which had already undergone this process – the feeling of “community” and the obligation to defend the country is slightly weakened, so is the mobilization potential within the nation. At the same time, paramilitary associations are still very active and numerous, sustaining the national military tradition which is exemplified for example in the tradition of reconstruction the historical battles etc.

Additionally, structural changes in the army (including a change in the pension system advertised lately by the government) are having the effect of many soldiers, also those well-trained, highly qualified and experienced in foreign deployments, leaving the military. It cannot be excluded that their skills will be finally capitalized on by some newly established paramilitary organization, which may emerge as a response to such an inflow of specialists on the market. As in many other European states, the negative demographic trends are also underlined. The Polish society is ageing; many young people are also leaving the country seeking more beneficial economic and social conditions, which will seriously influence the mobilization potential of the future armed forces.

The new model of the army is also bringing about changes in the military education. The need for consolidation and centralization of numerous military schools and liquidation of some of them is underlined by many experts. Sustaining too many schools is contradicting the demography trends, limiting the number of forces and goes against the economic

calculations. Lately, these proposals were laid out by the National Security Bureau and Academy of National Defence. As many experts underline, the military education is quite backwards compared to other branches of the defence sector. These delays in reforming the military education system are attributed mostly to the independence of many schools, which are defending their particular interests. As general Pacek, the rector of National Defence Academy argues, military universities must confine themselves to military education of the cadres and limit their civilian tasks (Dyskurs nad szkolnictwem, 2012).

It should be also noted that over the past two decades, a substantial pool of experts commenting the military affairs in Poland has emerged. They are active in specialized media devoted to observing Polish security and defence policy and represent numerous think-tanks, NGOs etc. This “security community” is quite large and plays an important role in framing the issues and proposing recommendations. They are consulted by the government and other state institutions in the process of developing policies (however, still the influence of non-government experts remains limited compared to other Western states which rely on external expertise in a much substantial way).

References:

- [1] Bilski, Artur, *Afganistan - Jaka piękna katastrofa*, In: Rzeczpospolita, October 8, 2009.
- [2] *Biała Księga Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP*, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2013 na http://www.spbn.gov.pl/portal/sbn/667/4630/Biala_Ksiega.html, 21.4.2013.
- [3] *Communique BS/127/2009*, CBOS, Warsaw, September 2009, www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2009/K_127_09.PDF, 11.4.2013.
- [4] *Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997*, www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm, 12.4.2013.
- [5] *Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw 2009, www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/2826/Strategia_Obronnosci_Rzeczypospolitej_Polskiej.html, 15.4.2013.
- [6] Doran, Peter, 2013, *U.S. Must Seize Opportunity of Polish Modernization*, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130203/DEFPEAT05/302030010/U-S-Must-Seize-Opportunity-Polish-Modernization>, 18.4.2013.
- [7] *Dyskurs nad szkolnictwem*, In: Polska Zbrojna nr 2, 8 stycznia 2012, p. 12-17;
- [8] Górka-Winter, Beata, *NATO po Lizbonie. Strategia dobra dla wszystkich?* In: Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2011;
- [9] Journal of Laws of 2004, no.: 241, position 2416;
- [10] *National Security Bureau*, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/2/4395/Poslowie_w_BBN_o_reformie_dowodzenia_silami_zbrojnymi.html, 25.4.2013.
- [11] *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, Warsaw 2007, <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Poland-2007-eng.pdf>, 21.4.2013.
- [12] *Polska Wobec Redukcji Sil USA v Europie*, 2011, Wikileaks, http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=5652, 28.4.2013.
- [13] Puchała, Franciszek, *Cywilna i demokratyczna kontrola nad Siłami Zbrojnymi Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (geneza, rozwój i doświadczenia)*, <http://www.gwir.pl/uploads/media/pucha%C5%82a.pdf>, 15.4.2013.
- [14] *Przeciwrakietowa układanka*, interview with minister Robert Kupiecki, In: Polska Zbrojna. October 27, 2012, <http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleinmagazineshow/5090?t=PRZECIWRAKIETOWA-UKLADANKA>, 10.4.2013.
- [15] *Speech of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament* (March 20, 2013): <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/nasz-los-zalezy-dzis-od-nas-samych-sikorski-o-sytuacji-polski.313129.html>, 9.4.2013.

- [16] Szatkowski, Tomasz, *Polish Defense Modernization in the Era of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing*, 01 March 2013, <http://www.cepa.org/content/polish-defense-modernization-era-us-strategic-rebalancing>, 22.4.2013.
- [17] Terlikowski, M., Madej, M., Górka-Winter, B., 2013, *Poland: Indirect and ad-hoc*, In: Leander A. (ed.), *Commercializing Security in Europe. Political Consequences for Peace Operations*, PRIO New Security Studies, Routledge 2013.
- [18] Trejnis, Zenon, *Cywilna kontrola nad armią*, Warszawa 1997.
- [19] *Ustawa o zasadach użycia lub pobytu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej poza granicami państwa*, In: Official Journal, 1998, No. 162, item 1117.
- [20] *Uchwała Rady Krajowej SLD nr 23 w sprawie wycofania polskich wojsk z Afganistanu*, October 10, 2009, www.sld.org.pl/partia/rada_krajowa/uchwaly_2009.htm, 25.4.2013.
- [21] Wągrowska, Maria, *The Normative Model of the Ideal-Type Soldier in a Democracy: Case of Poland*, PRIF Research Paper 1/6 – 2007.
- [22] *Zaufanie do wojska na wysokim poziomie*, 2011, <http://www.mon.gov.pl/pl/arttykul/11983>, 11.4.2013.

Chapter 7: SLOVAKIA

Marian Majer

Slovakia has during the twenty years since its establishment passed admirable changes in many areas. It has changed from a post-communist country, which had as a part of the Czech-Slovak Federative Republic been struggling with its feelings of inferiority and political and economic insignificance, to a stable and established member of the European Union and the Eurozone, the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as of a range of international groupings. Slovak security sector has undergone significant reforms, too. Nevertheless, the results of this reform process and its present state in some respects show signs of inconsistencies and contradictions. Fundamental changes in the strategic direction are compensated by noticeable shortcomings in the legislative area, hence a relatively successful process of professionalization of the armed forces is being disrupted by the lack of civilian and military experts in certain specializations and a significant shift of focus of the armed forces in terms of equipping and training is being undermined by the lack of modernization and obsolete technology. However, the process of security sector reform in Slovakia can be in many respects regarded as a success story, from which other countries can learn many lessons.

Strategic direction and legislative framework

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent changes in the geopolitical world order had a clear impact on the strategic direction of Central European countries, including the then Czecho-Slovakia. In Slovakia this question re-emerged a few years later after the formation of an independent state in 1993. Back then, several alternatives for Slovak engagement in European affairs have been presented, two of them coming to the forefront: an alternative of integration into transatlantic structures (NATO and the European Union) and that of (especially military) neutrality. The first option had received formal preference by the political elites, despite the controversy surrounding the actual conduct of domestic and foreign policy. In relation to the European Union, an important milestone was achieved by the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU in October 1993, followed by the application for the accession in June 1995. The approximation to NATO was underlined by the entry of Slovakia into the mechanism of Partnership for Peace (PfP) in February 1994, created on the basis of NATO's Brussels summit decision in January 1994 as a mechanism for increasing defence cooperation between NATO countries and their future partners. However, even though the three neighbouring states (Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic) took full advantage of this format to secure their invitation to the Alliance already at the summit in Madrid in 1997, the accession process for Slovakia turned out to be considerably longer.

The reasons for the decision from Madrid not to invite Slovakia to NATO accession talks were both officially and unofficially stated clearly: “Failing in fulfilling fundamental political criteria for integration to European and transatlantic structures” (see for example Simon, 1997). In particular they were the deformation of parliamentary democracy, political machinations aiming to establish centralized control over state and society, targeted constitution-breaking and an unclear foreign policy orientation. The new Slovak political leaderships had to struggle with all of these shortfalls to convince NATO members to re-evaluate their decision.

The question which was in front of the new government was whether it was possible to push Slovakia in the direction of the accession talks. As statements of NATO authorities showed, however, the alliance was very negative about this possibility. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in the end of 1998 said: “There are no doubts that Slovakia is a solid partner of NATO. We will work hard together to catch up on what we missed. But it does not mean that Slovakia will become a NATO member tomorrow” (Kmec, Korba, Ondrejcsák, 2004). Although his words were confirmed by the next NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 - no country has been invited to begin accession talks – albeit the Alliance at least agreed on launching Membership Action Plan (MAP). To aspirant countries it offered a basic list of recommended activities, the fulfilment of which would be a precondition for accession to the organization. But what was more important for the Slovak government, Slovakia was, in contrast to the previous summit, mentioned in the final communiqué that assessed the development of its internal politics very positively.

Regarding the Washington summit results, Slovakia started to implement MAP under its own conditions. In June 1999, the government ratified a Program for Preparation for NATO Membership (PRENAME) and agreed on a creation of Governmental Committee for this purpose. PRENAME outlined the entire mechanism of preparing for NATO membership involving MAP activities. In October 1999 the National Program PRENAME – as a list of detailed steps to be taken - was presented. This program was the outcome of a national effort combined with consultations mostly within the Visegrad group and other NATO members, as well. It defined tasks, responsibilities, resources and deadlines in five chapters: politics and economy; defence and military; resources; and information security and legislation. In defence and military chapter NP PRENAME defined these priorities:

- Military system reform on the basis of NATO defence planning knowledge and experience;
- Command, control, communication, logistic, infrastructure and intelligence systems interoperability and compatibility; Increasing of military personnel language preparedness;
- Defence planning and resources management improvements;

- Arms and military equipment modernization and decreasing one-sided dependence on systems of Russian origin.

Slovakia also had very active cooperation with NATO countries and other partners in defence matters (mainly through PfP). In its framework it executed Individual Partnership Program (IPP) and Planning and Review Process (PARP) as well as bilateral cooperation on different levels. Moreover, in foreign policy Slovakia endeavoured to act as “de facto ally.” It wanted to project a better reputation in international politics and prove that it was worthy of its future accession. The most visible example of this strategy was Slovakia’s contribution to NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign by opening its airspace. Slovakia contributed also very actively to SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thanks to all these efforts Slovakia, together with other six aspirants signed the Protocol to North-Atlantic Treaty in March 2003 by which the ratification process began. It was concluded officially on April 27, 2004 by its becoming a full member of NATO.

Changes in the country’s strategic direction have also been manifested in the strategic security and defence documents of Slovakia. The first document in the chronological list had many shortcomings, both in terms of the actual content and how they were arrived at. They were not comprehensive and were prepared only by a small group of people from within the Department of Defense (thus were not consulted with experts from academia or other fields). Moreover, they failed to overcome the narrow scope of understanding of security and defense issues. This was due to the peculiarities of that particular period influenced by the then political power structure and constellation under which they have been created. Therefore, they touched on the country’s relations to the process of EU and NATO integration only in very general terms (although the doctrine declared that in terms of long-term prospects, the Slovak Republic could fulfill the required security guarantees and provide for its effective defense only by joining NATO), they focused on purely “national” (internal) objectives. Moreover, in terms of using the military they focused only on the preservation of the country’s independence, sovereignty and inviolability of borders. Despite the shortfalls, however, at the time they were written they held great symbolic importance.

In 1998, after the changes introduced by the new administration and in the context of the assessment of certain strategic interests, the preparation of a trio of strategic documents had begun. There were several reasons for this: absence of implementation priorities in the previous documents; the need for a clearer characterization of the security environment; reaction to the non-inclusion of Slovakia among newly admitted members of NATO; and incompatibility of the threat assessment with the new threats, which became clear especially after the Washington Summit of 1999 and after the publication of the NATO Strategic Concept. Through this process of revision, Security Strategy, Defense Strategy and Military

Strategy were gradually drafted. Especially Security Strategy had its own distinctive strategic importance, since it was the first comprehensive document with the content reflecting its title. Concurrently, it was the first paper where national security policy and requirements for the security system have been defined. In terms of security policy it is also worth noting that for the first time an active approach to shaping the security environment and membership in NATO and the EU was taken as part of one of the vital interests (interests divided into vital and important) were presented there (Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2001). But the timing of their adoption appeared to be a problem (March and May of 2001), whereas only a few months later, based the terrorist attacks on American targets brought about a total global review of security threats. From the point of view of defence policy, essential characteristic of those documents was ensuring an effective defense of the country on its own by the time of accession to NATO. Although the ambition was to build armed forces that would already be fully compatible with allies to contribute to the full range of NATO missions (including collective defense) (Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2001).

Accession to EU and NATO and acceptance of the obligations of membership was translated into pressure the review the documents adopted in 2001. The necessity to review long-term plans of the Ministry of Defence and highlighting of the need for new strategic documents appeared with regard to NATO requirements and adoption of the so-called Force Goals. The new documents saw the light of day in 2005 after some transitional phase. It was very positive that the Security Strategy and Defense Strategy (military strategy has been incorporated into the defense one) were prepared in parallel, although under the auspices of different institutions. At the same time, relatively broad professional community was involved in the preparation process, which increased their general professional acceptance. Compared to the documents of 2001, there was a significant shift in the defined interests, a clearer expression of active security policy attitudes towards NATO and EU, and also more specific attitude towards certain countries or regions (USA, Russia, Ukraine, Balkans) (Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2005). The country's defence policy also got a new dimension. According to the Defence Strategy, a collective defense creates a pillar of the national as well as transatlantic security (with the option to contribute also to ad-hoc coalitions). Its main features were defined as follows:

- Prevention - through active participation in conflicts and crisis prevention;
- Complexity - emphasis on building of such capabilities of the defense system that will allow to respond not only to the current but also to future threats;
- Euro-Atlanticism - membership in NATO and EU as a key factor of Slovak security;
- Proactivity - active participation both in NATO crisis management and multinational military operations led by EU in complementarity with NATO commitments (Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2005).

At almost the same time, in addition to the completion of the strategic framework, also a new legislative framework has been created. Based on the Security Strategy (2001), the parliament approved the Constitutional Act on security in time of war, state of war and state of emergency in 2002. Along with it, other laws having a direct impact on transforming the security system and crisis management have been adopted: Act on Defence of the Slovak Republic and Act on Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, approved the same year, as well as Act on functioning of the Security Council of the Slovak Republic in the time of peace, approved in 2004. Although many amendments have been adopted in the following years, they had just minor influence on the whole security sector. Thus, many problems (mostly regarding competences and mutual relations of institutions) that have been identified since then, have still not been solved.

Eight years since their approval not only significant changes in the security environment occurred, but were also accompanied by a partial reassessment of the needs and focus of the armed forces and overall national defence. In particular, the current political-military ambition for use of armed forces is already out of date, whereas it only defines the requirements for their readiness to work in operations. Therefore, it would be desirable that the Slovak Government makes a decision about the preparation of new security and defence strategies, which will take into consideration the current situation of international security and the security needs of the Slovak Republic.

Security System

The aim of the security system (sector) of Slovakia is defined in the already mentioned Security Strategy from 2001. It states that *the security system of the state, [which] will represent a complex, integrated system with purposefully arranged functions and structures, with the division of authority specified in concrete terms, and with a mechanism of interrelations between the elements* (Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic, 2001). According to the above, the structure of the security system can be defined at several levels:

- State level: National Council of the Slovak Republic, President, Government and National Security Council as a specialized body;
- Governmental level: central government authorities and other institutions;
- Regional level - county, township (offices at the county and district level), local governmental bodies;
- Companies and other private actors

Having in mind the provisions of the Constitution of the Slovak republic, the bodies of the legislative and executive power – namely the National Council, president and government - deal with strategic decisions of national security policy (security strategies, partial strategies

and concepts); adopt security legislation and are responsible for the responding to emerging crises. At the lower level the governmental policy is conducted by institutions of the central government (ministries and institutions with the status of the central state administration), heads of district offices, mayors and statutory representatives of legal entities.

The Security Council of the Slovak Republic (SC SR) is the only specialized body regarding the security system. It acts as an advisory body to the Government, which is in peace time involved in creating and implementing the security system of the Slovak Republic and international commitments in the field of security. It evaluates the security situation in the Slovak Republic and all over the world and prepares proposals for governmental action in security in the Slovak Republic, in crisis situations and prevention, as well as in post crisis situation. Of course, there are many other components of the Executive Sub-system of the security system in the competencies of various ministries and institutions:

- Ministry of Interior - Police Force, Fire and Rescue Service, Railway Police, Mountain Rescue, control chemical laboratories for civil protection,
- Ministry of Defence - Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (consisting of Land Forces, Air Forces and Training and Support Forces),
- Ministry of Finance - Customs Administration,
- Ministry of Justice - Prison and Court Guard,
- Ministry of Health - Emergency Medical Services providers,
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Foreign Service,
- Ministry of Economy - Mining Rescue Service,
- The National Security Office
- Intelligence Services - Slovak Information Service and Military Intelligence
- Institutions in the competencies of the villages (municipal police and fire departments) and humanitarian public institutions (such as Slovak Red Cross, voluntary fire protection units, medical emergency units, Public Health Service, Caving Rescue, Water Rescue Service, Forest Guard, Fishing inspection etc.).

The main problem in connection with the functions of the Slovak security system is that there are many discrepancies between the security system itself and the crisis management system. There are many deficiencies in the responsibilities and mutual relations of the particular bodies of the system as a consequence of absence of a complex law on addressing both military and non-military crisis situations. In other words, the current management of the security system is loaded with a number of institutional complications, unclear horizontal and vertical interface and the absence of adequate information and communication flow and analytical elements. It means that there is a requirement to form a more comprehensive and integrated system that will enable the full utilisation of isolated systems such as the defence system, system of internal security, system of economic and financial security, as well as

the crisis management system. However, in spite of different initiatives coming especially from the expert level since 2002, no comprehensive document has been adopted so far. The most promising draft of the Security System Concept has been prepared in 2009 and 2010; nevertheless there was not enough political will for this draft to be presented to the Government for ratification.

Transformation and professionalization of the Armed Forces

Although Slovakia has not been invited to NATO accession talks at the Madrid summit in 1997, Slovak Armed Forces were assessed relatively positively, which was testified by a statement of Deputy Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff of US Armed Forces General Ralston just four months after Madrid summit: “US did not have any concerns regarding to preparedness of Slovak Armed Forces because Slovak soldiers and officers had earned great reputation in Partnership for Peace and UN peace operations, as well.” (Kmec, Korba, Ondrejcsák, 2004). Therefore US promised to support Slovak accession as early as it would be possible from the political point of view.

Nevertheless, the reality was not so positive as there was still much to do in the armed forces reform process. That was – paradoxically when compared to the previous statement – also pointed out in a very critical report of the General Garret’s team and 2000/2001 MAP Progress Report, as well. That is why a much stronger effort was needed to fulfil all the conditions in the following two years. It started by ratifying so-called Model 2010 (Long-Term Development Plan of the Armed Forces) in 2002 aiming to establish relatively small, properly equipped and well trained armed forces. Although it was oriented mostly to the territorial and individual defence of the Slovak Republic, it already created the space for NATO integration. For the first time, the framework for needed resources guaranteed by governmental and parliamentary resolutions was defined in this document. Only three years later, and in the situation of notable delay in fulfilling the goals of Model 2010, new conceptual long-term document titled Long-term Plan of the Development of the Ministry of Defence until 2015 (Model 2015), was adopted. It emphasized building of expeditionary forces, but compared to the Model 2010 it predicted a lower level of defence spending. However, its implementation was also lagging behind, which was negatively reflected mostly in the process of modernization of the armed forces and capabilities development.

The transformation process was also slowed down by the negative effects of the economic crisis, but also by the general decline of interest in security issues by politicians. This was further reflected in the decreasing share of expenses devoted for defence (budget). This was far from the level corresponding with the growth of military capabilities requirements. Those were affected mainly by increased quantitative and qualitative participation of Slovakia in international crisis management operations and their demands on the human,

material and financial resources in particular. Therefore, the incoming government after the general elections in 2010, motivated by this negative situation, initiated the process of Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Its primary aim was to conduct a consistent and unbiased analysis of the state of the armed forces, and consequently outline the future developments in the horizon of 10 years. SDR revealed, as notes a White Book on Defence as one of the main products of the process, that given the years of existence of the Slovak armed forces the quality parameters of the Armed Forces transformation have not been met in several key areas:

- In the field of military personnel - despite a substantial reduction up to one-third and the professionalism of the Armed Forces, career growth of military personnel was halted, the aging of soldiers is deepening and manning of units is being reduced – all of that having an impact on the level of training, professional readiness and scope and quality of the tasks to be fulfilled;
- In the field of armaments and equipment - more than 70% of land armaments and equipment is over its life-cycle because no bigger modernization project for replacement of any of the main types of armaments and equipment has been conducted during the last twenty years. In other words the modernization has basically stopped;
- In the field of military capabilities - the loss of some of these capabilities occurred gradually, leading to a situation when the armed forces have only a limited range of capabilities of a limited quality level - interoperability with other allies according to NATO standards achieves only 54% of these capabilities, which substantially limits their ability for joint action in operations (White Book on Defence, 2013).

As was already mentioned, a crucial problem that significantly affects the extent and quality of the main activities of the Ministry of Defence is the discrepancy between the declared tasks on the one hand and the amount of resources allocated for their implementation on the other. This is a long-term problematic trend which had been continuously deepening over the 20 years of Slovakia's existence. Above all, a declared governmental commitment to allocate at least 2% of GDP for defence, which should ensure a favourable course of modernization and transformation of the armed forces, was never met. The government started to retreat from this commitment already a few years after Slovakia's accession to NATO. This is confirmed by the Ministry of Defence's budget data over the past decade. While in 2003 the share of the defence budget was 1.87% of GDP, in 2006 it was only 1.62% and dropped further to 1.53% (967 mil. EUR) in 2009.

Considerably faster decline, however, occurred in the next two years. Defence budget for 2011 did not exceed 1.08% of GDP (763 mil. EUR), which meant a decline from 2009 to 2011 in absolute terms by about 27%. But more importantly, these figures differed significantly compared to the long-term development plans approved by the government. Unlike the

reality, the planned figures for the years 2002-2005 (the Model 2010) ranged from 2% to 1.89% of GDP and for the period from 2006 to 2010 (the Model 2015) were at the level of 1.85 %. Newer drafts (the Model 2020 prepared in 2009) assumed the allocation of 1.53% of GDP starting in 2011. But as stated in the document Starting points of the Strategic Defence Review from August 2011, also this level of funding - substantially reduced compared to the commitment of Government - was not achieved in any given year. Consequently, the deficit in allocated resources has only in the period from 2002 to 2008 reached the figure of about € 970 million. During the next two years, this deficit it was even increased by around a further € 550 million, justified by an argument that it was due to the impact of the economic crisis. Thus, the total deficit in the allocated resources for the period 2002-2010 represents twice the budget of the Ministry of Defence in 2011 (Starting points of the Strategic Defence Review, 2011).

Equally worrisome is the development of a percentage comparison of the expenditure share on personnel and modernization. While the cost of personnel increased from about 50% to 65% in the last 5 years, the share of modernization spending decreased from about 16% to 8%. By this, Slovakia substantially moved away from a general NATO ambition to have all allies investing about one-fifth of their budgets to the development of their armed forces. Although the efforts of the current government to reverse this negative trend and once again move Slovakia closer to the expected figures are positive, the question is, however, how will these efforts translate into reality. Past experience encourages being cautious about it.

To stay objective, it has to be said that growth of personnel-related costs has very much to do with the professionalization of the army. Armed Forces of Slovakia are fully professional since January 2006, which has raised the overall expenditures for military personnel in the following years. But professionalization had also several other consequences. Firstly, the total number of armed forces that fell from about 25,500 to the current level of almost 16,000. It also had an essential impact on the changes in the composition of military personnel, whereas there was a substantial reduction of senior ranks and officers' functions in favor of lower ranks. The number of women in the armed forces was gradually increasing, too. It currently stands at around 9%. Rapid introduction of professionalism also did not allow resolving all conceptual and legislative aspects of professional services, which was later confirmed by numerous un-systemic changes in legislation. Professionalization has also significantly influenced the way of recruitment of soldiers, which was connected to the limited interest of young people (especially in some of the specializations), as well as to the available resources. The resources were largely drained by expenses for pensions for departing soldiers, which is a long-term problem in the budget allocation process. At the same time all of these aspects have resulted in the aging of military personnel and created undesirable "generation waves." To conclude, the potential of professionalism, which was at

the start a positive step, has not been fully taken advantage of when it comes to the quality and stability improvement of military personnel.

Creating a list of shortcomings and missed opportunities of the Slovak defence transformation effort, the quality of armaments and equipment of the armed forces is a necessary exercise. The already mentioned declining share of nominal and absolute expenditures on modernization had a significant impact on the acquisition of military equipment, which was not in accordance with the prepared long-term and medium-term plans. The negative consequence of this development was that in the entire period since 1993, no extensive modernization project of select main types of weapons and equipment has been completed. Although over 180 different types of weapons, equipment and materiel and communications and information systems has been put into use in the Armed Forces since 2003, this modernization has been too fragmented – producing a wide range of commodities mostly in small numbers. Despite the various political and professional ambitions and affirmations to ensure wider and conceptual modernization, adequate financial resources to enable successful completion of projects have not been allocated. Particularly critical appears to be the future of air force equipment (mostly transport helicopters and aircrafts as well as fighter jets), but also of some ground forces components (especially armored vehicles). But prospects for a fundamental change under the current unfavorable economic situation are not positive enough at least for two reasons: first, because for almost all the ruling administrations defense was far from one of their priorities; second, it is completely impossible to carry out the exchange of this equipment purely from the budget of the Ministry of Defence.

Combination of the above-mentioned factors had enormous implications on the capabilities of armed forces and on fulfilling NATO's criteria, as well. Many of them, promised continuously to the Brussels HQ in the framework of the so called "Force Goals" were postponed because of the inability to achieve them at the scheduled time. This fact causes that the interoperability of armed forces is far from the required quality, posing great limitations for their potential deployment with other allies. Moreover, it has consequences for the number of military tasks Slovakia is able to perform in the proscribed extent and quality. During the Strategic Defence Review out of ten tasks resulting from the legislation and strategic framework, only four have been identified as the crucial priorities for the future. These are as follows: 1. contribution to the international crisis management operations (up to 600 persons) including NATO Response Force and EU Battle Groups, 2. Protecting the air space in the framework of NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS) 3. keeping mechanized battalion in high readiness and host nation support, 4. domestic crisis management (so-called "assistant tasks").

International Engagement

The active participation of the Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations to support and promote peace in conflict resolution, world security and the fight against terrorism belong to the main components of foreign and security policy of the Slovak Republic. Since its establishment as an independent state Slovak Armed Forces successfully performed their tasks in 31 peacekeeping operations with the overall involvement of more than 10,000 soldiers.

The emphasis on active participation in international operations resulted from the concept of national defence after joining NATO which changed from the individual territorial defence towards its combination with the collective defence. This shift was defined in the above-mentioned strategic documents. Slovakia's participation in operations is legally binding mainly by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Based on its Articles 86 and 119, members of the Armed Forces can, with an agreement of the Slovak government, participate in humanitarian relief operations, observer missions, military exercises or international commitments of the common defence at longest for 60 days. For engagement in all other kinds of operations and mission, the agreement of the National Council is required. From international point of view, Slovakia is as a United Nations member and based on the UN Charter, committed to contribute to the protection of international peace and security. In addition, Slovakia as a member of NATO is bound by the Washington Treaty and the principle of collective defence obliged to provide appropriate assistance, as well as a direct deployment of its armed forces in the event of an attack on one or more member states (in case these states ask for such assistance).

Slovakia is now officially taking part in seven operations, in two of them however, it provides no real contribution. A total contribution approved by the Parliament was determined in the first half of 2013 - and is 717. The real deployment is at the level of 438 soldiers stationed as follows:

- ISAF operation (NATO) in Afghanistan – 252 mandate, 242 real contribution;
- ALTHEA operation (EU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina - 176 mandate, 35 real contribution;
- UNFICYP operation (UN) in Cyprus – 280 mandate, 158 real contribution;
- UNTSO observer mission (UN) in Syria and Israel – 5 mandate, 2 real contribution;
- EUMM observer mission (EU) in Georgia – 1 mandate, 1 real contribution;
- OSCE observer mission in Moldova – 1 mandate, 0 real contribution;
- OSCE observer mission in Georgia – 2 mandate, 0 real contribution.

A specific commitment is involvement in the NATO and EU Response Force. Currently, Slovak Republic participates in the preparation process of Visegrad Four countries' battle group, which should be at the stand-by stage in the first half of 2016. It builds on the previous

experience with the preparation of a multinational force in the Czech and Slovak battle group in the second half of 2009 and combined battle group of Germany, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia in the first half of 2010. So far, Slovakia has also contributed four times to the original form of NATO Response Force (NRF 7, NRF 8, NRF 10, and NRF 11) and committed to contribute 150 soldiers to this cluster after the revision of the method of its creation in 2010.

The funding of these contributions remains to be a problem to some extent because possible deployment is covered on an ad-hoc basis from defence budget and often at the expense of development and training of the armed forces. As was calculated during SDR, the cost of deployment of the unit size of a company (about 150 people) is estimated at about 60 million Euros, which is a significant part of the budget. Desirable solution would be to finance the deployment and maintenance of armed forces in operations from resources outside the budget of the Ministry of Defence, as it is the case in many other states.

Another problem in terms of the potential impact of the participation of Slovak soldiers in operations abroad on the capabilities of the armed forces was the deployment of predominantly inorganic units formed by professional soldiers from several units. A negative aspect was also in the characteristics of tasks being fulfilled - they were mostly support, engineering and guarding tasks due to the unavailability of the desired range and quality of capabilities of the Armed Forces. The consequence of this fact was that the benefits of participation in these units in foreign operations for capabilities development were lower than in case of other types of tasks. However, it is quite positive that in the past two years more emphasis is placed on more rigorous selection of units as well as the type of missions and tasks these units are going to perform abroad.

Instead of conclusions: Civil-military relations and “security community”

In the first years of the existence of Slovakia, the relations of civilians and civil society on one hand and armed forces on the other were to a great extent influenced by the culture of the previous regime. There was only a limited public control of the internal development of the Armed Forces and all the processes in the security sector (system) were seen as too distant from the interests of the ordinary people. Really interested in the defence issues were just a small number of professional associations and organizations based on the reminiscences of the former groupings. Thus the actions of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have been influenced only by the legislative framework adopted in the period before the establishment of the Slovak Republic (1990-1992). In that time the defence sector was predominantly under the control of the parliament (National Council) with several committees also having direct responsibilities towards security and defence matters: Committee for Financing and Budget, Committee for Defence and Security, Special Control

Committee for Control of the Action of Military Intelligence, Special Control Committee for Control of the Slovak Intelligence Service, and Special Control Committee for Control of National Security Bureau. Nevertheless, the Army remained the most trusted among all state institutions in Slovakia and has kept this position to this day. In the early 1990s the situation in the civil-military relations was influenced also by the limited transparency of defence issues and by very antagonistic position of the state leadership towards international and domestic non-governmental organizations and other professional institutions.

The situation has changed in the late 1990s when more open position of the government towards the Euro-Atlantic integration created the space for opening up the communication on the problematic issues to the wider public in Slovakia and abroad. That was a time when the germs of the real civil society in the security and defence sector have been established and the security community started to emerge. It had very much to do with at least two factors:

First, there was a wide support of external actors including significant role of international donors. Since 1998, the developments in the security sector in Slovakia were closely supported by a number of institutions from abroad, mostly, by NATO and the EU because it was in the general interest of the Western countries for the democratization process to continue.

Second, there was gradually a growing number of people educated in the spheres of international relations, political studies and security studies. These topics started to be incorporated in the curricula of several universities, including those which have almost no tradition in teaching and researching these subjects. Newly established Faculty of International Relations at the Matej Bel University, Faculty of European Studies at Comenius University or Faculty of International Relations at University of Economics are producing the majority of the decision-makers in this sector. Also the position of the Military Academy in Liptovsky Mikulas, specializing in military education, has an important position in the security sector of Slovakia.

Third, in general greater attention was paid by the public and the political leadership towards the issues of international position of Slovakia and developments on the international scene. Mostly the accession process to European Union helped this situation. And although security was not of primary public interest (rather issues of common currency or dismantling of borders), it exploited this positive attention, bringing about something like a “strategic security communication” helping to bring many important decisions into reality (e.g. the commitment to contribute by 2% of GDP to the defence budget). Unfortunately, all the security actors involved were not able to keep this positive momentum in the long-term perspective and the positive gains have gradually disappeared just several short years after

NATO and EU accession. One of the crucial consequences is the lack of professionals able to make relevant decisions on the political level among members of parliament, representatives of political parties.

Therefore, the biggest challenge for community of Slovak security sector in the upcoming years is to bring issues of security and defence back among the national priorities. For further development and keeping the ability to transfer knowledge in this area to other regions it is highly required Slovak governments and political leadership to pay more attention to the questions of modernization of Armed Forces and conditions for training of soldiers. Otherwise Slovakia`s position as a good example for others would be in jeopardy.

References

- [1] *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on May 25, 2001.
- [2] *Defence Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on September 23, 2005, <http://www.mosr.sk/data/files/832.pdf> (in Slovak only), 26.4.2013.
- [3] Kmec, Vladimír, Korba, Matúš, Ondrejcsák, Róbert, 2004, *Transformácia NATO a bezpečnostná a obranná politika SR*, Centre for Security Studies, Bratislava.
- [4] *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on March 27, 2001.
- [5] *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, approved by the National Council of the Slovak Republic on September 27, 2005, <http://www.mosr.sk/data/files/833.pdf> (in Slovak only), 26.4.2013.
- [6] Simon, Jeffrey, *Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and After*, NDU Strategic forum, Number 111, April 1997, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394276>, 25.4.2013.
- [7] *Starting points of the Strategic Defence Review*, adopted by the Government of the Slovak Republic on August 24, 2011, <http://www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.aspx/BodRokovaniaDetail?idMaterial=20144> (Slovak only), 26.4.2013.
- [8] *White Book on Defence*, adopted by the Government of the Slovak Republic on June 26, 2013, <http://www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.aspx/BodRokovaniaDetail?idMaterial=22495> (Slovak only), 27.6.2013.

About the authors

Ditrych, Ondřej - Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague and an assistant professor at Charles University in Prague. In the past, he was an associate fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), visiting fellow at CERI, Sciences Po Paris, visiting researcher at SWP Berlin and Fulbright research fellow at Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. He specialises in EU external relations (neighbourhood), Transatlantic Relations and terrorism.

Górka-Winter, Beáta - Research Fellow and program coordinator on international security at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), the leading Polish think tank, where she is responsible for the program dealing with international security. She authored or co-authored numerous publications concerning different aspects of Polish security policy, NATO, Common Security and Defence Policy, missile defence, Security Sector Reform etc. She is also a visiting lecturer at the PISM Diplomatic Academy, the National School of Public Administration (KSAP) and the European Security and Defence College. She graduated in international relations from the Warsaw University, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science and National Security Faculty. She was also international polling supervisor in Kosovo (2001) and Ukraine (2006). Since 2004 she is a member of Women in International Security association at the Georgetown University, member of the Editorial Board of "The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest" (2001-2004) and „Polish Diplomatic Review”.

Kalo, Otto - Ph.D candidate at National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary and defence and security policy expert. Fields of his research include state modernization related to security issues, energy policy and Eastern Partnership policy of European Union. During his carrier he worked in several positions in the administration of Hungary. He served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Central European Division. In the pre-accession period of Hungary to EU he contributed as an expert for the cabinet of the minister of interior. During the time of the Hungarian Presidency of EU he worked at the Ministry of Interior as a coordinator.

Majer, Marian – Research Fellow of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, based in Bratislava, Slovakia. He graduated from history and political science at the Comenius University in Bratislava in 2003 and later also from specialized educational programs at various institutions in Europe. In 2010 he completed his PhD. studies in theory of politics at the Comenius University. He started his professional career in TA3 News Television, between 2002 and 2004 he worked for the daily SME as a reporter of the foreign affairs news department. Since 2004 until 2012 he worked at the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic on various positions. He is actively publishing on different security and defence policy issues.

Makili-Aliyev, Kamal - leading research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies (Baku, Azerbaijan) dealing with international and regional security and military issues as well as international legal affairs; editor of „Caucasus International“ journal; has a working experience in Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in Institute on Human Rights (Azerbaijan) and in UNDP Azerbaijan; he is graduate of Baku State University, has a Master’s Degree in International Human Rights Law (Lund University, Sweden), Master’s Degree in Constitutional Law

(Academy of Public Administration, Azerbaijan) and a Legum Doctor degree (LL.D.) in International and Constitutional Law (Lund University, Sweden / Institute on Human Rights of Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences). Dr. Makili-Aliyev has three published academic books, two monographies and more than forty articles.

Novikova, Gayane - founding director of the Center for Strategic Analysis in Yerevan, Armenia. She is presently a Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University (2008-2013) and a Visiting Lecturer in the International Relations Department at Boston University (2011, 2013). Areas of expertise include international relations and regional security, including ethno-political conflicts and unconventional threats. She is the author of several books, including *The Conflict Potential of the South Caucasus: the Geopolitical Dimension* (with S. Sargsyan, 2011), and more than seventy articles. Since 2004 Dr. Novikova has been President of the George C. Marshall Center Alumni Association of Armenia.

Pkhaladze, Tengiz - chairman of International Centre for Geopolitical Studies (Georgian independent think tank). He started his career in the public service in 1992. As a public servant he held different jobs, including the positions of Head of the Diplomatic Protocol Service of the Head of State, Vice-governor of the Mtskheta-Mtianeti region, Consul of Georgia to the Azerbaijan Republic, Deputy Director of Department of Asia, Africa, Australia and Pacific Rim of MFA of Georgia. In 2008, he switched to the NGO sector. Mr. Pkhaladze is a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), Public Advisory Councils on Georgia's NATO and EU Integration of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgian Council on Foreign Relations and other various local and international professional networks. Mr. Pkhaladze is a guest professor of Georgian Institute of Public Affairs and guest professor of Caucasus University. He is editor and co-author a number of books about Russia's foreign policy towards neighboring countries.

Rácz, András - Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs in Budapest. Besides, he is lecturing at the Department of International Studies of the Péter Pázmány Catholic University. András Rácz defended his PhD in Modern History in 2008 at the Eötvös Loránd University. His main research interests cover the post-Soviet region, the Eastern neighbourhood policy of the EU and the foreign and security policy of Hungary and of the Visegrad region. He was research fellow of the EFSPS Programme of the Volkswagen Foundation, and also visiting fellow of the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund.

Rondeli, Alexander - President of the Georgian Foundation For Strategic and International Studies (since 2001). From 1997 to 2001 he served as a Director of the Foreign Policy Research and Analysis Center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Prior to that, in 1991-1996, Dr. Rondeli was a Chair of an International Relations Department at the Tbilisi State University. Ambassador Rondeli was a Research Fellow at London School of Economics and Political Science (1976-77), a Mid-career Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (1993-94), a Visiting Professor at Emory University (1991), Mount Holyoke College (1995) and Williams College (1992, 1995 and 1997). Ambassador Rondeli holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Tbilisi State University (1974). Dr Rondeli is a member of the Atlantic Council (USA) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies (UK).

Sargsyan, Sergey - Senior Analyst of the Center for Strategic Analysis “SPECTRUM”, Armenia since April 2004. He is also a member of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes (since April 2007) and co-founder and Member of the Board of the George C. Marshall Center Armenian Alumni Association (since April 2004). In his research Mr. Sargsyan focuses on dynamics of political and military processes in the South Caucasus and the Middle East, international terrorism, local conflicts and energy security. He wrote three monographs and more than 70 articles published both in Armenia and abroad. He also edited two and co-edited twelve books and collections of articles.

Střítecký, Vít - Assistant Professor at the Departments of International Relation, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague and Metropolitan University, Prague. He has studied postgraduate security and international relations programs at the Charles University, Uppsala University, Sweden and University of St. Andrews, Scotland. His major interests include security policies of Central European states, NATO and EU with a particular focus on the development of defense and security capabilities.

About CENAA

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) is an independent think-tank, focusing mainly on research, training and education, publication activities, as well as organizing conferences and seminars on contemporary issues of international relations, foreign and security policy.

Through our activities we have an ambition to play an active role in the strategic and foreign policy discussion in Slovakia, Europe and the Transatlantic area, to bring new ideas and visions for decision-makers, to participate in the education process of future foreign and security policy professionals, and to contribute to the transition, stability and sustainable development in all regions and countries where we are present through our educational and training programmes. CENAA's transition activities cover Afghanistan, Southern Caucasus, South-Eastern Europe, Tunisia, Eastern Europe among others.

